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ABSTRACT 
 
THE PROBLEM OF NORTHERN IRELAND AS A CASE STUDY OF FIRST 
WORLD NATIONALISM 
Gür, Asaf Çınar 
Master’s Thesis, Department of Political science and Public Administration 
Supervisor: Dr. Aylin Güney  
 
September 2001 
 
This thesis analyzes the challenges presented by ethnic movements in the first 
world to the sovereignty rights of nation-states. Modern states, that erased the former 
identities of their native populations, saw with the termination of the Cold War, the 
resurrection of those past identities, claiming self-determination. Some movements 
were successful in seceding and establishing new states. Whereas some other ethnic 
movements reached accommodations with power devolution mechanisms. However 
those that have not been able to achieve both, experienced continuous ethnic strife in 
the political sphere. The thesis explores the Northern Irish case as a First World 
nationalism that has not been able to achieve either. The Irish case is analyzed in order 
to identify reasons behind the existence and emergence of First World ethnic 
nationalisms. 
 
Key Words: Northern Ireland, Fragmentation, First World 
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ÖZET 
 
BİRİNCİ DÜNYA MİLLİYETÇİLİĞİNE ÖRNEK OLARAK KUZEY İRLANDA 
SORUNUN İRDELENMESİ  
Gür, Asaf Çınar 
Yüksek Lisans, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi:Dr.Aylin Güney  
 
Eylül 2001 
 
 Bu çalışma birinci dünya ülkelerinde ulus devletlerin egemenlik hakkına 
başkaldıran etnik hareketleri incelemiştir. Modern devletler kökünü kazıdıkları etnik 
kimliklerin, soğuk savaşın sona ermesini takiben self-determinasyon talepleri ile 
ortaya çıktıklarına tanık oldular. Bu cereyanlardan bir kısmı ayrılmak ve yeni 
devletler kurmak konusunda başarı göstermişlerdir. Bir kısmı, egemen merkezi 
yönetim ile düzenlemeler yaparak uzlaşma yolunu seçtiler. Bu iki amaca da 
ulaşamayan hareketler ise sonu gelmez etnik çatışmalar ile boğuşup durdular. Bu tez 
Kuzey İrlanda sorununu bu iki sonuca da ulaşamamış bir "birinci dünya 
milliyertçiliği" örneği olarak incelerken, halen birinci dünyada varlığını sürdürmekte 
olan diğer milliyetçiliklerin nedenlerini belirlemek amacına yöneliktir. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler:Kuzey İrlanda,Parçalanma,Birinci Dünya. 
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CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 
 
1800                            Act of Union signed between Britain and Ireland. 
1845                            Beginning of potato blight, which becomes known as the Great 
Famine, 1845-49. Nearly a million perish and another million 
emigrate, mainly to the US, Canada and Australia. Over the 
next fifty years the Irish population is halved, due mainly to 
emigration, from over 8 million in 1841 to 4.5 in 1901.  
1858  17 March          Foundation of the Irish Republican Brotherhood, also known as  
the Fenians, led by James Stephens in Ireland and John 
O’Mahoney in USA. 
1870                            Home Government Association formed under Isaac Butt to  
campaign for return of self-government to Ireland. 
1879                            Land League formed by Michael Davitt and Charles Stewart  
Parnell. 
1881  January              Fenian Bombing campaign in England, sponsored by the  
American Arm of the Fenians, the Clan-na-Gael. The bombings 
continue intermittently until 1887. 
          April                  Land Act introduced following widespread agitation on the  
land organized by the Land league. 
1886                            First Home Rule Bill defeated in House of Lords. 
1907                            Sinn Fein formed under the leadership of Arthur Griffith. 
1912                            Third Home Rule Bill passed. 
                                    Ulster Volunteer Force formed to oppose imposition of home  
 rule. 
1913                            Irish Volunteers formed to resist threat from UVF. 
                                    Irish citizen Army formed by James Connolly. 
1914                            Outbreak of First World War. 
                                    Irish Volunteers split over attitude to First World War with  
majority following call of John Redmond to enlist in British 
Army, leaving smaller group under Eoin Macneil opposed to 
involvement in the war. 
1916                            Easter Uprising in Dublin. 
          May                   Leaders of Rising, such as Patrick Pearse and James Connolly,  
executed. 
1917                            Eamon de Valera elected President of Sinn Fein.  
1919  21 January        Dail Eireann formed. Two policemen killed at Soloheadbeg, Co.  
Tipperay, signaling the start of the Anglo-Irish war. 
1920                           Attacks on police and army by units of Irish Volunteers,  
increasingly known as the IRA. 
British introduce Auxiliaries and ‘Black and Tans’ to support 
security forces. 
          December         Government of Ireland Act provides Northern Ireland with its  
own assembly and government at Stormont. 
1921  7 July                Northern Ireland parliament convenes. 
 
 x
          11 July              Truce declared between British and IRA. 
          6 December       Anglo-Irish Treaty reached between British and Irish  
delegations. 
1922  7 January           Dail approves Anglo-Irish Treaty, 64 votes to 57. 
           March               IRA splits into pro- and anti-Treaty factions. 
           April                 Anti-Treaty IRA or ‘irregulars’ set up headquarters at four  
Courts in center of Dublin. 
           June                  The pro-Treaty party, Cumann na n Gaedhal, win large  
majority in elections to the first Irish Free State parliament. 
           28 June             Free State forces attack IRA Irregulars at Four Courts,  
signaling start of Irish Civil war. 
          October             Free State government introduces severe measures to curb IRA  
violence. 
1923  27 April            IRA orders ceasefire bringing civil war to a close. 
1926  16 May             De Valera and some of his colleagues in Sinn Fein split from  
the anti-Treatyites to form Fianna Fail. 
1927  12 August         Fianna Fail deputies enter Dail for the first time. 
1931   October           Free State outlaws IRA. 
1932                           Fianna Fail wins general election. De Valera becomes Prime  
Minister. 
1933  9 September      Fine Gael Party formed out of old Cumann na nGaedheal. 
1936  June                  De Valera government declares IRA illegal. 
1937                           New Constitution changes name of Free State to Eire and  
claims territorial jurisdiction over Northern Ireland. 
1939  12 January        IRA ultimatum threatens to declare war on Britain unless its  
forces withdraw from Northern Ireland. 
          16 January        IRA begins bombing campaign in England. 
1940  January             Irish government passes Emergency Powers Act to intern IRA  
suspects. 
1948                           A Fine Gael/Clann na Phoblacta coalition wins power from  
Fianna Fail. 
Irish government declares the country a full republic. 
British government passes Ireland Act in which Northern 
Ireland’s position in UK guaranteed so long as the Stormont 
parliament wishes. 
1956  11 December    IRA launch border campaign against Northern Ireland. 
                                   Northern Ireland government introduces internment. 
1957  March               Fianna Fail returned to power in Irish general election. 
          July                  De Valera introduces internment in Irish Republic. 
1959                           Sean Lemass replaces de Valera as Irish premier. 
1963  March               Terence O’Neill becomes Prime Minister of Northern Ireland. 
1966                           Series of UVF killings -organization declared illegal in  
Northern Ireland. 
1967  January             Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association formed. 
1968  August              First Civil Rights march from Coalisland to Dunganon. 
 
 xi 
1969  January             Civil Rights march from Belfast to Derry attacked by loyalist  
crowd at Burntollet Bridge. 
          28 April            Terence O’Neill replaced as Northern Ireland Prime Minister by  
James Chichester-Clark. 
          12-14 August    Severe rioting in Bogside, Derry. 
          14 August         British troops sent onto streets of Derry. 
           December        Extraordinary IRA Convention approves ending of abstention.  
Opposition delegation form PIRA Army Council. 
1970  11 January         Split between Official and Provisional wings of IRA confirmed  
at Sinn Fein Ard Fheis when a third of delegates opposed to the 
ending of abstention walk out of to form Provisional Sinn Fein. 
           1 April             Ulster Defence Regiment formed to replace RUC B Specials. 
            July                 Curfew imposed by British Army on Lower Falls Area of West  
Belfast. 
            21 August        Social Democratic and Labor Party formed.  
            October           PIRA begins sustained bombing campaign, mainly against  
commercial targets. 
1971  20 March           James Chichester-Clark resigns as Northern Ireland Prime  
Minister and is replaced by Brian Faulkner. 
                                    Ulster Defence Association is formed. 
1972  30 January         Parachute regiment shoot dead thirteen men during a civil  
 rights demonstration in Derry, incident becomes known as 
‘Bloody Sunday’. 
          22 February       Official IRA bomb kills seven people at Parachute Regiment’s  
headquarters in Aldershot. 
          20 March          Six people killed by PIRA car bomb in Donegall Street, Belfast. 
          24 March          Stormont parliament suspended. Direct rule from Westminster  
introduced. William Whitelaw appointed Secretary of State for 
Northern Ireland. 
          20 May             OIRA announces ceasefire. 
          14 June             WhiteLaw grants special category status (political status) for  
prisoners convicted of paramilitary offences. 
           22 June            PIRA announces ceasefire. 
           1 July               UDA erects ‘no-go’ areas in loyalist districts to match those in  
nationalist areas of Derry and Belfast. 
           7 July               PIRA delegation meets William WhiteLaw in London. Nothing  
is agreed. 
           9 July               Ceasefire collapses over PIRA claims that British Army have  
broken truce during incident at Lenadoon, West Belfast. 
           21 July             Nine people killed in PIRA bombing assault in Belfast, the  
incident becomes known as ‘Bloody Friday’. 
1973  8 March            Border poll in Northern Ireland produces large vote for staying  
in UK.  
          December         Sunningdale Conference agrees to establish a Power sharing  
executive for the province. 
 
 xii 
1974  January             Power Sharing Executive takes office under leadership of Brian  
Faulkner. Immense unionist objections to Executive, especially 
to Council of Ireland. 
          15 May             Ulster Workers Council (UWC) strike aimed at bringing down  
Power Sharing Executive. 
           28 May            UWC strike causes collapse of Power Sharing Executive. 
           4 July               Secretary of State, Merlyn Rees, announces the setting up of a  
constitutional Convention to work out a new from of devolved 
government for the province. 
           10 December   PIRA announces a ceasefire to run from 22 December to 2  
January 1976. 
1975   16 January       PIRA calls off ceasefire. 
           10 February     PIRA suspends operations against security forces after new  
ceasefire negotiated. Incident centers set up by PSF to monitor 
ceasefire and liaise with Northern Ireland Office. 
           1 May              Polling takes place for Northern Ireland Constitutional  
Convention. 
1976   1 March           Special category status ended for those convicted of  
paramilitary offences. 
           9 March           Northern Ireland Convention dissolved after failure of  
participants to agree on a form of power sharing. 
           September        Protest in Maze Prison against the ending of special category  
status begins.  
1977  3 May                Loyalist strike launched as protest against the British  
government’s security policy and to demand return of majority 
rule in Northern Ireland.  
          13 May             Loyalist strike called off after falling to rally support and in face  
of the British government’s determination to resist striker’s 
demand. 
1979  5 May                Humphrey Atkins made new Secretary of State for Northern  
Ireland following election of Conservative government on 3 
May. 
1980  7 January           Constitutional conference convened at Stormont to debate  
forms of government for the province. 
          27 October        PIRA prisoners in Maze prison begin hunger strike to demand  
the restoration of political status. 
1981  5 May                Bobby Sands dies on the hunger strike causing widespread 
rioting in Belfast and Derry. 
          13 September    James Prior becomes Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. 
           3 October         Hunger strike called off after ten republican prisoners in all  
have died. 
1982  April                 James Prior issues White Paper on proposal for ‘rolling  
devolution’ Assembly which would agree on measures of self-
government for the province. 
         20 October        Voting takes place for ‘rolling devolution’ Assembly. PSF gain  
10.1 per cent of the vote in Northern Ireland  
 xiii
1983   9 June              British general election. PSF gains 13.4 per cent of the vote and  
Gerry Adams wins the seat of West Belfast. The Unionist 
parties win fifteen seats and the SDLP one seat. 
           13 November   Gerry Adams elected PSF president. 
1984   10 September   Douglas Hurd appointed new Secretary of State for Northern  
Ireland. 
           12 October       PIRA bomb planted at Grand Hotel, Brighton, explodes during  
Conservative Party Conference. conservative Prime Minister, 
Margaret Thatcher, narrowly escapes death, five others killed. 
1985   20 May             Local government elections - PSF wins 11.4 per cent of vote in  
the province and fifty-nine seats. 
           2 September    Tom King becomes new Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. 
           15 November   Irish Prime Minister, Garret FitzGerald, and Prime Minister,  
Margaret Thatcher, sign Anglo-Irish Agreement at 
Hillsborough, Co. Down. 
           23 November   Large Loyalist demonstration held in Belfast to protest at  
Anglo-Irish Agreement. 
1986   26 February     Loyalist day action against the Anglo-Irish Agreement causes  
widespread disruption to most areas of the province. 
           29  May           Tom King announces that Northern Ireland assembly will be  
dissolved. 
           2 November     PSF Ard Heis votes to end abstention from the Leinster House  
parliament in the Irish Republic. The vote causes some former 
PSF members to break away to establish Republican Sinn Fein. 
1987  19  February      In general election in the Irish Republic, PSF gain 1.9 per cent  
of the vote and fail to win a seat. 
          12  June             In British general election PSF gains 11.4 percent of the vote in  
Northern Ireland. Gerry Adams retains his seat. 
1988  January              PSF - SDLP talks begin, end of talks on 2 September. 
          19 October        Home Secretary, Douglas Hurd, announces restrictions on the  
broadcast of interviews with members of paramilitary 
organizations and their supporters. 
1989  January              PSF president, Gerry Adams, publicly cautions PIRA over  
increasing number of civilian deaths caused by its operations.  
          17 May             Local elections in Northern Ireland sees PSF win 11.3 per cent  
of vote. 
          16 June             In general election in Irish Republic PSF gain only 1.2 per cent  
of the vote. 
          24 July              Peter Brooke becomes new Secretary of State for Northern 
Ireland. 
1991  7 February        PIRA mount mortar attack on Downing Street, London, while  
(Gulf War) War Cabinet is in session; no one is injured. 
           30 April           Inter-party talks on the political future of Northern Ireland  
involving the constitutional parties get underway in Stormont. 
 
 
 xiv 
           3 July               Following protracted procedural difficulties the inter-party talks  
in Northern Ireland. 
1992  10 April            Westminster General Elections, the Conservative government of 
John Major elected. In Northern Ireland PSF’s votes declines 
to 10 per cent. Gerry Adams loses the seat of West Belfast 
           11 April           Sir Patrick Mayhew appointed Secretary of State for Northern  
Ireland. 
           6 July               Political talks among the constitutional parties in Northern  
Ireland opened at Lancaster Hose in London. 
1993  11 April             John Hume, leader of the SDLP, and PSF president, Gerry  
Adams, meet each other in the first of a series of meetings, 
which become known as the “Hume-Adams” talks. 
           15 November  Gerry Adams, president of PSF, reveals that his party has been  
in prolonged talks with the British government. 
           15  December The British and Irish governments announce a joint statement on  
Northern Ireland, known as the Downing Street declaration. 
1994  11 January        The Irish government lifts the Republic’s broadcasting  
restrictions on PSF. 
          9 March            PIRA launch mortar attack on Heathrow airport, London. 
          5 April              PIRA begins three-day ceasefire in order to facilitate  
clarification of the Downing Street Declaration. 
          13 May             PSF submits questions for clarification to the Irish government. 
          19 May             Northern Ireland Office publishes response to PSF’s lists of  
clarification questions. 
          24 June             PSF conference in Letterkenny, Co. Donegal, rejects key  
sections of the Downing Street Declaration. 
          31 August         PIRA announces indefinite ceasefire. 
          13 October       The Combined Loyalist Military command declares a ceasefire. 
1995  7 March            Northern Ireland Secretary, sets out the conditions for Sinn Féin 
to join all-party talks, 
          September        David Trimble takes over from James Molyneaux as leader of  
the Ulster Unionist Party. 
          24 November   The British and Irish governments launch 'twin-track initiative'  
(preparatory talks and the establishment of an international 
body to oversee decommissioning and other matters).  
          30 November   US President Bill Clinton visits Belfast, Derry and Dublin. 
1996  24 January       The international body proposes six principles of democracy and  
non-violence as conditions for entry to all-party talks ('the 
Mitchell principles'). 
          9 February        The IRA ends its ceasefire by bombing South Quays, London 
1997  31 October       Mary McAleese is elected President of the Republic, succeeding  
Mary Robinson. 
          1 May               Tony Blair's Labor Party wins a big victory in the UK general  
election; Mo Mowlam becomes Northern Ireland Secretary. 
          20 July              The IRA institutes a second ceasefire.  
 
 xv
          9 September      Sinn Féin subscribes to the Mitchell principle; some hard-line  
Republicans quit the Provisional IRA in protest. 
          7 October         ‘All-party’ negotiations commence. 
          27 December    The Loyalist Volunteer Force leader Billy Wright shot dead in 
the Maze prison, seven Catholics killed in revenge by Loyalist 
paramilitaries. 
1998  January-March  The Ulster Democratic Party and Sinn Féin are suspended from 
the talks at different times because of their associates’ violence. 
          10 April            The Good Friday Agreement is negotiated by most of Northern  
Ireland's political parties and the British and Irish Governments.  
          22 May             The Good Friday Agreement is endorsed in referendums North  
(71%) and South (94%).  
          15 August         The ‘Real IRA’ kills 28 people in a bomb attack in Omagh, Co.  
Tyrone.  
          16 October        John Hume and David Trimble awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. 
1999  2 December      The end of direct Westminster rule in Northern Ireland: a  
devolved government takes office , with David Trimble (UUP) 
as First Minister and Seamus Mallon (SDLP) as Deputy First 
Minister; other ministers are from the UUP (3), the SDLP (3), 
the DUP (2) and Sinn Féin (2). The DUP ministers refuse to 
attend cabinet meetings while Sinn Féin ministers are present.  
          2 December      The Irish government replaces Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish  
constitution, the British government repeals the Government of 
Ireland Act 1920, the IRA appoints an intermediary to enter 
discussions with the decommissioning body headed by General 
John de Chastelain. 
2000                            The Good Friday Agreement has a difficult year, with varying  
degrees of deadlock on the decommissioning, demilitarization 
and policing issues. 
The Provisional IRA, notwithstanding its ostensible ceasefire, is 
responsible for numerous 'punishment' attacks and 'expulsions'. 
The 'Real IRA' and 'Continuity IRA' continue their terrorist 
campaigns having imported arms from Croatia. 
2001  7 June                Elections in Ulster. 
          8 June                Irish voters rejected the treaty of Nice. 
          1 July                 David Trimble resigned from the power-sharing government  
because of the deadlock on decommissioning of arms. 
           3 August          Real IRA bomb attack in London center. 
           14 August        PIRA announced that it has annulled the ceasefire. 
 
Sources: 
-Smith. M.L.R .1995. Fighting For Ireland? The Military Strategy of the Irish  
Republican Movement. London: Routledge. 
- A Timeline of Irish History 
http://www.rootsweb.com/~fianna/history/index.html 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The second half of the twenty-century has seen the emergence of nation-states that 
have freed themselves from their former occupiers and took their place in the 
international community as ‘sovereign states’. That period which was accepted as the 
period of decolonization created an environment of hope for the new emerging states. 
It was thought, that by replicating the countries labeled as the “First World”, they 
could acquire the same levels of economic, social and political development. 
However, in the course of time the newly formed entities had some major problems 
that were threatening to break them into parts, or had already broken them into a 
number of states. This process, which continued during the Cold war era, reached 
even a greater level with the end of the Cold war (Hannum, 1998).  
 
Nonetheless, what was differing from the previous experiences was that as a surprise 
of most, in the last decade, the fragmentation processes was not limited to Third-
World countries but was experienced by the leading developed countries as well. Prior 
to the fragmentation experiences in developed countries, those events were considered 
as major symptoms of processes of misintegration, or the failure of the modernization 
project. After the ferocious events that led to the disintegration of Yugoslavia into a 
multitude of states, as well as the breakup of the Russian empire and more recently the 
NATO intervention of Kosovo, a set of ethnic theories were developed to satisfy the 
need to understand the raison d'être of those brutal separations. Another aspect of the 
fragmentation process related with the first world was the re-emergence of identities 
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that were considered as lost, forgotten. Those were thought of having been erased in 
the cultural homogenization process of the enlightenment-guided nation-states, 
experienced a resurgence in the form of sub-regional claims for self-determination 
ranging from autonomy to regional independence. A factor leading to those structures 
is the threat that the nation-states are experiencing faced with the globalization of the 
economy, a slow but relentless act that can lead to the dismemberment of the modern 
state. What is more, there is the formation of arrangements that encompass the nation-
states such as the European Union project that will materialize with the usage of one 
currency, the Euro. Although not new, the Northern Ireland issue has persisted from 
the beginning of the twenty-century until the present. What makes the Northern 
Ireland case interesting is that it is located in the Northwestern part of Europe, where 
the first nation states emerged, and the industrial revolution started. Briefly, as 
O’Sullivan (1986) used saying that it is a “first world nationalism,” and that makes it 
useful for to pursue the understanding of the persistence or re-emergence of ethnic 
affiliations on the Western block.  
 
The first chapter will consist of theories that will establish the basis of the ensuing 
analyses. In the first chapter, the aim will be at first to show how the modern state 
came into existence. What were the historical consequences that helped its 
formulation and what are its consequences? Second, the challenges to the nation-state 
will be given in a detailed manner to provide an accurate understanding of the events 
that are threatening the existence of nation-states. Within that, the reasons for ethnic 
challenges will be explained, as well as the meaning of ethnicity in the identity-
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shaping process, and finally how the link between ethnicity and nationalism was 
formed. Third, the basic sociological approaches to ethnic nationalism will be given in 
order to build the theoretical framework in which the analysis of Irish affairs will be 
dealt with. Lastly theories of secession will be dealt with separately from the other 
theories. These answer the justification for making a claim to secession will be 
analyzed.  
 
Accordingly, the second chapter will focus on the origins of the Irish problem. It will 
concentrate on the British occupation, and the results that it created. Second the 
colonization of Ireland by foreign forces, with the immigration of a massive 
population that brought a new religion, which is be the most important basis of the 
crisis. Third, the interaction between the members of two different religions, 
especially violence that is used to create differentiation among the population will be 
studied. Fourth, the significance of the Orange Order for the native Irish population, 
its leading role in creating a common cause for Protestants will be explained. Fifth, 
the expectation of emancipation of the Catholics by constitutional ways, the “Home 
Rule” experience, and its effect upon Irish nationalism will be given. Lastly, the birth 
of the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the military branch of the Irish Catholic 
emancipative experiment will be analyzed.  
 
Chapter three will be about the Northern Irish problem after World War I. At first, the 
socio-political developments will be given since that period coincides with the Irish 
rebellion attempt, and an attempt to form an independent state apart from Britain. 
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Second, the Anglo-Irish treaty that formally created the Free Irish state and the civil 
war that was fought in order to form that state will be explained. Third, the emergence 
of the Ulster Republic and its repressive policies, with respect to its Catholic minority 
through the formation of an apparatus that will systematize the discriminatory policies 
of the Protestants. Fourth, the ways in which that repressive apparatus was legitimized 
and how the state consolidated itself will be discussed. Fifth, the challenges that the 
Southern part of the island had to experience in order to evolve into the Irish republic 
from the Irish Free State which was dependent on the British Crown will be given. 
Sixth and last, the impact of the Second World War will be reviewed. 
 
Chapter Four will deal with the issue of decolonization and its effect on the Northern 
Ireland question. At first the peculiarities of that period will be given. Second, that 
period will be analyzed in accordance with the British decolonization and the 
Commonwealth issues. Succeedingly, the problems of Northern Ireland after the war 
will be analyzed. 
 
Chapter Five will deal with the structural changes in Northern Ireland in the 1970s. At 
first, the effects of the economic environment that are reflected on the politics of the 
Republic of Ireland will be introduced. The oil crisis of the 1970s and the fluctuations 
in international markets and their effect on the Irish economy will be given to show its 
impact on the political system of Ireland. Second, the admission of Ireland to the 
European Economic Community, and its reflection on the Northern Ireland issue will 
be shown. Third, the Irish-British relations and their improvement that have created 
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differences on the issue of Northern Ireland will be demonstrated. Lastly, the 
beginning of the armed struggle of the IRA and the political side of the armed struggle 
will be explained.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
THEORIES  OF  NATION BUILDING  
 
 
Nowadays the nation-state is under serious challenges. Groups aim to change, to 
undermine the status of unitary nation-states, and bring national fragmentation onto 
the agenda. The concept of fragmentation has a large scope, and ranges from 
decentralization and autonomous administration to secessionist claims. For a better 
understanding of the fragmentation process, the basic tenets of the nation-state, 
especially its ways of deriving its legitimacy will be shown; then, after changes in the 
political and social environment, which helped to speed up the process of 
fragmentation, will be dealt. Lastly with the help of the theories of secessionism, 
developed throughout the last years, factors causing the re-emergence of regional 
loyalties and resurgence of sub-national territorial claims in the areas considered, as 
the “First World” will be explained in extenso. 
 
1.1 The  Nation  State  and  its  Formulation    
Keating argues that “Nationalism is a doctrine of self-determination”(1996:1), 
important nation-building process. Nationalism should not only be understood as a 
form of politics, argues Breuilly (1994), since it can only be applicable in a particular 
political context, it has also the aim to establish that special context to promote its 
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own objectives. The climax of the nationalist project can only be achieved by the 
establishment of the modern state. Benedict Anderson (1991) finds that one of the 
pillars of the modern state, the nation, is a cultural construction whose meaning has 
created controversies1. Therefore Anderson defines the nation as an “imagined 
political community” that is “limited” and “sovereign”.  
The nation is imagined as limited because even the largest of them, has finite, if 
elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations. It is imagined as sovereign 
because the concept was born in an age in which Enlightenment and Revolution 
were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely ordained, hierarchical dynastic 
realm ...Finally it is imagined as a community, because, regardless of the actual 
inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always 
conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. (Anderson, 1991: 7)       
 
Anderson claims that what made possible the emergence of these “imagined 
communities” by superseding “the imagined community of Christendom” was an 
“interaction between a system of production and productive relations (capitalism), a 
technology of communications (print) and the fatality of human linguistic activity” 
(1991: 43). The convergence of capitalism and print technology paved the way for a 
new form of imagined community that transformed itself to the modern nation. The 
emerging bourgeoisie acquired a national character since it operated within a “pre-
existing framework of ethnic communities and states that were frequently locked in 
rivalry and warfare”(Smith, 1991:166). At first, merchants and later industrial 
capitalism increased the level of competition. Resulting in wars that glued the nation 
and the territorial unitary state, the contribution of the expanding capitalist system was 
                                                 
1 Theorists of nationalism have often been perplexed, not to say irritated, by these paradoxes: (1) the 
objective modernity of nations to the historian’s eye vs. their subjective antiquity in the eyes of 
nationalists. (2) The formal universality of nationality as a socio–cultural concept –in the modern world 
everyone can, should, will ‘have’ a nationality, as he or she has a gender- vs. the irremediable 
particularity of its concrete manifestations, such that, by definition, ‘Greek’ nationality is sui generis. 
(3) The ‘political’ power of nationalisms vs. their philosophical poverty and even incoherence. See 
Anderson, Benedict. 1991. Imagined Communities.                
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“to strengthen the existing inter-state system in Europe, and through its wars and 
rivalries to help the process of crystallizing national sentiment in the state’s dominant 
ethnie”(Smith, 1991: 166). Hall (1996) argues that a nation is not only a political 
community but also an entity that produces meaning, “a system of cultural 
representation”. National culture is important in providing symbols of identity for it 
creates guidelines of communications and means of interpreting social reality in a 
society (Keating, 1996). Common language can be shown as an example of a 
mechanism, which enables the individual to participate in the civic life since it serves 
to integrate in the society. 
 
National history and culture are the tenets of national discourse2. According to 
Keating (1996) the nationalist ideology has led to the construction of civic values 
since the “legitimacy” was driven within the rules of the newly born “liberal 
democracy,” which required a certain level of participation by its citizens. So this 
framework, the development of popular sovereignty, has led to the development of the 
representative institutions, which was the most important element in the development 
of liberal democracy. Breuilly (1994) also suggested that the nature of the modern-
state has necessitated a specialized kind of political leadership in a civil society in 
order to reclaim needs from the state for various projects. 
                                                 
2 Keating quotes Mill saying: “This feeling of nationality may have been generated by various causes. 
Sometimes it is the effect of identity of race or descent. Community of language, and community of 
religion, greatly contributes to it. Geographical limits are one of its causes. But strongest of all is 
identity of antecedents; the possession of a national history, and consequent community of 
recollections; collective pride and humiliation, pleasure and regret, connected with the same incidents 
in the past.” See Keating, Michael. 1996. Nations Against the State. 
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Another important point is how the model of imagined communities was constructed. 
Hall (1996) shows that five types of narratives were used for that aim. First, the 
“narrative of a nation” is repeated in national history, literature, media and popular 
culture. “These provide a set of stories, images, scenarios, historical events, national 
symbols and rituals which stand for, or represent, the shared experiences, sorrows and 
triumphs and disasters which give meaning to the nation” (Hall, 1996: 613). Second, 
emphasis is given to “continuity, tradition and timelessness” (Hall, 1996) by creating 
a national identity that serves many purposes. 
Perhaps the most important of its functions is to provide a satisfactory answer to 
the problem of personal oblivion. Identification with the ‘nation’ in a secular 
area is the surest way to surmount the finality of death and ensure a measure of 
personal immortality...Even more important, it can offer a glorious future 
similar to its heroic past. In this way it can galvanize people into following a 
common destiny to be realized by succeeding generations. But these are the 
generations of ‘our’ children; they are ‘ours’ biologically as well as spiritually, 
which is more than any class or Party can promise. So the promise of life 
immortal in our posterity seems genetically vindicated. (Smith, 1991:161) 
 
Third, on re-inventing tradition3 by for example generalizing some local traits in the 
whole nation as a discursive strategy, fourth, by giving emphasis on foundational 
myths4 in an aim to propagate the idea of difference from other nations. Fifth and last, 
in some cases, national identity is also based “on the idea of the pure, original people 
or folk” (Hall, 1996).  
 
                                                 
3 Hall quotes Hobsbawn and Ranger. “The invention of tradition: Traditions which appear or claim to 
be old are often quite recent in origin and sometimes invented … [ means ] …a set of practices, … of a 
ritual or symbolic nature which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviors by repetition 
which automatically implies continuity with a suitable historical past”. See Hall, Stuart .1996. 
Modernity: An Introduction to Modern Societies.      
                                                                                                                                                                      
4 Foundational myth: a story, which locates the origin of the nation, the people, and their national 
character so early that they are lost in the minds of, not  “real ” but “mythic” time. See Hall, Stuart 
.1996. Modernity: An Introduction to Modern Societies 
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Keating claims that nationalism serves as a mechanism to bridge the gap, which exists 
between the individual, created by the enlightenment and the collective area where the 
individual is embedded. “Nationalism thus functions as a civil religion, legitimating 
the political order, providing social cohesion and transcending ethnic and other 
particularistic differences’’(1996: 13). Hall criticizes the discourse of national culture. 
It constructs identities, which are ambiguously placed between past and future. 
It straddles the temptation to return to former glories and the drive to go 
forwards ever deeper into modernity. Sometimes national cultures are tempted 
to turn the clock back, to retrout defensively to that ‘lost time’ when the nation 
was ‘great’ and to restore past identities. This is the regressive, the anachronistic 
element in the national cultural story (Hall, 1996: 615) 
 
The discourse of national culture shapes the formation of the nation-state. Keating 
argues that the term nationalism also referred to two type of nation–building methods, 
the ethnic and civic. “The ethnic theory of nation-building holds that nations are 
constituted by ethnic groups” (Keating, 1996: 3). In that model membership of the 
national community is accorded on the ascriptive criteria. “Civic nationalism” is a 
different mode of nation building. Individual agreement rather than ascriptive identity 
(birth, ethnic origin) is important in that model. Civic nationalism goes from the 
individual to the nation where individual rights and duties are derived from a common 
nationality. Since civic nationalism, which has a broader appeal than ethnic 
nationalism, lacks the emotive side of ethnic nationalism, both models are used in 
discourses depending of the audience and circumstances (Keating, 1996). 
 
Each state has used the nationalist doctrine in order to prove that it is sovereign in a 
certain area that means that it has the ultimate authority within a territory, which has 
fixed boundaries. The national theory focuses on common aspects, which exist within 
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those boundaries, while at the same time it tries to show the differences lying outside 
the borders. The concept of the “other” is very important in the nationalist ideology    
-since a competition is supposed to exist within states- the state should have the 
monopoly of power within its territory to be able to not loose the competition.  
Externally the limit upon sovereignty is set by the sovereignty of other 
states...internally the sovereignty of the state is limited...by the distinction 
between the public and the private spheres. In the public sphere the state 
exercises sovereignty directly; in the private sphere it does no more than provide 
ground rules for dealings between individual and groups...This idea of the state 
is marked by internal tensions between universality and particularity and 
between boundlessness and limitation...The state is universal in that was it 
envisaged is a world made up wholly of a number of such states. There should 
be no area or person not subject to the rule of the state (Breuilly, 1994: 369)  
 
The citizens are subject to equal treatment as long as they belong to that nation. Smith 
argues that “to be legitimate in these terms a nation-state must show that its citizens 
are sharply differentiated from ‘foreigners’, but equally undifferentiated from each 
other internally, as far as it is possible”(1991:169). So a different identity that 
challenges the sole identity preconceived by the states in strong state tradition was 
seen as a failure against the outsiders and obstacle to the modern states’ goal, the idea 
of progress, which was taken from the enlightenment thinkers5. Toland (1993) 
criticizes the history of state building by saying that who have captured power have 
tried all manners to “eradicate ethnicity through genocide” by labeling them as 
“tribalism” or “discredit it with the mind frame of modernization,” or by not taking 
                                                 
5 Keating and Bartkus quoting from J.S. Mill: “Nobody can suppose that it is not more beneficial for a 
Breton or a Basque of French Navarre to be…a member of the French nationality, admitted on equal 
terms to all the privileges of French citizenship… than to sulk on his own rocks, the half-savage relic of 
past times, revolving in his own little orbit, without participation or interest in the general movement of 
the world. The same remark applies for the Welshman or the Scottish highlander as members of the 
British nation”. See Keating, Michael. 1996. Nations Against the State. Also see Bartkus, Viva 
Ona.1999. The Dynamic of Secession.   
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those aspirations into account in daily national policies but rather “relegate it to local” 
level of politics.  
 
Following the idea of progress, nationalism was also used in the economic arena in 
order to create unified and integrated markets within the nation states by attacking in 
the name of the common good the particular interests of guilds, towns and 
corporations. The state also used its means to develop and strengthen internal markets 
with policies, like tariff protection and promotion of trade. With the depression of the 
1930s the state adopted protectionism against international competition. The state also 
used the economy as a device to build the nation internally. With state protectionism 
native capitalist and business classes were created, which have increased employment 
levels and ameliorated the situation of workers. With the rise of the nation-state, 
capitalists became increasingly national capitalists rather than local or international. 
The industrial proletariat, that was both internationalist and localist, and opposed 
protectionism by seeing it as a device to protect the interests of the employer, realized 
in the twentieth century that it had vested interests in the nation-state and acted in 
favor of protectionism as a means of defending jobs (Keating, 1996). The nation-state 
has led the creation of prosperity as a means of legitimizing itself by assuming wider 
responsibilities and adopting Keynesian policies. In those years “basic industries such 
as energy, transport, coal and steel were taken into public ownership”(1996: 32). Neo-
corporatist policies that brought together the employer, the workers and the state 
created a ground for the state to consolidate its position vis ặ vis its internal enemies 
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since the state had obtained the opportunity to affect nearly all of the spheres of public 
life. 
 
1.2 Challenges  to  the  Nation-State   
Since some environmental factors, which eased the way for the nation state, to 
strengthen and legitimize itself, have changed; the nation state now is threatened of 
losing its sovereignty in three dimensions (Keating, 1996). The first dimension which 
is called “from above” by Keating (1996) results from the economical change that the 
world experienced, the phenomenon that is called “globalization” threatens the status 
quo which existed since the French revolution. The nation-state owes its existence to 
the modern understanding of sovereignty. This theory was conceived for a world of 
independently dominant sovereign nation states, but nowadays with 
internationalization of the economy the ability of states to pursue economic policies 
through by-passing multinational corporations has decreased. The globe has witnessed 
plenty of changes since the Second World War. As Smith (1991) argues the 1970s and 
1980s saw the relaxation of relations, that had reached incomparable levels of threat 
after World War II, between two power blocks; communism and capitalism .The 
bipolarity was relaxed with, at first, increasing political and economic forces of states 
such as West Germany, Japan, China; and second by the emergence of the European 
Economic Union and lastly by the impact of “perestroika” on the Eastern European 
countries and the Soviet Union. The emergence of transnational corporations, aided by 
the rapid growth of mass telecommunications, their ability to plan long-term 
strategies, and their presence on many continents coincided with the period of 
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relaxation, which resulted in the “formation of an international division of labor in 
which states with different levels of development are inserted, often through the 
operations of the transnational corporations”(Smith, 1991: 154). According to Keating 
(1996) the economic environment of competing states doesn’t exist anymore since the 
economic corporations are not national anymore, as they changed their character from 
being national to transnational entities there appeared new allies and new enemies. 
Barnet and Cavanagh argue that the competition between the states continue but in a 
different manner: 
The competition based in a handful of developed industrial nations to reach the 
affluent and the credit-worthy is so intense that issues of trade are becoming the 
national-security preoccupation of the 1990s. A world in which national purpose 
defined by global economic competition just as it was measured by territorial 
expansion is vulnerable to global economic warfare. The limits of the global 
market are pushing nations into economic and political conflict even as scarcity 
of living space and natural resources not so long ago pushed them into wars of 
conquest (1994: 176)   
 
Nation-states have also lost the ability to control the private economic sector. States 
guided by economic change pursued the path led by transnational corporations, and 
formed blocks where new allies came together. This led to continental rapprochement 
and integration. There appeared models like North America Free Trade Association 
(NAFTA), an integration model where national governments are favored compared to 
the European Union model, where new institutions that have the ability to by-pass 
central governments gaining more and more power to deal with the internal affairs of 
the eroding nation state (Keating, 1996). 
Economic necessities are compelling states to surrender parts of their 
sovereignty to supra-national organizations. The European Union is a good 
example: no longer do the parliaments of the member states have the powers, 
which they formally had. (Billig, 1995: 133) 
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Two basic arguments are used to legitimize the damage caused by transnational 
forces, which have created massive population movements and growing levels of 
environmental pollution throughout the globe. “The first claims that advanced 
industrial capitalism has given birth to giant economic and political units that render 
the ‘nation state’ obsolete”. (Smith, 1991:155) The agent of such obsolescence, it is 
argued by Smith (1991), is the emergence of giant corporations that acquired 
“complex computerized networks and package imagery” which make them very 
effective.  
The second argument sees the super session of the nation as part of the move to 
a ‘post-industrial’ society. While nations were functional for an industrial world 
and its technological and market needs, the growth of the ‘service society’ based 
on computerized knowledge and communications systems overleapt national 
boundaries and penetrated every corner of the globe. Only continental cultures, 
ultimately a single global culture, can fulfill the requirements of a post-
industrial knowledge-based society. (1991:155).  
 
The economic development and increasing levels of trans-national forces, and the 
increasing power of the supra-national institutions encourage, give incentives to the 
second level of challenge, which is called by Keating (1996) “from below”. This is the 
resurgence of loyalties that were assumed to disappear by the modernists; those are 
the sub-territorial movements, which differentiate themselves from the uniform 
understanding of the nation-states. These movements exert regional claims with 
varying degrees. Examples are the various peripheral nationalist movements which 
tried to decrease the capacity of their central governments. Billig says, “The very 
differences and attachments which the state sought to erase in its modernist quest for 
uniformity are now being revived. Some of these newly revived identities are 
constructed in the image of nationhood”(1995: 133). 
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In the space of little more than a generation, regional assertiveness has been felt 
in most of the countries of the EC. Whether in Scotland or Corsica or Catalonia, 
Lombardy, Flanders or the Basque country, the seamless and integral nature of 
the nation-state has been called into question, as regionalist movements have 
sought   to shake off the more or less oppressive yoke of central control and to 
stake their claim to varying degrees of autonomy and regional self-expression. 
(Wagstaff, 1994:3).  
 
Billig (1995) argues however, that those nations that succeed in achieving 
independence will not have the same opportunities, which the earlier sovereign states 
enjoyed; they will face challenges from supra-national organizations, as well as from 
the sub-national identities. They will be threatened by the same processes that helped 
them to create their own states.  
 
The third level of challenge which is called by Keating (1996) “lateral pressures” is 
the result of the two dimensions. The national state loses its ability, the monopoly of 
mobilizing collective action since new forms of identifications are becoming more 
important than the former national identity, which become less important and useless 
in some cases. It is argued that identities are defined rather by consumption patterns 
than by national denomination (Billig, 1995).  
The result is that the processes of globalization, which are diminishing 
differences and spaces between nations, are also fragmenting the imagined unity 
within those nations The state, declining in its powers, is no longer able to 
impose a uniform sense of identity. With the pressure for national uniformity 
removed, a variety of other forces are released. Within the national territory, 
multiple narratives and new identities are emerging. Local, ethnic and gender 
identities have become the site for post-modern politics (Billig, 1995:132-133) 
 
Keating argues (1996) that, the Single European Act (SEA) is the typical example of a 
treaty that undermines the center’s authority since the regions will have direct 
representation and say in the European Union (EU), by-passing the sovereign nation-
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states. Billig (1995:141) on the contrary sees the EU as “some sort of permanent 
alliance and trading agreement between states, which jealously preserve their 
historical independence”. The issue of limiting migration shows that states have not 
evaporated and are still sovereign, since there is no free market of labor in the world. 
Also Barnet and Cavanagh believe that the nation-state is still the dominant unit of 
governance in the world, since: 
The nation-state is far from disappearing. On the contrary, the Cold War victory 
has unleashed a revival of nationalism, a bloody nightmare in the Balkans that is 
a prototype of the national-security crises of the 1990s. Every ethnic group and 
religious faction, it seems, wants its own banner. National governments 
everywhere are getting bigger, but are neither more effective nor popular.  
(1994:20). 
 
1.2.1  Re-emergence  of  Ethnic  Challenge  as  a  Fragmentary  Force   
Hannum (1998) signals that “ethnic conflict has replaced the Cold War as the primary 
interest of political and military theorists, and even conflicts that may be primarily 
political or economic in nature are frequently given an ethnic cast”. In effect, the end 
of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia were 
accompanied by new ethnic and national claims, since “about a dozen new ethnic 
wars erupted in the erstwhile Soviet empire between 1988 and 1992” (Gurr, 2000:2) 
and more than 24 wars started or finished in the same period in the southern part of 
the globe, most of them not directly related to the end of the Cold War. Gurr (2000) 
adds that the interventions in Kosovo and East Timor were only taken after long 
tentative of discussions aiming reconciliation with constitutional means, and when 
those failed, military intervention took place. The participation of the United States, 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United Nations, and Australia 
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was proof that ethnic management had become an international responsibility. Gurr 
(2000) claims that by the mid-1990s the number of ethnic groups using violence as a 
tool fell from 115 to 95 6, and that between 1993 and the beginning of 2000; the 
number of wars for self-determination had decreased.  
During the 1990s, 16 separatist wars were settled by negotiated peace 
agreements, and 10 others were checked by ceasefires and ongoing negotiations 
...Less visible than the shift toward settling separatist wars is a parallel trend 
toward accommodating ethnic demands that have not yet escalated into armed 
conflict. Leaders of ethnic movements appeal to minorities’ resentment about 
rights denied - political participation, autonomy, and cultural recognition (Gurr, 
2000:2)  
 
The reason for the decrease in violent confrontations is related to common decisions 
reached at the international level7. Protection of collective rights and democracy are 
the most important elements of the new preferred strategy for managing ethnic 
heterogeneity. According to Hannum (1998) ethnic wars of secessions reflect the 
tensions existing between “self-determination” and “sovereignty”, or “territorial 
integrity”. Although those agreements were reached at the international level, central 
authorities are distant towards autonomy since it can slip towards independence. Gurr 
(2000) points out that few negotiated autonomies produced independence.  
 
 
                                                 
6 But a more important indicator was the balance between escalation and de-escalation: of the 59 armed 
conflicts under way in early 1999, 23 were de-escalating, 29 had no short-term trend, and only 7 were 
escalating—including Kosovo. See Gurr, Ted Robert. 2000. Ethnic Warfare on the Wane 
 
7 The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe adopted 
standards in 1990-95 that prohibit forced assimilation and population transfers, endorse autonomy for 
minorities within existing states, and acknowledge that minority claims are legitimate subjects of 
international discussion at both U.N and European regional organizations. See Gurr, Ted Robert. 2000. 
Ethnic Warfare on the Wane 
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1.2.1.2 Ethnicity  and  Identity8  
Brown (1993) uses the definition of Anthony Smith for ethnic groups. He thinks that a 
group should have six qualifications in order to be considered as an ethnic 
community. 
First the group must have a name for itself…Second the people in the group 
must believe in a common ancestry…Third, the members of the group must 
share historical memories…Fourth, the group must have a shared culture, 
generally based on a combination of language, religion, laws, customs, 
institutions, dress, music, crafts…Fifth the group must feel an attachment to a 
specific territory, which it may or may not actually inhabit. Sixth and last, the 
people in a group have to think of themselves as a group in order to constitute an 
ethnic community; that is they must have a common sense of ethnicity (1993: 4-
5) 
 
Causes of ethnic conflicts are regrouped into a three level analysis by Brown: a- the 
systemic level; b- the domestic level; and c- the perceptual level. Brown argues that 
“Systemic explanations of ethnic conflict focus on the nature of the security systems 
in which ethnic groups operate and the security concerns of these groups” (1993: 6). 
Some conditions must be met for systematic analysis. The first condition is the 
coexistence of two ethnic groups in a certain environment. The second point for the 
analysis is the lack of a strong authority to provide security for both of the groups. In 
that case the groups have to work for their own defense. Also they can suffer from a 
“security dilemma” by “mobilizing or deploying military forces” which will treat the 
security of their counterparts. This dilemma can be experienced in two forms, if 
offensive and defensive forces are not distinguishable, or when the advantage of 
offensive acts surpasses the benefits of defensive acts. Brown (1993) argued that these 
                                                 
 
8 The title was taken from a sub-title from: Rupesinghe, Kumar .1996. Ethnicity and Power in the 
Contemporary World. 
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can be materialized in conditions of instant collapse of empires, where groups 
suddenly realize that they have to create their own defenses or that to attack is the way 
to defend the acquired benefits. Also “Windows of opportunity and vulnerability” is 
important in the analysis since that would be the result of different levels of military 
power as well as the formation of a state. Second, nuclear weapons are a major 
incentive to build stability. Therefore it is important in preventing “the windows of 
vulnerability to open up”. Domestic explanations can be summarized as “the 
effectiveness of states in addressing the concerns of their constituents, the impact of 
nationalism on inter-ethnic relations, and the impact of democratization on inter-
ethnic relations” (Brown, 1993: 8). The basic needs of a population are security and 
economic development. It is argued that nationalism is the best remedy for the 
societies that experience insecure times9. So the emergence of ethnic nationalism is 
much more than a coincidence in disintegrating societies such as Yugoslavia. The 
emergence of ethnic nationalism fuels other ethnic nationalism, and confrontation 
becomes inevitable. The level of tension between ethnic groups is the principal 
denominator in future events. If the disintegrating regime was controlled by a minority 
ethnic group, the suppressed larger groups will try to take revenge. If the old regime 
had discriminated and used violence against the other ethnie, the new regime needs 
fewer changes to consolidate itself to a democracy. The second important point is the 
relative size ethnic groups in a country. “If one group is substantially larger than the 
others, then it is more likely that the majority group will be able to dominate 
                                                 
9 Brown quotes from Snyder:“By its nature, nationalism based on equal and universal citizenship rights 
within a territory depends on a framework of laws to guarantee those rights, as well as effective 
institutions to allow citizens to give voice to their views. Ethnic nationalism, in contrast, depends not on 
institutions, but on culture.” See. Brown, Michael E. 1993. Ethnic Conflict and International Security 
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discussions about new political arrangements and that minority interests will be 
neglected” (Brown, 1993: 9). However, if opposition to the ruling ethnic group is 
achieved with the help of the other ethnic group that will eventually lead to 
fragmentation and the democratic experience will fail. Another important situation 
arises from sudden changes in which negotiations take place rapidly and the issue of 
ethnicity is neglected but power struggles channel into ethnic problems and 
democracy can fail. Another problem is the existence of political parties in multiethnic 
society that are based on ethnic differences.  
When this happens, party affiliations are a reflection of ethnic identity rather 
than political conviction…under these circumstances, elections are mere 
censuses, and minority parties have no chance of winning power…In countries 
where parties are organized along ethnic lines and where winner-take-all 
elections are conducted…minorities remain essentially powerless, victims of a 
“tyranny of the majority”(Brown, 1993: 10) 
 
What is more, in many countries existing minority rights are not applied although they 
exist theoretically. Perceptual explanations are false explanations about historical 
events; the ethnic conflict is interpreted by one group. Those are passed from 
generation to generation “by word of mouth”. “Distorted and exaggerated with time, 
these histories present one’s own group as heroic, while other groups are demonized” 
(Brown, 1993, p.11). A person socialized under these circumstances can easily be 
driven into the fight. 
 
1.2.2.  Defining  Ethnic  Groups  and  Nationalism  
Two approaches, that give relevant explanations, competed; about the formation of an 
ethnic group and how it acquires the possibility to become a nation. Those were the 
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primordialists and the instrumentalists (Freeman, 1998a; Keating,1996; O`Sullivan, 
1986; Smith, 1995). 
Primordialism, by emphasizing the strength and non-rational character of certain 
social ties, explains the persistence of ethnic bonds and their power to override 
other motives, especially those based on economic calculation. However. Its 
claim that identities and attachments are natural, ancient, prior to social 
interaction…has been refuted by sociological evidence. This shows that ethnic 
identities and attachments persist only as the result of continuing social 
interaction (Freeman, 1998a: 19-20)    
 
Primordialism was reformulated after several criticisms, and the revised version has 
taken the family as the most fundamental human group. By that it is implied that 
humans are not only members of their biological families, but also “to a larger cultural 
collectivity, such as clan, tribe or nation...this is why community ties may seem 
sacred, ineffable and coercive. This is why individuals may be willing to sacrifice 
themselves for the good of the community” (Freeman, 1998a: 20). O`Sullivan (1986) 
states that our need to have an identity and self-esteem can only be nourished in 
collectivities where individuals met with each other. In the community the individual 
encounters and adopts a much larger identity that of himself. Smith (1995) sees the 
extreme version of ‘primordialism’ as the one which claims that we have an ethnic 
identity as we have “sight, speech or smell”. “This form of primordialism regards 
human beings as belonging ‘by nature’ to fixed ethnic communities, in the same way 
that they belong to families” (Smith, 1995:31). The revised version of primordialism, 
takes ethnic groups and nations as “enlarged quasi-families10 ”(Freeman, 1998a). 
                                                 
10 Freeman quotes from Horowitz (1985:64) and Smith (1986: 24): Where ethnic group members 
believe that kinship and ethnicity are indistinguishable, because, for example, they subscribe to a myth 
of the common ancestry of the ethnic group, the self and the group are mutually incorporated in each 
other, and thereby the distinction between self-interest and self-sacrifice for the group is blurred, if not 
wholly eliminated. See Freeman, Michael .1998a. “Theories of Ethnicity, Tribalism and Nationalism in 
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Freeman (1998a) gives an example of violence that is condemned when applied 
within the group, but tolerated outside the group. The conception of ethnicity seen as 
extended kinship has major problems. One of the problems is in its cultural 
imbededness. A common culture that brings people together can help in 
differentiation, but also it is difficult to put a strict limitation on an ethnic group, 
defined in terms of a shared culture. Ethnicity can easily be manipulated by using 
myths and common memories. Territoriality is also used as an element of ethnicity but 
many cases have shown that changes in territorial boundaries can lead to different 
ethnic identifications (Freeman, 1998a). Sociobiology was another primordialist 
approach towards the explanation of ethnicity. According to this approach “ethnies 
and nations are ‘natural’, because they are extensions of kin groups which are selected 
by genetic evolution for their inclusive fitness”(Smith, 1995: 32). Sociobiologists used 
the theory of inclusive fitness taken from biology and applied to social sciences11. Van 
den Berghe developed a theory that was a combination of sociobiology with social 
science in which the individual is at the core of the ethnic group as a “selfish 
maximizer”. The assumption of the theory is that ethnic behavior is shaped by the 
choices of the maximizing individuals who benefit from the outcome of those choices. 
According to Smith the application of that theory is as follows: 
Individual reproductive success is maximized by ‘nepotism’ as well as 
reciprocity, and cultural similarity is treated as an important means of guiding 
individuals in their quest for genetic reproduction through inclusive kin groups. 
                                                                                                                                            
Ethnic Conflict, Tribal Politics” in Ethnic conflict, tribal politics: a global perspective. Kenneth 
Christie, ed. 
 
11 Freeman quotes from V. Reynolds, V. Falger and I. Vine: The theory holds that humans are 
genetically predisposed to ethnocentrism, because selection favors those groups whose members prefer 
their kin and who develop cultural (i.e., ethnic) markers to identify them. See Freeman, Michael .1998a. 
in Ethnic conflict, tribal politics: a global perspective. Kenneth Christie, ed.  
 24
The fact of biological origins of ethnic groups is reflected in their cultural myths 
of origin and descent (1995:32).  
 
The theory has three major failures according to Freeman. The first point is that the 
individuals are selfish but are required to favor their group, rather than just 
themselves. The issue of maximization is another problem since the theory appeals to 
material interests but at the same time to religious beliefs and social status as a 
powerful motivator. Thirdly..  
The theory assumes that selfish genes seek to reproduce themselves --rough kin 
selection. But it explains altruism only if selfish genes select altruistic kin ... 
However, the theory still fails to explain how selfish genes produces individual 
choices and how such choices produce altruism. (Freeman, 1998a: 20). 
 
Freeman criticizes Van den Berghe’s methodology as being too “reductionist, 
materialist; and individualist”; since he finds the definition of an ethnic group based 
on biology too narrow, and prefers to see them as culturally constituted. The proof for 
that is the capability of elites to mobilize ethnic groups for political ends, as well as to 
reform identities, and even form new ethnic groups and nations (Freeman, 1998a). A 
third version of primordialism also accepts the view that ethnicity is a given, powerful 
social bond. The emotional power of the ethnic bond is however not inherent in itself, 
but rather it is felt by the participants of the ethnie in encounters between them 
(Smith, 1995).“It is the members of participants that attribute a ‘primordial’ quality to 
their particular ethnie; in their eyes the ethnic tie has logical and temporal priority 
over other ties, and they acknowledge its compelling power and ‘affect’ ” (Smith, 
1995: 32). 
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Smith (1995) opposed the primordialist approach, and saw the nation-building process 
as a “continuing process, which may involve the destruction, incorporation, 
transformation or invention of putatively primordial groups”(Freeman, 1998a: 26). 
Also O’Sullivan (1986) argued that there is a strong psycho logic impulse in the 
formation of the ethnic groups that is a necessary but not a sufficient condition. “A 
group constitutes itself as ethnic because it is politically useful, not because the 
members feel any psychological bond. And ethnicity will be abandoned when it 
ceases to serve that instrumental purpose” (O`Sullivan, 1986: 4). 
Briefly an ‘instrumentalist’ approach is one that regards human beings as having 
always lived and worked in a wide range of groups. As a result, people have a 
variety of collective identities, from the family and gender to class, religious and 
ethnic affiliations. Human beings are continually moving in and out of these 
collective identities. They choose, and construct, their identities according to the 
situations in which they find themselves. Hence, for instrumentalists, identity 
tends to be ‘situational’ rather than pervasive, and must be analyses as a 
property of individuals rather than of collectivities.(Smith, 1995:30) 
 
As per O`Sullivan (1986) that without the conscience and conceptualization of a 
difference between ‘them’ and ‘us’, neither ethnicity nor race can exist. “These 
subjective perceptions do not develop at random, they crystallize around clusters of 
objective characteristics that become badges of inclusion or exclusion” (O`Sullivan, 
1986: 4). A second important point is the concept of nationalism. According to 
O`Sullivan (1986) nationalism has two important aspects for nationalist movements. 
One is its mobilizing effect on a social group that wants to secure its own political, 
social and economic autonomy by having the opportunity to govern itself in an 
independent state. The second aspect is its justification of that act by claiming for 
itself the status of a nation. From that point the difference between a nation and an 
ethnic group should be clear. The basic difference between an ethnic group and a 
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nation, according to O’Sullivan, is that “unlike the ethnic group, the nation requires a 
sense of territoriality. The ethnic group can retain its identity without a geo-national 
locus...the nation cannot” (O’Sullivan, 1986: 5). Ethnic groups can either accept to 
assimilate or seek a system of political pluralism or at its more extreme form to secede 
from a state to form their own nation. 
 
1.3  Sociological  Approaches  to  Ethnic  Nationalism  
O´Sullivan (1986) lists several theories that are used in the literature on nationalism. 
Those are modernization theories, plural society and power conflict theories and 
Marxist and Neo-Marxist theories. 
 
1.3.1 Modernization  Approach  
Modernization theories are based on the premises of the “Durkheimian emphasis upon 
social differentiation as society develops from the small traditional group -family, 
tribe, clan (gemeinschaft)- to the interest based community-class, party (gesellschaft)” 
(O`Sullivan, 1986: 6). Keating argues that with the modernization theory it was 
expected that  
Industrialization, capitalism and urbanization would break down ascriptive roles 
and traditional values, substituting the impersonal relations of the market. 
Technology, mechanization and specialization would break down peripheral 
self-sufficient economies and encourage the spread of the centre´s universalist 
values. Modern communications would erode regional languages. The modern 
state would extend the impartial, universal norms of bureaucratic administration. 
There might be revolts in the periphery in the transitional phase...These, 
however, would eventually be stilled by integration or by secession of the 
deviant territory, to produce sovereign governments which have no critical 
regional or community cleavages (1996: 43-44). 
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1.3.2  Plural  Society  and  Power  Conflict  Approaches   
The plural society model “emphasize the ordered segmentation resulting from 
colonization” (O`Sullivan, 1986: 8). Imperial expansion pursued by colonization has 
led to domination of some groups and incorporation of some others into the colonial 
state and its economy. According to Smith nations were formed in two main patterns. 
The first was “through a process of vernacular mobilization” that accounted for most 
of today’s national states .The second way was “a process of bureaucratic 
incorporation” (1995: 86). In most cases the path of incorporation had to start with the 
upper strata of the conquered lands. 
In most cases, in fact, an aristocracy led usually by a king or prince and his court 
and staff, and supported by the clergy, ruled over one or more regional or ethnic 
communities and categories who supplied the labor and services necessary for 
the maintenance of the aristocracy’s life-style...In the course of the nineteenth 
century, the European colonial empires established a modified version of this 
basic pattern; in this case, the aristocracy in question was an overseas 
administrative elite, sometimes supported by missionaries and settlers, forming 
a ‘parallel society’(Smith ,1995: 86 ). 
 
In the colonies the governing bodies were a mechanism for controlling indigenous 
population. This meant limiting their economic and political resources. “And 
nationalist movements are the effort of the subordinated group to secure control over 
its own political interests”(O`Sullivan, 1986: 9). In those settings nationalist 
movements that are powerless, faced with a colonizer who commands vast resources 
and armies, tends to emerge when there is a high degree of social segregation from the 
larger community. Plural society and power conflict theory focus on the competitive 
process in which the ethnic groups realize and try to protect their own interests. 
According to O´Sullivan (1986) the failure of the theory comes from seeing the 
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dominated group as one. This neglects the differing interests between members of one 
camp and gives a misleading picture of the reality.  
 
1.3.3  Marxist  and  Neo-Marxist  Approaches  
The Marxist theory is based upon the role of the system of production that shapes the 
social environment as well as the differing political interests of the groups. According 
to Marxist theory as capital is accumulated in the hands of few, capitalists implement 
structures to protect their “competitive advantage”. Protective tariffs are one of those 
mechanisms to protect the bourgeoisie from foreign competition. A need for new 
markets to export occurs in a time when competition between capitalist states has 
intensified, profit rates have declined and displaced workers have started to mobilize 
against the bourgeoisie.  
Capitalist states adopted programs of nationalist imperial expansion. They 
invade and colonize nonindustrial regions, extracting raw materials for home 
industry, using the markets as a market to export, employing colonial labor as 
cheap supply, and returning some benefits to the home labor market...this entire 
process is justified by ideologues which proclaim the superiority of the core 
state’s nationality and hence its inherent right to dominate. And within the core 
state, the ruling class will also moderate class conflict by fostering ethnic 
antagonism among workers through mechanisms as differential wage rates and 
segregation. (O`Sullivan, 1986: 12 ).  
 
Marxists see nationalism as a problem in capitalist societies since it serves to divide 
the proletariat. To the contrary, in colonies national attachment serves to defy 
capitalist domination of foreign powers. Marxists explanations are suitable for 
colonial contexts, but fail to explain the separatist movements in advanced capitalist 
societies. 
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Neo-Marxist theories, share some of the aspects of Marxist theories. O’Sullivan 
(1986) takes as the most influential theory, the internal colonial theory of Michael 
Hechter, the uneven development and split labor market theories. Those theories share 
with the Marxist approach the idea that the growth and concentration of capitalism in 
core states enflames the emerging bourgeoisies in peripheral colonized areas against 
metropolitan domination due to uneven development of the core against the peripheral 
areas.“ Over time, the relative deprivation of the ‘peripheral bourgeoisie’ laid the 
ground for populist demands for independent state formations” (O’Sullivan, 1986:13). 
 
Before explaining the neo-Marxist theories the terms “core” and “periphery” should 
be understood since those models are based on those definitions. According to 
Paddison (1983) the center is identified with certain social groups or with those 
groups that are closer to decision-making elites and the periphery is defined as distant 
from the center where all administrative, cultural and economic power are reunified.  
In other words, the centre is a decision-making nucleus separated from the 
periphery, which is (or thinks of itself as) remote from the decision-makers. One 
of the defining features of the relationship is the idea of the domination of the 
periphery; another is the concept of dependence upon the centre (Paddison, 
1986:77) 
 
Hechter (1975) argues that a distinction should be made between societies, which 
have developed as a result of internal factors, and external involvement; since the 
second type of development generally occurs in Third World societies. In the second 
type of development an external group conquers a country and imposes its ethnic or 
cultural superiority on the materially inferior indigenous group. 
A system of stratification where objective cultural distinctions are super-
imposed upon class lines. High status occupations tend to be reserved for those 
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of metropolitan; while those of indigenous culture cluster at the bottom of the 
stratification system. The economical pattern of development differs in the 
colonial situation...since the colony’s role is designed to be instrumental, 
development tends to be complementary to that of metropolis. The colonial 
economy often specializes in the production of a narrow range of primary 
commodities or raw materials for export.(Hechter,1975:30) 
 
The internal colonialism theory tries to show that reaction against cultural and 
economic domination of a core group leads to ethnic nationalism. “Centralisation of 
power, often perceived from the margins as internal colonialism, is the factor which 
provokes regional dissent and the desire for a distinctive voice” (Wagstaff, 1994: 13). 
Cultural domination occurs because of the economic advantageous position of some 
section -the core group- of the society, if this economic superiority leads to the 
cultural suppression of the disadvantaged group, this provokes the losers who link 
their failure to their difference of culture. In that case the occupational situation of 
minority groups will be the result of that economical domination; the minorities will 
occupy low-ranking status and jobs. “The peripheral economy is forced into 
complementary development to the core and thus becomes dependent to the core, and 
thus become dependent on external markets” (Hechter, 1975:33). Paddison argues that 
if industry is allowed to develop, it will exist primarily because of the core’s needs. 
“In this sense dependence is likely to be characterized by greater economic 
specialization in the periphery, whereas the core will enjoy a diversified economic 
base” (Paddison, 1983:82). That dependence to foreign markets is reflected on the 
prices of the exported primary goods that start to fluctuate, and this brings the number 
of peripheral workers to the core with hopes to find better economic conditions to 
pursue their life. Increased contact between the core and periphery groups does not 
tend to narrow the economic differences between the groups, the distribution of 
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resources is still low since there is not a shift of power for the benefit of the 
subordinate group. 
The obstacle to national development suggested by the internal colonial model 
analogy, therefore, relates not to a failure of peripheral integration with the core 
but to a malintegration established on terms increasingly regarded as unjust and 
illegitimate. (Hechter, 1975:34). 
 
The uneven development theory emphasizes the “crucial role of the elites in the 
periphery and the importance of the structure of the state in shaping ethnic relations” 
(O’Sullivan, 1986:14). In fact, when an imperial state invades an area it tends to 
distribute some amount of benefits to the elites of peripheral areas. So, when 
traditional patrimonial relation between elites of the center and the periphery are 
damaged, elites may use this opportunity to mobilize effectively.  
 
O’Sullivan (1986) explains split labor theory as an ethnic struggle between capital, 
indigenous as high priced labor, and ethnically distinct ‘cheap labor’. In that case it is 
argued that capitalists are not worrying about the ethnic worker base but an 
indigenous labor force that mobilized the market may feel threatened with the 
entrance of a new group of immigrant workers. They can reply to newcomers with 
“exclusionary movements, job segregation, or protectionist policies, which block 
access to cheap labor”. (O’Sullivan, 1986:15). 
Split labor markets occur when two ethnic groups compete with one another for 
employment and when one group is paid a lower wage. The competition for jobs 
reinforces the ethnic boundary dividing the group and increases the likelihood of 
intergroup conflict.(Nagel,1995:5)  
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1.3.4 Resource  Competition  and  Relative  Deprivation  Theories 
O’Sullivan argues that all theories reflect some part of the truth. But she argues that 
ethnicity is not a simple subjective characteristic that can be easily manipulated for 
organizing competitive groups to obtain resources, but neither a primordial attachment 
that persists without the broader environment in which groups live. According to her, 
some conditions must met to give rise to strengthened ethnic boundaries. Those are 
competition for scarce resources, existence of leadership in one or of both groups that 
persuade its members that “resources are best secured through ethnic organization and 
solidarity”, and the availability of a material basis for cultural identification provided 
by “ethnic organizations and institutions” (1986:164). Nagel gives several 
propositions about ethnic identification and inter-ethnic conflict. 
1.Ethnicity is a problematic social category, the boundaries and meaning of 
which are negotiated by in-group and out-group members .2.To the extent that 
resource competition in a society is organized along ethnic lines, increased 
competition increases the likelihood of a. ethnic identification (strengthened 
ethnic boundaries); b. racism and prejudice (discrimination and hatred against 
ethnic competitors); c. interethnic conflict (interpersonal and intergroup 
violence); ethnic mobilization (movements and collective action ).3.Increased 
interethnic contact (integration) in the presence of ethnic resource competition 
increases the likelihood of a. ethnic mobilization; b. racism and prejudice; c. 
interethnic conflict; and ethnic mobilization.(1995:1) 
 
The relative deprivation theory focuses on the subjective belief that peripheral 
economies are disadvantaged because of control of the economy by the center. So 
they end up with larger autonomy claims. The claims are based on the assumption that 
they -the suppressed ethnic group- sacrifice much more to have less from the national 
budget. This leads to strong resentment towards the dominant ethnic group. Paddison 
claims that Ted Gurr has developed a general model that explains that situation well: 
“Relative deprivation leads to frustration, which in turn fuels discontent and results in 
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violence; in extreme cases this could lead to demands for territorial secession” 
(1983:86). 
 
1.4.  Justifying  Separatism , Secession  
Gurr lists four types of actions that communal groups use to manifest their grievances 
upon the state “that claims sovereignty over them” (1993:292). Those are exit, 
autonomy, access or control. Exit is the option to secede from a state, that option has 
the risk to “breakup the state and is threatening nationalism of dominant groups”. 
Autonomy and access are ways of accommodation between the subordinate and 
dominant group. Five types of arrangements can be chosen to devolve authority to the 
minority group: confederalism, federalism, regional autonomism, regional 
administrative decentralization and community. 
Access means that minorities individually and collectively have the means to 
pursue their cultural, political, and material interests with the same rights and 
restraints apply to other groups. Control is the revolutionary aim of a minority or 
subordinate majority to establish the group’s political and economic hegemony 
over others (Gurr, 1993:292)  
 
Secession by its nature required a kind of justification and for that theories of 
secession were developed.  
A secession crisis occurs when the leaders representing a territorially 
concentrated and distinct community within a larger state translate discontent 
into demands for secession, and possess the power, either through sufficiently 
strong internal community mobilization or through the use of force, to compel 
the central government to react to those demands (Bartkus, 1999:10). 
 
According to Bartkus four elements are necessary for a secession crisis to occur; “a 
distinct community”, “territory”, “leaders”, and “discontent”. First, an identifiable unit 
or a distinct community, which is smaller than the state, must present itself and 
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threaten to withdraw if not satisfied. Second, a kind of association should exist with a 
territory. Third, leadership plays an important role in organizing itself as a potential 
threat and to represent the voice for the community’s demands. Fourth, discontent is 
an important element in bringing people together under a common cause. Bartkus has 
suggested a model that would make secession understandable and see the just 
conditions under which it can be achieved. For that, the model takes into account “(1) 
the benefits of continued membership in the larger existing political entity; (2) the 
costs of such membership; (3) the costs of secession; and (4) the benefits of 
secession” (1999: 4). Bartkus under the heading of the benefits of membership takes 
up those issues: security benefits, economic benefits, social benefits. According to 
Bartkus “both underdeveloped and economically advanced distinct communities are 
unwilling to secede due to the economic sacrifices such a decision would 
entail”(1999:43). The cost of the secession issue is dealt under two headings: state 
opposition and international hostility. States have opposed secessionist movements at 
all costs, although the cost of retaining some areas was higher than its benefits. The 
international community has reacted to those movements in accordance with the 
states’ interests. The distinct communities used the principle of self-determination12 to 
legitimize their attempts. With the UN General Assembly resolution 151413, 
                                                 
12 Article 1(2) of the UN Charter recognizes the right of self-determination as: To develop friendly 
relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.  
Article 55: With a view…the UN shall promote: a. higher standards of living, full employment, and 
conditions of economic and social progress and development; b. solutions of international economic 
social, health, and related problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation; and c. 
universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. 
 
13 The General Assembly Declares that: (1) the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination, 
and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the 
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Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries, adopted on 
December 14, 1960; the concept of self-determination became much more important. 
Rupesinghe argued that some problems related to the application of those decisions 
still existed.  
1.The United Nations has not established any formal procedures for adjudicating 
claims to self-determination. The committee of 24, the Decolonisation 
Committee, entertains representations only on behalf of peoples whose 
territories they have listed, all of which are dependencies of former 
dependencies of European powers. But the Committee has no mechanism for 
examining claims from persons or organizations claiming to represent peoples 
aspiring to the right of self-determination, let alone of assessing to a set of 
agenda.2. A distinction is made in practice between the so-called “salt-sea” 
imperialism where the dominating and the dominated are separated by hundreds 
of miles, and “local” imperialism, where the two peoples are immediate 
neighbors. It has been assumed until very recently that peoples locked together 
within a state must remain so linked indefinitely. This means that many cases of 
“internal colonialism” do not come under the purview of any international body. 
3. The right to self-determination is treated essentially as a political right, rather 
than one of international law. (1996:21) 
 
Another important term that was used in relation with self-determination was 
territorial integrity14. Hannum (1998) argues that the vagueness of the terms “self-
determination” and “sovereignty” or “territorial integrity” have created confusion. In 
times of decolonization self-determination was equivalent to independence but later 
there were disagreements about their application to non-colonial situations. 
Neither sovereignty nor self-determination is an absolute right. Each is limited 
by other rights and international obligations. Sovereignty is limited not only by 
                                                                                                                                            
United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and cooperation; (2) all peoples 
have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status, 
freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development. See Bartkus, Viva Ona. 1999. The 
Dynamic of Secession.  
 
14 Article 2(4) of the UN charter reflects this attitude: The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of 
the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles: …(4) all 
members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity of political independence of any state. See Bartkus, Viva Ona. 1999. The Dynamic 
of Secession  
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the rights of other states and the innumerable political and economic ties that 
bind them, but also by a legitimate international interest in human rights, the 
environment, and other issues formerly considered the sole jurisdiction of the 
state (Hannum, 1998:1).  
 
It is argued by Bartkus that internal turmoil, as a result of revolutionary campaigns, 
war, natural catastrophes or foreign assistance, can decrease central governments’ 
power which in turn can decrease the costs of secession and open windows of 
opportunity for secessionist movements. Under the title of cost of membership are 
given the examples of deported or persecuted communities. Second, as an example of 
the membership cost, the loss of regional or ethnic cultures due to cultural 
homogenization policies of states is given. The integration of markets had restricted 
the maneuvers of the nation-state with the exception of few states like Japan, 
Germany and the United States; most states cannot do the planning for autonomous 
monetary policies. The development of regional trade arrangements like NAFTA or 
the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) “has gone some way to providing 
citizens of small countries with the same economic advantages that have previously 
been enjoyed only by citizens of larger and more prosperous countries”(Bartkus, 
1999:195). The benefits of membership therefore have not decreased but conditions 
that are more supportive of economic viability of new states have been created 
(Bartkus, 1999). The benefits of secession were summarized as elite interests and the 
principle of national self-determination was discussed. In the post-World War II era, 
the state opposition and the non-willingness of the international community to extend 
diplomatic recognition created a barrier for communities willing to form new states. 
However, if a community is able to form an independent state by seceding from a 
state, the elites are aware that they will benefit from “the political support and 
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economic aid which the international community provides to such newly emerging 
recognized states” (Bartkus, 1999:206) 
 
1.5  Theories  of  Secessionism   
Allen Buchanan tries to find answers to those basic questions:  
1 Under what conditions does a group have a moral right to secede, 
independently of any questions of institutional morality, and in particular apart 
from any consideration of international legal institutions and their relationship to 
moral principles? 2 Under what conditions should a group be recognized as 
having a right to secede as a matter of international institutional morality, 
including a morally defensible system of international law? (1998:227) 
 
According to Buchanan two basic types of theories for the right to secede exist: 
Remedial Right Only theories, Primary Right theories.  
 
The classic argument for the right to secede has similarities with the right to revolt, 
developed by John Locke. John Locke’s theory that gave people the right to 
overthrow their governments if they acted unjustly is important since that creates a 
conditional situation that legitimizes revolution. 
There are conditions in which there is a right of revolution by the people 
against a tyrannical government, there may be an analogous right of 
secession, where a minority is subjected to tyranny in circumstances in 
which a revolution by the majority would be unlikely, ineffective or 
unjust. This argument makes oppression a necessary condition of the right 
(Freeman, 1998b: 16) 
 
However there is a difference between the right to secede and the right to revolt. The 
right to secede is applicable only to a portion of the population living concentrated in 
a part of the territory of the state and “The object of the exercise of the right to secede 
is not to overthrow the government, but only to sever the government’s control over 
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that portion of the territory” (Buchanan, 1998:231). The Remedial Right Only theory 
focuses on the injustices carried out by a government not to a population at large, but 
rather to a particular group that lives in a particular area of the state. The right of 
secession for that group must be considered as the right of individuals subjected to a 
political authority that commits injustices, and by those individuals have the 
legitimate right to defend themselves against the oppressor (Buchanan, 1998). Events 
that can be considered as creating permissiveness to revolt are “unjust conquest, 
exploitation, threat of extermination, and threat of cultural extinction” (Beran, 
1998:41). 
 
Primary Right theories can be divided onto two parts: Ascriptive-Group theories and 
Associative-Group theories. According to Ascriptive-Group theories there is no 
necessity for political organization of a group nor any collective decision to form a 
political association for it to be considered a nation or people but ascriptive 
characteristics such as common culture, history, language, a sense of distinctiveness 
or an aspiration for establishing their own political unit are sufficient conditions of 
being considered as a nation (Buchanan, 1998). Associative-Group theories focus on 
the right of political association. According to the pure plebiscite theory, the right to 
secede “any group that can constitute a majority…in favor of secession within a 
proportion of the state has the right to secede”(Buchanan, 1998: 234). A variation of 
that theory is offered by Harry Beran who calls his theory the democratic theory of 
political self-determination, in which he criticizes the international law that gives 
states the right to counter internal and external threats to their territorial integrity with 
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force. “The democratic theory rejects the state’s right to meet with force internal 
challenges to its integrity but fully supports its right to so meet external challenges” 
(Beran, 1998: 42). Beran claims that: 
(a) Normal adults have the right of personal self-determination and, therefore, of 
freedom of association with willing partners (b) Territorial communities that 
have acquired their territory rightfully, have the right of habitation (c) A group 
has the right of political self-determination if it is a territorial community (or 
community of communities) and politically and economically viable as an 
independent entity. This right is derived from the rights mentioned in (a) and (b) 
(1998:39) 
 
Buchanan (1998) argues that in Associative-Group theories, a group acquires the right 
to secede even under conditions in which the state is effectively performing its 
legitimating functions of just rule and security. When secession takes place (1) if that 
creates another minority within the new unit, “the formerly persecuted become the 
persecutors”(1998:240). (2) If not all members of the seceding group are included 
within the newly formed unit, that creates a problem of vulnerability of persecution 
for the group that stays within the old entity. 
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Chapter  II 
 
The  British  Occupation  and  Origins  of   the  Emergence  of  
the  Problem  of  Northern  Ireland  
 
 
Ireland lies in the West of Great Britain and near the mainland of Europe has been 
mainly victimized by its geographical position. Ireland’s settlers, as well as its early 
culture, came from European migrants. For Irish history the main theme was the 
relationship between England and Ireland that started from A.D 1100’s onwards 
(Hernon, 1989). The English were able to conquer the island after long years of 
devastating wars that impoverished the country. Plantations, which amounted nearly 
to nine-tenths of the land, passed to English and Scottish landlords. Political and 
religious persecution and economic problems forced the Irish people to emigrate as 
the result of British conquest. Later the Irish were able to free themselves but some of 
their countrymen could not be liberated and are undergoing continuous repression in 
the Northern part of the isle. The root cause of the problem lies in the colonial past of 
Ireland, and the existence of a state which is seen as the actual continuation of that 
imperial idea to suppress Celtic lands and culture under the English cultural and 
territorial occupation. The endless struggle of the Irish people is worth to be analyzed 
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since it shows a conscience that was shaped throughout the ages to continue to try to 
restore the lands to whom it really belongs. 
 
2.1  British  Occupation  of  Ireland 
Anglo-Normans invaded Ireland in 1169. In those days Ireland was divided into a 
multiplicity of autonomous tribes in which the economy was organized on semi-
nomadic patterns of seasonal migration into pastures, so a kind of pastoral 
communalism prevailed. 
When the Norman English arrived in late twelfth-century Ireland, they 
encountered a Gaelic nation united in language and tradition with a clan social 
structure, a system of Brehon laws, and a Catholicism that was more monastic 
than diocesan and remote from Rome in both distance and loyalty (Hachey, 
1989: 1) 
 
The tribes were acting as the basic political organization by dominating the political 
arena in a country where the land was common property. What is more, a 
decentralized church system and a belief system that had not abandoned paganistic 
practices existed. The Normans began the Anglicization of many aspects of Irish life 
such as political, social, cultural, and economic life and advanced the romanization of 
Irish Catholicism (Hachey, 1989: 1). At the opposite spectrum Anglo-Normans led a 
sedentary culture, and feudal power was concentrated in the hands of the centralized 
state, strong relations with the Roman-Catholic church was another contradiction that 
separated the island of Ireland and England. This meant that Europeans considered 
Irish social structure as primitive. As Pope Adrian declared it, he was happy to see 
Ireland that was considered as a land of savages finally conquered, and the dominion 
by the Roman church increased. In those days only a small portion of the isle was 
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under the strict control of the British Crown. In the district of Pale “the Irish were 
viewed as savages, whose religion was at best a pagan adaptation of Christianity and 
whose tribal organization appeared primitive to the strong feudal state”(O’Sullivan, 
1986: 35). The Norman political apparatus with its parliament that was established in 
the Pale district of Ireland, from the 14th to the late 16th century, couldn’t reach the 
other parts of Ireland. Hachey (1989) argues that the tiny English occupation started to 
change its characteristics with the nationalization of the church in England. The 
preoccupations of the royal family started to change with the fear that the 89 percent 
of Irish Catholics would ally with the Roman Catholic Church (and other European 
powers). At first “the English, state controlled Church came into existence in 
1537”(Hernon, 1989:15) in order to create an alternative organization. Serious 
colonization efforts started in 1541 with an act of parliament declaring Henry VIII 
King of Ireland. From 1565 the Crown started to encourage individuals to settle in 
Ireland in order to replace the Irish peasants with English planters. (Hachey, 1989).  
The struggle there in the sixteenth century became more embittered than ever 
because Ireland had remained Roman Catholic when England had become 
protestant in the middle of the century. The conquest of Ireland was the largest 
military undertaking of Elizabeth’s reign, costing over £ 1m, or the total revenue 
for three years which was far more than any other military or naval activities, 
and a new wave of English Landlords was able to gain estates if they could hold 
the rebellious Irish population in subjection (T.O.Lloyd, 1996:15) 
 
The newcomers were also bringing the newly adopted religion and that led to serious 
conflict between the Old Catholic English people and the New Protestant English 
People. Religion became a way to acquire the status of elites. (Hernon, 1989) 
Descendants of the original English colonizers that had come well before England had 
adopted Protestantism rejected the Protestant religion by considering it as a cultural 
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dimension of 16th century Tudor conquests. Twice in the next century they joined with 
Gaels to reverse the property and power results of Elizabethan and Cromwellian 
victories. They countered the plantations that were the result of Tudor, Stuart, and 
Cromwellian policies (Hachey, 1989: 1). The old elites joined the masses in order to 
counter the new settlers. However the aims of the allies were different, Gaels wanted 
to restore their previous cultural order but the Old English intended to take back the 
control of the Irish political nation. The conquests of William III ended with the 
assimilation, common defeat and suffering of the Old English and Gael into one 
oppressed Irish Catholic nation. While most of the Gaelic and Old English aristocracy 
and gentry turned Protestant to protect their property, influence, and status the masses 
remained Catholic (Hachey, 1989: 2). After order was reestablished in Ireland by the 
new elites in 1590, Ulster was the only one of the four provinces that was still free of 
English dominion. The strong resistance to England that started in the Ulster region in 
1590, was supported by the French dynasties was suppressed in 1607. This meant that 
the entire Irish isle was invaded and the conquest of Ireland was accomplished in 
1607. The motivation behind this conquest was mostly economic. Economists claimed 
that the country was over-populated and believed that the problems of poverty and 
unemployment would be reduced if “the surplus hands and mouths would go 
overseas”, but they did not suggest to the government to pay for them to go. 
(T.O.Lloyd, 1996)  
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2.2  Immigration  to  Ireland  and  Implications  for  the  Native  Population 
As a result of the British victory, the last tribes were defeated and eliminated from the 
political sphere. Some 150,000 Scots and 20,000 English migrated to the northeastern 
provinces of Ireland after a series of enactments (1607) that confiscated land from the 
Irish peasantry. O’Sullivan (1986) speculates that those enactments pushed the Irish 
peasantry into small reservations. The northeast corner of the island was populated 
with Protestants since Protestant landlords owned most of the land compared with the 
rest of the island. In 1641 a Catholic uprising against the Protestants of Ulster and 
English authority over the island began. However much of the island didn’t rebel 
against the monarchy: the Republic was determined to undermine the Catholic Irish 
and the Royalist Irish, seeing not much differences between the two. Cromwell took 
his army across St.George´s channel and invaded Ireland, and declared the island a 
republic. By 1650 it was clear that the English government was going to reconquer the 
island (T.O.Lloyd, 1996). The Republic had then to face other problems. Many 
Royalists had gone into exile in the colonies, especially Virginia and the new 
government could not expect that its orders would be obeyed on the other side of the 
Atlantic. Cromwell’s foreign policy was based on anti-Catholic and anti-Spanish 
sentiment that aimed to maintain a balance of power by opposing the strongest nation 
in Europe. Cromwell’s death in 1658 led to a change in the regime accompanying the 
collapse of the Republican system, and Charles II returned to his father’s throne. 
Cromwell had understood that a monarch with some claim to divine authority could 
rule three separate kingdoms separately while in the possession of three separate 
crowns, and that a republic, in order to not disintegrate, had to have a parliament 
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which united all the British isles. Once he had dethroned the King, he created a House 
of Commons to which Scotland and Ireland elected members. Charles II, when he 
took back the throne, returned to the old system of three separate kingdoms, united by 
virtue of the same man that was head of each of them. (T.O.Lloyd, 1996). James the 
brother of Charles became the new king in 1685, but his rule lasted three years 
because he was considered as a tyrant since his reign was too strict, and he seemed to 
favor the Catholic cause. In 1688, William of Orange overthrew him. William’s 
accession to the English throne changed the foreign policy of Britain with a return of f 
hostility towards France, “and for almost all of the following 125 years England was 
either at war with France or preparing for war with France or recovering from war 
with France” (T.O.Lloyd, 1996). William in order to bring back the territories of the 
King of England into obedience used the methods employed by Cromwell. The 
resistance in Scotland was easily broken but that of Ireland lasted relatively long. As 
the Catholic majority saw James as their best hope for power, William had to fight a 
long war in Ireland where resistance survived until the victory at the Boyne in 
1690.The successful defense in Londonderry, and the victory of 1690 became an 
unforgettable part of the Protestant tradition. Whereas the treaty of Limerick and the 
Protestant failure to apply the religious tolerance which was part of the treaty became 
immovable parts of the Catholic interpretation of the history of Ireland (T.O.Lloyd, 
1996). The basic difference that existed between the Scottish people and the Irish 
people, although both were of Celtic origin was that the Scottish people were 
Protestant and English-speaking, whereas the Irish people were Catholic and Gaelic-
speaking. (O’Sullivan, 1986). The policies of the Crown functioned well, and in 1659 
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English and Scots settlers constituted 37 percent of the Ulster region. In the areas 
where the soil was most fertile the new settlers started to become majorities, at least to 
become bigger minorities. In the South (the districts of Pale and Dublin) the natives 
were also restricted to the land. “In 1703 altogether Catholics owned 15%of Irish soil. 
By 1778 this share had declined to 5%”(Hernon, 1989:29).  
 
Hachey (1989) comments that between the years of 1586-1692 the Irish parliament sat 
in Dublin for a total of only fifteen years. The American War of Independence had 
affected the structure of the British administration profoundly. The administration of 
the colonies, the Secretary of State for American Affairs and the Board of Trade that 
was its advisory council were abolished. Colonial affairs were transferred to the Home 
Secretary (Adams, 1991). Finally in 1719, the English parliament passed a 
Declaratory Act guaranteeing English control over all Irish legislation (O’Sullivan, 
1986). The new government passed laws which subjected Ireland to legislation by 
Westminster, and which impeached the Irish Parliament from adopting laws that 
would not have been approved by London. The freedom claimed by American 
Assemblies in the years just before the Declaration of Independence was taken from 
Ireland (Hernon, 1989). The British Lord-Lieutenant in Dublin still was holding legal 
powers of the monarch and exercising active control of the executive, with the 
instructions taken from the government of London. He had a similar position that of 
an American colonial governor against the Irish Parliament, but London expected him 
to manage his Parliament more effectively than the governors did. (T.O. Lloyd, 1996). 
This meant that all the protectionary walls of Ireland were by-passed, all customs 
 47
were lifted on English goods. The Irish small urban mercantile class was deeply 
harmed by differential taxation and English protectionist measures, and by the end of 
the 18th century emigration to America started, where they formed one sixth of the 
population at that time.  
 
2.3  The  Rise  of  Reactionary  Movements  Among  the  Irish  
Hachey (1989) claims that with the beginning of 1740´s secret paramilitary groups 
emerged in order to resist the Catholic competition against the landowners in Ulster. 
They started to renounce traditional religious patronage by replacing Protestant 
tenants with Catholics, who paid higher rents and to cultivate on smaller plots. In 
1782 an attempt to form an independent country under a joint British Crown was 
launched by a clandestine organization called the Irish Volunteers. 
 
Competition for land tenancies between Catholic and Protestants provoked the 
existing antagonism. After some sectarian clashes in Armagh and Tyrone, the Orange 
Order was formed in 1795 (Hepburn, 1980). The Orange Order, emerging as a 
militant Protestant organization aimed to preserve Protestant advantages over that of 
Catholics, immediately began attacking and driving Catholics out of North Armagh 
and South Tyrone. The Orangemen who did not attack government institutions, 
emerged as defenders of Protestant supremacy, and its members were recruited 
quickly to the yeomanry which was a part-time force offered by the landlords (Farrell, 
1980).  
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Hachey (1989) stresses that the violence used by the Protestants to distinguish 
themselves from the Catholics, to manifest their real interests led to an Irish rebellion 
in 1798, aiming to form a kind of Irish republic influenced by the French Revolution. 
The majority of the population wanted to create a country where the state apparatus 
recognized the interests of the Catholics without sacrificing Protestant interests, i.e. a 
kind of republic, which would encompass the religious identities. The rebellion that 
started in 1798 was short and bloody. The Irishmen lost. “The Irish parliament held its 
last session in August 2, 1800”(McCaffrey, 1989:53) As a result of the victory the 
Westminster declared the “Act of Union (1801)”. This abolished the Irish parliament 
and incorporated Ireland into the British parliamentary system. The Act of Union had 
brought important structural changes that was accompanied by important population 
movement:   
The restrictions on industry and trade were lifted and Ulster, especially Belfast, 
prospered under the Union...The population of Belfast jumped from 20,000 in 
1801 to 100,000 in 1851 and 350,000 in 1901. Belfast was becoming a major 
industrial city like Birmingham and Glasgow...The Belfast businessmen and 
merchants quickly began to forget their former nationalism and republicanism 
and became strong supporters of the Union -after all they have a vested interest 
in it (Farrell, 1980: 14). 
 
Those structural changes led to enrichment in the North, while the Southern parts of 
the country stagnated. The North with the lifting of restrictions developed a linen 
industry. The linen industry paved the way for the development of an engineering 
industry making textile machinery. Those businessman, who monopolized the linen 
machinery in the United Kingdom that led to the development of an export trade, later 
established the biggest dry dock in the world, so a shipbuilding industry started to 
flourish in Belfast in1858 (Lloyd.1996). 
 49
2.4  Importance  and  Impact  of  the  Orange  Order  Upon  Irish  Nationalism 
The Orange Order that was extremely Protestant dedicated itself to maintaining 
Protestant privileges and supremacy. It held considerable influence over small farmers 
and Protestant workers demoralized and brutalized by living conditions in the 
industrial slums .The influence of the Orange Order increased with the growth of 
sectarian tension in Belfast, and with the migration of the Catholics to areas of 
industrial expansion. When in early 1800’s only 6 percent of the town’s population 
was Catholic there was little religious tension. As Belfast became a gigantic industrial 
machine, especially after the famine, Catholics began to move in, and in 1861 
Catholics reached one third of the population. As low wages and periodic economic 
depressions hit the Protestant workers they began seeing Catholics as a threat. Finally 
serious sectarian riots broke in 1857, 1864, and 1872. (Farrell, 1980) 
 
2.5  Home  Rule  and  Irish  Nationalism 
In 1885 the Home-Rule Party led by Parnell, a protestant land-owner but who 
represented the growing Catholic middle class in the South had obtained 85 seats in 
Westminster, and 17 of the 33 seats in Ulster. He tried to obtain a kind of limited form 
of government for Ireland (Home Rule Bill). However, the business classes of Ulster 
did not welcome his moves. So, the alliance between the majority of Ulster 
businessman with the conservative party and landlord-dominated local Tories defeated 
that proposal in 1886.  
Although Home Rule was a type of devolution, which would give Ireland, rather 
less power within the United Kingdom than the provinces had within the 
Canadian federation, most Englishmen saw it as a terrible threat to their country. 
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When the crisis ended in mid-1886 the Liberals were out of office for most of 
the next twenty years (T.O.Lloyd, 1996:213). 
 
The Orange Order, by exploiting the tensions between Protestants and Catholics, and 
recalling the past struggles between settlers and natives claimed that Home Rule 
would mean domination by the Catholic Church. This way it was able to mobilize the 
Protestant masses and rioting from June to September of 1886 resumed. In 1893 
another bill passed Commons but was stopped by the Lords (Farrell, 1980). 
Most colonial politicians supported home rule for Ireland; some of them merely 
wanted to conciliate any fervent Irishmen they might have among their voters by 
advocating a fairly modest change but some of them, of whom Cecil Rhodes 
was the outstanding example, believed that a discontented Ireland was bad for 
imperial unity and a pacified Ireland with a certain amount of devolution would 
serve as an example that would make it easier to build a united empire that 
could agree in a common policy (T.O.Lloyd, 1996: 230) 
 
As the inevitability of the Home Rule bill became apparent, Protestants started to 
organize themselves, and established a separate Ulster Unionist Council (UUC), and 
in 1910 they selected Edward Carson15 as their leader. In 1911 Carson threatened to 
establish a Provisional government in Ulster if the Home rule Bill passed. Unionists 
started forming a private army recruited by the help of the Orange Order to acquire 
means of acting independently form the other actors. Sir James Craig16 leader of the 
Irish Unionist Council “announced that if necessary, Ulster Protestants were ready to 
                                                 
15 Edward Carson, Lord Carson of Duncairn 1854-1935: Unionist leader, Dublin Protestant. Successful 
barrister in both Irish and British courts. Elected Unionist MP for Dublin University at Westminster in 
1892, he became Solicitor General for Ireland 1900-05. Elected leader of the Unionist Council in 1911, 
he presided over the signing of the Covenant and the formation of the UVF. Guided Unionists through 
Home Rule crisis of 1911-14 and War of Independence 1919-21, with interlude as British Attorney 
General 1915-16,First Lord of the Admiralty and a member of Lloyd George’s War Cabinet 1917-18. 
Refused premiership of the new Northern Ireland state and retired from Irish politics in 1921, when he 
was created Lord Carson of Duncairn. Member of Orange Order.(Farrell,1980:338) 
 
16 Sir James Craig, Lord Craigavon 1871-1940: First Prime Minister of Northern Ireland. Company 
director and landowner. Unionist MP for East Down at Westminster1906-21. Treasurer of the 
Household 1916-18; MP at Stormont 1921-40. Prime Minister of Northern Ireland 1921- 40. Member 
of the Orange Order. Made Lord Craivagon 1926. (Farrell, 1980:339)  
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swear allegiance to the German Kaiser in preference to the control of an Irish Catholic 
Parliament”(McCaffrey, 1989:149). In 1913 a veteran of many colonial wars, a retired 
member of the British army Sir George Richardson took the lead of the private army 
called the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF). The end of 1913 saw a force of Irish 
National Volunteers to counter UVF. 
Colonial nationalism first emerged because people in the colonies could see 
ways in which they differed from Englishmen and wanted administrative 
arrangements to express the fact, but it did not mean they wanted to disturb the 
framework of imperial unity.( T.O.Lloyd, 1996: 105). 
 
The National Volunteers were under the control of an uneasy alliance between Sinn 
Fein supporters, members of Irish Republican Brotherhood17(İRB) and United Irish 
League18 (UIL). In 1916 the IRB and Sinn Fein volunteers refused to participate in the 
war as an ally of Great Britain, and on Easter Monday 1916, they proclaimed the Irish 
Republic by seizing the Dublin Post Office and the center of Dublin. The rebellion 
was easily crushed. But this led to the beginning of the war of independence against 
British rule in Ireland between 1918-1924. The eruption of war simplified the 
implementation of legislation giving Ireland Home Rule (Jackson, 1999). The Easter 
rising was easily suppressed since at the time the idea of independence was not 
                                                 
17 Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB): A revolutionary secret society dedicated to the establishment of 
an Irish Republic by force. It was first known as the Fenians and organized an unsuccessful rising in 
1867 and a bombing campaign in England. It was re-organized as the IRB in 1873 and eventually 
infiltrated the Sinn Fein party and the Irish Volunteers. It was the IRB, which planned the 1916 Rising 
and re-organized the Volunteers into the IRA in 1918-19. Michael Collins was a leading figure in the 
IRB and under his influence it supported the Treaty and swung much of the IRA behind it. The IRB 
ceased to have much influence after Collins’ death in 1922 (Farrell, 1980:355). 
 
18 United Irish League (UIL): Set up in 1898 as a mass organization to agitate for land reform, the UIL 
helped to re-unite the divided Irish Home Rule Party and then provided its constituency organization 
and branches. The UIL was effectively the voice of the Irish Catholic middle class and the Church 
before the First World War. Mildly reformist on social issues, it was solidly constitutionalist and anti-
revolutionary. After 1916 it was swept aside by Sinn Fein everywhere except in the North, where Joe 
Devlin and the AOH held it together a little longer. Some of the Belfast branches were still in existence 
up to 1925 (Farrell, 1980: 364). 
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popular. When the leaders of the uprising were shot after trial by a court-martial, a 
feeling of sympathy emerged for them and their cause became a popular one. 
(T.O.Lloyd, 1996). 
 
2.6  The  Birth  of  IRA / Irish  Republican  Army   
In 1919 Irish Volunteers re-armed and re-formed themselves to form the Irish 
Republican Army (IRA). In return a special kind of paramilitary organization was 
formed in Northern Ireland with the help of Britain in 1920-The Specials. It was 
formed to help the RIC, the British Police in the region.  
 
The last of the bills came in 1920 and proposed two home rule parliaments in Ireland. 
One was to be set up for most of the country, and the other for six of the nine counties 
of Ulster--both parts would be represented in Westminster. That last proposition 
would be the accepted but at a cost of thousands of Catholics who were displaced 
from their homes in Ulster, of hundreds of civilians dead within two years 
(McCaffrey, 1995). Finally the free parliament opened and the Ulster parliament 
representing six counties out of nine was recognized as a kind of state in the northern 
part of Ireland. After sectarian-based violent clashes and three years of fruitless 
diplomacy by the South, both parts agreed to recognize each other and finally on 
December 6 1922, the Irish Free State was established formally. The establishment of 
the Irish Free State did not mean that the conflict was over, since in three counties of 
Ulster Catholics were still the majority. That created a special environment where the 
fear of Catholics materialized itself with the formation of the Ulster state, in which all 
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political power and patronage were in the hands of the Protestants. Protestants on the 
contrary tried not to lose what they had obtained; their fear was to be left alone by 
Britain against Catholic Ireland since they were in a tiny majority, which permitted 
them to control the system. Memories of massacres were mostly used to create a 
political consciousness. Protestants in Ulster used the Orange Order to create 
solidarity. 
The Ulster Unionists kept up their organisation, cemented the Orange link and 
secured the allegiance of the Protestant workers by a systematic policy of 
discrimination against Catholics which left the Protestants with a virtual 
monopoly of the well paid-skilled trades, especially in the shipbuilding and 
engineering industry.(Farrell, 1980 :16) 
 
As in Ulster the Protestants subdued the Catholics, both sections of society lived in a 
continual struggle in which both tried to establish their political dominance over the 
other in armed conflicts and with mobs. The Protestants used their institutional 
domination whereas Catholics used the geographical advantage of being surrounded 
by the Irish Free State. That led to the development of fear of extinction, respectively.  
Memories of massacre have made survival the most salient goal for both 
communities, many of whose members believe they must protect their group 
identity at all costs.. The fundamentalist Protestant leader Ian Paisley has 
compared the events of 1641 both to the St. Bartholomew `s Day massacre of 
1572 in France (.) To the contemporary actions of the Provisional Irish 
Republican Army (Crighton & Mac Iver, 1991: 129) 
 
Paisley in his argument against unifying with Ireland speaks of “genocide” as the 
decrease in the number of Protestants living in the Irish Free State from 10 percent to 
3 percent in the last sixty years. Although it had happened mostly through 
intermarriage and assimilation, for many Protestants the fear of cultural extinction is 
still an important phobia.  
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Just as the Maronites see themselves as the last outpost of Western and Christian 
civilization in the region, encircled and menaced by hostile Islamic forces so 
many Protestants view Ulster as the last bastion of Evangelical Protestantism in 
Western Europe (Crighton & Mac Iver, 1991: 129) 
 
In the Irish case the interests of Protestants were protected as follows: At first the 
domination by English forces under Cromwell and later William of Orange created a 
dominant position against the Catholics. Later rigid laws that stopped their 
participation in politics were applied. In late 18th and early 19th centuries some 
reforms were implemented but in those times the Irish parliament has been closed 
several times and direct rule was applied by Westminster. When demands came from 
Catholics for “Home Rule” it was perceived as something that would damage 
Protestant interests since the political culture of the country was not permitting equal 
participation, but rather domination by one group over the other, in the areas where 
one has its majority. Tactics that aimed to terrorize the whole population, or the 
population of an enclave accompanied domination. A kind of war is pursued in order 
to force people to migrate or to be pacified in the living environment.  
It was a time of irregular armies: the Irish Republican Army could have no legal 
existence, private armies were fighting across all the eastern European frontiers 
created by the Versailles Treaty, and the British government created its own 
irregular armies -the black and tans, and the auxiliaries- to fight the I.R.A. As a 
military device it was successful enough, but it weakened Englishmen’s 
confidence in the justice of their cause to see the rough instruments that had to 
be used to make it effective (T.O.Lloyd, 1996:285) 
 
Societies that have lost the ability to cooperate were waging wars in what they 
perceived as something that would make the society ill. Those events are results of the 
erosion of the institutional legitimacy in places that have lost the capability to reach a 
section of the society, since the institutions were generally not autonomous but 
dependent on a group. (Tonge, 1998) As long as the state apparatus or institutions 
 55
would not serve the interest of the suffering group, as long as deprivation continued 
and no other avenue exists to cure the grievances, the apparition of new radical groups 
will not be a surprise since alienation is the result. As those groups are alienated they 
lost the capability to compromise and to reach political solutions. Those groups rather 
each year commemorate some historical events such as battles by organizing some 
marches that can easily be used to inflame the masses to attack the “other” group. The 
Protestant marches are typical examples of that. Each year those marches are done. 
“Because of the need to keep a similar vigil over the liberties they perceive 
themselves as having won. Moderates who seek to forget the conflicts of the past are 
charged with betraying the heritage of Protestantism in Ireland” (Crighton & Mac 
Iver: 137)  
 
One can see from the Irish case that the conflict was caused by several reasons coming 
from the earlier English presence to the ensuing confrontations .The reasons are 
economic. The presence of settlers and the monopolization of resources, by 
confiscating the most fertile lands from the Catholics, and giving them to few and 
approved persons. It is also cultural since, an intolerant culture flourished in the 
course of the struggle for scarce resources. This required being a member of the 
dominant religion in order to acquire or to prolong the status of being an elite. It is 
also social since the migration of societies is one of the main reasons of the problem. 
It fueled the competition for valuable land and gave superiority to the owners of those 
goods. 
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The invaders who came from the mainland colonized an area first by taking the most 
important places, these forcing migrations of the population from their areas in the 
agricultural era. Second, they have incorporated the conquered lands into the center, at 
least for administrative use. They inflamed sectarian issues and used violence to 
subdue Catholics, and gave some privileges to poor Protestant classes by taking them 
to the machinery, which would ensure their domination over the Catholics: the 
yeomanry. When the landlords and merchants of Ireland faced the protective walls of 
England they tried to break away from the center and easily forgot sectarian 
divergence. But the center (England) with the Act of Union in 1801 provided some 
possibilities for the development of an indigenous industry, so as an uneven 
development theorist would suggest the elites were bribed for the continuation of 
British rule. This industry as it developed in a colonial setting required specialization 
in some issues as Hechter also would put forth. A linen industry and later a shipping 
industry flourished to become the best of all British production areas. The increase in 
production led to immigration of the Catholics to the Belfast area since the other areas 
populated by them became poorer after the Act of Union. Catholics who moved to 
industrial areas faced violence from Protestant lower classes as they were seen as a 
threat as was dictated by the split labor theory. So as O’Sullivan would approve, the 
competition for resources increased the level of tension. The first sectarian rioting 
appeared in those years when perceptual explanations were given to create the enemy. 
As Catholics faced violence realized that they could not be successful under Protestant 
rule, they started to forge new ways to free themselves, as Brown would put it with 
domestic explanation to the effect that the requirement of security was not fulfilled 
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within the existing state. So they tried constitutional ways such as Home Rule. But all 
this agitated the proprietors of the lands who resorted to every effort possible to 
preserve their interests. At first riots reappeared in industrial settings, later Protestant 
elites propagated to the masses for some kind of autonomy to create their own state. 
As Brown would put it again, in the domestic explanations and systemic explanations, 
the size of the group and the security dilemma affected the situation. The fear that the 
large group, if it acquired the means, led the Protestants with British assistance to 
adopt the idea of a state for themselves. World War I created a window of 
opportunity, as Bartkus would say, for the Catholics, to commence a bloody civil war 
to create the opportunity to liberate themselves. Protestant elites also used another 
window of opportunity, a Civil war, to create their own state. Protestants were able to 
form their own state in which systematic discrimination was applied against Catholics 
in order to strengthen the dominant ethos to secure a viable microstate whose only 
raison d’ểtre would be oppression of Catholics. 
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Chapter  III 
 
The  Problem  of  Northern  Ireland  in  the  Aftermath  of  World  
War I 
 
 
3.1  The  socio-political  developments  in  Northern  Ireland  in  the  Aftermath  
of  World  War  I :  
After World War I Britain had to solve the problems that had emerged during the war 
with its dominions. During the war Britain had accepted that in cases of need of armed 
forces Britain would consult with its dominions. If not, the dominions would have the 
right not to send armed forces to areas of conflict. But during the war only New 
Zealand accepted British request of assistance willingly. Australia did it reluctantly, 
while Canada and South Africa found ways to escape from their commitments (Lloyd, 
1996). 
 
The failure to receive the armed forces contingent from her dominions forced Britain 
to change its policies. London wanted to return to its pre-war strategy of not 
consulting its dominions while pursuing its own policies and asking for help in serious 
situations. The dominions were not satisfied with the British point of view and wanted 
to make treaties that reflected the changes in their status after 1914 in the international 
community (Adams, 1991). Ireland obtained the status of dominion only in 1921. 
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Ireland was different in the way it acquired that status since it became a dominion, not 
as a result of evolution or constitutional process, but of revolutionary action. 
Broadly speaking there were two possible Commonwealth policies for Irish 
governments after 1921.The first was to refashion the Commonwealth in closer 
accord with Irish interests and outlook; the second to seek the first opportunity 
to unravel,...to sever, Irish ties with the Commonwealth. These alternatives, 
again speaking very broadly, were pursued in turn by president Cosgrave´s 
government from 1922 to 1932, and by President de Valera´s administration 
from 1932 onwards (Mansergh, 1997:109-110). 
 
In 1926 the definition of relations between Commonwealth countries was clarified in 
the Balfour Declaration, which recognized member countries as equal. In 1931 the 
Statute of Westminster gave the right to dominions to control their own constitutions. 
Those steps, or in other words concessions, were understood as the beginning of the 
disintegration of the British Empire (Adams, 1991). The start of devolution policies in 
some dominions after the Great War, yielded to transformations in the balance of 
political parties of the dominions. Those who were able to capture power were able to 
fix the pattern of politics for the next sixty years. Exceptions were Ireland --in, which 
the Fianna Gael made the settlement of 1921 with Britain lost the government to 
Fianna Fail in 1932-- and Great Britain; in other countries the parties in power were 
able to stay in power for three decades in the dominions (Lloyd, 1996). 
 
After the Balfour Declaration in 1927 another important change occurred. Britain 
started to appoint High Commissioners to all the dominions to show its views on 
diplomatic issues, by putting aside the Governors-General that were representing the 
King as the head of each state and who had the right to dissolve parliaments. 
Following this, the dominions wanted the appointment of natives to that ceremonial 
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post. The Statute of Westminster was proclaimed as a further step of dissolution 
(Darwin, 1988). The change gained from the statute was pressed by Ireland and South 
Africa. Those countries were embarrassed with the idea of going to London for formal 
ratification for every little change in their constitution. Countries like Australia, New 
Zealand and Newfoundland were not impressed with the idea to change constitutions 
locally. 
People rather liked the idea that a constitutional change was a serious matter that 
went through the formal process of approval by the Mother of parliaments at 
Westminster... so these countries left the power of amendment in London, with 
the knowledge that they could ask for it to be transferred to them at any time. 
(Lloyd, 1996: 300) 
 
Canada also preserved its links with Great Britain not only for reasons of sentiment 
but also to reassure the province of Quebec against Ottawa’s anti-Quebec or 
centralizing policies. With the financial collapse of the 1930s, the dominions entered a 
crisis. They had to repay their debts, but as the world markets collapsed, the prices of 
their exports that consisted mainly of food and raw materials were much more 
affected than what they were importing (Adams, 1991). 
 
Later the British government adopted a differing economic policy, by giving up the 
gold standard by ceasing to keep the value of the pound equal to a fixed weight of 
gold in order to form an economic unit in which currencies remain fixed in value 
against each other though they floated against non-sterling currencies. In that way 
Britain settled most of the economical and constitutional questions that 
Commonwealth countries faced (Crokaert, 1940). 
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The interests of Great Britain differed in many issues from the dominions. Great 
Britain made its own foreign policy, while member states tried to avoid making policy 
decisions and relied on Britain. But they faced contradictory situations:  
To some extent the two sides in the discussion were at cross-purposes; the 
immediate hope of the British was that a number of unemployed would go 
overseas, while the Dominions were concerned to avoid becoming a dumping 
ground for failures (Lloyd, 1996: 304) 
 
British emigration slowed down by the 1920´s and the whole pattern of the previous 
three centuries was reversed in the 1930´s. As a result of that, British population 
increased by 500,000 in the 1930´s. Britain had acquired those colonies without any 
payment and had used the resources of these countries at very low costs, but this habit 
would have to change. Britain saw that the cost of retaining the colonies surpassed the 
benefits; the first problem to be tackled was the large number of people coming from 
abroad. All these were indoctrinated to feel British, but now the turn had come for the 
British people to believe also to what they had teach to peoples from their colonies 
(Crokaert, 1940).  
 
3.2  The Anglo-Irish  Treaty  and  the  Civil War 
The period between 1918 to 1923 were to be bloody years. At first the old Home Rule 
party (UIL) was ousted by Sinn Fein. Later an illegal Irish parliament was established 
in Dublin. The Parliament was formed in opposition to Westminster as a symbol of 
the War of Independence against Britain. On January 21, 1919 both the Unionists and 
UIL members boycotted the parliament when it convened and declared its 
independence. Later IRA units attacked the Royal Irish Constabulary barracks and the 
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war began. In October 1919 a bill introduced in Westminster suggested to establish 
two local parliaments with limited powers to represent Westminster. At the same time 
the struggle continued between the IRA and the paramilitary armies of the Unionists, 
accompanied with massive expulsions of people in order to establish and reinforce 
Ulster and its boundaries. Although the nationalists wanted the whole island, the fear 
of the Protestants was to be absorbed by the Catholics and led to acceptance of the 
1920 Act, which gave Ulster a parliament with limited jurisdiction. Fraser (2000) also 
argues that the partition of Ireland originated with the 1920 Act. The Southerners were 
ready to accept the Northern state but believed that if a boundary commission would 
be formed places like Tyrone, Fermanagh, Derry City where the nationalists were 
majorities would be given to them. But that did not materialize. The 1920 Act was 
accepted on the condition that the boundary commission would start working. The 
Irish leaders Griffith and Collins learned from Lloyd George that the commission 
would give those lands to the North. That was reflected on the treaty signed between 
the Irish and British states. The Anglo-Irish treaty created the Irish Free State by 
giving greater autonomy to the South with a dominion status. This would mean 
Southern Ireland would continue to be a part of the Commonwealth. Ireland would 
benefit from the same status as Canada (Adams, 1991). Both would pledge their 
allegiance to the King, who in return would send a Governor-General responsible for 
political arrangements and would supervise the constitution. Giving greater autonomy 
to the Southern part the status quo was legitimized, since the division between the two 
entities was confirmed. When the dominion status was acquired for the Southern part, 
some parts of society were not happy with the situation (Shannon, 1985).  
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The Irish parliament of the south, the “Dail” accepted the Anglo-Irish Treaty. 
Ireland’s first President de Valera resigned from his office. De Valera resigned 
because he believed that the Dominion status made Ireland vulnerable to Britain. He 
would have preferred an external association with the empire (Fraser, 2000). That 
event increased the level of polarization between those who were for dominion status 
and those aiming for independence (leaded by Michael Collins). Pro-and anti-Treaty 
forces started a civil war. A pro-treaty government was successful in controlling the 
Dail. Those who were successful in controlling the parliament were the Free State 
Army; their opponents were called IRA. In the election of June 1922 only 36 anti-
treaty Sinn Fein were elected to the 128-seat Dail. The IRA increased its operations 
with the Easter Rising tactics against the treaty forces, but could not win the battle 
against the treaty forces equipped with superior weapons and backed by the Roman 
Catholic Church. Not until 1927, constitutional politics dominated the political sphere. 
Former president de Valera formed a new party called as Fianna Fail (“Soldiers of 
Destiny”) to oppose Fine Gael19 (Shannon, 1985:9). 
Fianna Fail´s policy combined cultural, economic and political nationalism, and 
in particular was aiming at the dismantling of the 1921 settlement. In cultural 
terms, de Valera´s vision of a Gaelic Ireland was pursued through the continued 
fostering of the Irish language. In economic policy the goal was greater self-
sufficiency and industrial development through a tariff policy (Fraser, 2000:18). 
 
The question of land annuities created problems between Fianna Fail and Great 
Britain (Lloyd, 1996). Land annuities were payments made in the period 1891-1909 
                                                 
19 Fine Gael (FG): Southern political party formed by a merger between Cumann na nGaedheal (the 
free state governement in 1920s), the National Centre Party, led by a son of the last leader of the UIL, 
and General O´ Duffy´s blueshirts. Founded  in 1933 with O´ Duffy as its first leader, it looked as if  
Fine Gael would become a semi-Fascist party  on the European  model. O´ Duffy was forced to resign  
however and it settled down to become an orthodox conservative party, pro-British and anti-Republican  
(Farrell, 1980, p. 353) . 
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by the farmers, which have enabled them to buy back their farms from their landlords. 
Under arrangements between London and the Cosgave governments in 1923 and 
1926, the annuities were remitted to London. Those represented 18% of government 
spending and were seen as the major impediment to economic progress. As the 1923 
and the 1926 agreements were not ratified in the Dail, de Valera wanted to find ways 
not to pay that large amount of money to Great Britain. For this he chosed two policy: 
The first one was to remove the oath of allegiance to King George V, the second way 
to withhold the payment of the land annuities. The British government’s decision 
against those policies was to impose a 20% duty on imports from Ireland basically for 
agricultural goods. The Irish for their part choose to tax British exports of coal, 
cement, sugar, electrical machinery, iron and steel to counter the economic offensive 
of Britain. The issue of annuities was not to be solved for a longer period. 
 
Another problem coming from the 1921 Treaty with England according to de Valera 
was the existence of the office of Governor-General. In 1932, its holder James 
MacNeill has been removed from office and was replaced by a member of the Fianna 
Fail, Donal O’Buachalla. He worked to decrease the meaning of the office of 
Governor-General. De Valera had thought of a gradual plan towards the nullification 
of the dominion status, and the establishment of a republic (Lloyd, 1996). 
 
In 1936, in a time of crisis in Britain within the royal family, De Valera ordered the 
introduction of two acts. The Constitutional Amendment Act removed the monarch 
from the constitution, whereas the other called the External Relations Act retained the 
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symbolic role of the monarchy in foreign affairs (Fraser, 2000). With those steps, De 
Valera moved from the Free State to nearly a republic. The new constitution was 
accepted by 685,105 voters to 526,945.It came into effect on December 29,1937. The 
constitution formed under the guidance of de Valera had some kind of republican 
aspirations and Catholic social teachings mixed with a kind of pragmatism. The name 
of the Free State was changed to “Eire”. 
 
Before World War II, in the spring of 1938, De Valera sat for negotiations with the 
British prime minister, Neville Chamberlain. They reached an agreement on April 25 
on the issue of the annuities with an Irish payment of 10 million pounds. Also, Britain 
had to evacuate three southern ports of Ireland. Prime Minister Chamberlain was 
bitterly criticized by Winston Churchill for the loss of the ports since those had 
strategic importance in times of war. 
 
By making the 1921 treaty obsolete, De Valera had systematically, started to distance 
Ireland from the British Imperial system (Lloyd, 1996). But the distance between the 
two jurisdictions of Ireland was also augmenting at a time when the tension between 
religious sects was not diminishing. 
 
3.3  Ulster, a  repressive  state  apparatus 
In reality the struggle for the Catholics didn’t end since they believed that three more 
counties should at least join the South because they were in majority in these counties. 
The Protestants although embarrassed to have such a large minority within the new 
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state thought that if they gave up those counties, they would lose all their advantages 
and would abandon 90,000 Protestant to the South. So, the division of the island was 
based upon politics rather than geography (Farrell, 1980). Incorporation of all nine 
counties of Ulster into Northern Ireland would create a situation where a dangerous 
proportion would occur 56% Protestants to 44% of Catholics. “There were then 
890,000 Protestants and 690,000 Catholics in Ulster. Since the Catholics had a higher 
birthrate, it was conceivable that by the end of the century, they would comprise a 
slight majority”(Shannon, 1985: 12). When the state was established with six 
counties, by excluding Donegal, Cavan and Monaghan the Protestants obtained a two 
third majority in the region. When Protestants obtained the opportunity to form their 
own state with a large Catholic minority, they applied policies aiming to discourage 
Catholic participation in all of the state apparatus. Protestants created a system that 
would favor the Protestants while putting pressure on the Catholics and forcing them 
to the last point: armed counter-offense.  
So the Unionists set about constructing an Orange and Protestant state with 
almost all political power and patronage in their own hands ... and operated an 
elaborate and comprehensive system of discrimination in housing and jobs 
which kept the minority in a position of permanent and hopeless inferiority 
(Farrell, 1980, p .81). 
 
In July 1922 new measures were introduced to reduce the power of the Catholic 
minority. A local government bill was accepted which omitted the available system of 
proportional representation (PR) in the six counties at the local level. In addition after 
the bill, the local boundaries were redrawn for valorizing the votes of the Protestants 
and the elections were postponed till 1924 for implementations. What is more, when 
universal suffrage was accepted in all of Britain in 1945 by the labor government, 
 67
only Ulster retained restricted franchise for local government. The Stormont 
government adopted a more restrictive franchise called as “Representation of the 
People Bill ” in 1946.  
Some 10, 000 young married couples lost the vote in Belfast. The Bill also 
retained the extraordinary principle of company voting, whereby limited 
companies received up to six votes according to their rate able valuation, the 
votes to be exercised by the company directors (Farrell, 1980: 85) 
 
The discriminative policies were also seen in rural councils. The 28 Unionist-
controlled rural councils in 1951 were employing 218 non-manual workers of whom 
only 11, or five percent were Catholics. Catholics were better situated in lower-paid 
jobs compared to well-paid manual workers. Despite the fact that Catholics were in 
the poorer sections of the society, they were receiving fewer houses that were built by 
the municipalities since they should be controlled in some areas and more in some 
districts the allocation of houses was used as a tool to increase Protestant voters 
numbers. For elections to local councils, only home owning taxpayers could vote. 
Poorer Protestants were also affected but the majorities that were affected were 
Catholics. Property requirements changed the size of the local electorate. The number 
of voters that reached 900,000 for Westminster and Stormont elections, but for local 
elections, that number was about 600,000 (Tonge, 1998). Also regulations like the 
‘Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act’ empowering the authorities were of qualities 
that gave room to the use of arbitrary power...such as the possibility to outlaw 
organizations or to detain or intern people indefinitely without sending them to trial, 
seeing it as an offence the refusal of answering questions put by a policeman, if 
necessary blocking roads and bridges and evacuating or destroying houses and 
buildings (Farrell, 1980). In addition to set curfews, the will to establish exclusions 
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orders such as having the power to bar people from a remote area within the six 
counties in a manner that effective blocked the right of movement and freedom to 
chose their living place was violated. In 1923 a further development occurred in 
Ulster, a regulation empowering the government, examine bank accounts and to seize 
bank deposits was accepted. 
 
Employment was another area in which discrimination was applied. An example of 
that is the discrimination in industrial location decisions. Areas with Catholic 
majorities received only three quarters of the amount of the employment awards that 
were received by the Protestants between 1949 and 1963. The result was that a more 
industrialized east of Northern Ireland and a more rural west was formed throughout 
the years. Also discrimination in employment prospects can be given as an example. 
In 1972 almost one-third of Catholic males were unskilled, and the overall Catholic 
number of males that were unskilled was double the number of the Protestants. Finally 
discrimination in public sector appointments is seen in three ways. a- The security 
services that are of sectarian nature discouraged Catholics to join those governmental 
institutions. 
The regular police, the RUC, were to have been one third Catholic but in 1922 
Catholics were unlikely to join a force so much identified with the new state. 
Less than one sixth of the new force was Catholic, and the balance was made up 
by recruitment from the Specials... The Catholic proportion never increased and 
the Hunt Committee found that in 1969 only about eleven per cent of the force 
was Catholic. (Farrell, 1980: 96) 
 
b- the civil service contained few Catholics within its ranks since the lower echelons 
of the working force were accessible only to them. c- In local councils led by 
Unionists, Catholics had difficulties to find jobs. Catholics were impeached to be 
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materially strong since they were forced to get the worst jobs, aimed to break the 
confidence of the Catholics by making them understand they had no way to win 
(Tonge, 1998). 
 
3.4  Legitimization  of  the  Repression  in  Ulster    
After the partition, Protestants used their relatively better situations to discriminate 
against the Catholics of Ulster by becoming the hegemonic power in the area. 
Jonathan Tonge refers to an interview that gives the opinions of Protestants about the 
issue of discriminating against the other. Only 18% of the Protestants are admitting 
that Catholics were treated unfairly in Ulster.  
Protestant superiority was seen as the natural order, justified by the need for 
eternal vigilance against suspect Catholics. Electoral hegemony for Unionists 
was not seen as unjust, but rather as a justifiable product of the creation of North 
Ireland, with its attendant demographical and religious balance (Tonge, 1998: 
22) 
 
Some factors are cited by Protestants that do not see the situation of Catholics as 
abnormal. They pursue that some factors created the position of the Catholics in 
Northern Ireland. Those factors were used to banalize the current situation of the 
Catholic minority in Ireland. At first it was claimed that it was impossible to enact 
racist laws in Northern Ireland as a result of the Government of Ireland Act 1920, but 
that approach misses the point that all discrimination acts can be effectuated in local 
levels since that treaty binds the national level. Tonge shows the existence of racial 
theories even at the academic level in Northern Ireland although laws exist to protect 
the minority.  
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In 1955, one academic asserted that Catholics often were inferior, if only in 
those personal qualities that make for success in competitive economic life. 
(Wilson, 1955: 208-9)…Such an argument suggested a greater economic 
competence amongst the Unionist population, based upon a combination of the 
Protestant work ethic and superior schooling (Tonge, 1998: 23). 
 
The second point was that in local elections, manipulations to disenfranchise the 
Protestant proletariat existed. This situation was used to defend the view that those 
policies by their nature were not sectarian. Also the proportions of Catholics living in 
public houses were equal to Protestant. Both examples were used as pretexts that deny 
the economic difference between Catholics and Protestants. The proportion of poor 
Protestant people is smaller than the Catholic poor in fact. Also the number of 
Catholics is smaller compared to Protestants. 
 
Third, it is claimed that Catholics have excluded themselves from society by not 
entering into the institutions of Ulster. Abstention from Stormont by the Nationalist 
party is used as a pretext. But those critics are missing the point that in a majoritarian 
polity the Nationalist party becomes useless since it has no power to affect the 
legislative process. Also communities have not developed, throughout the years, the 
means of meeting each other; since the Catholics that maintained the old Gaelic 
culture and the Protestant Anglican culture saw in that environment their beliefs 
juxtaposed and alien to each other. 
 
Fourth it is claimed that as nationalists are disloyal, they have denied the existence of 
the Ulster state. Nationalists have excluded themselves from the social and political 
sphere by claiming that the Ulster state is illegitimate. This viewpoint also misses the 
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fact that as the institutions became unrepresentative they became illegitimate. Tonge 
claims that the Catholics have mostly persevered under the repressive policies of the 
Protestants by adopting a compliant behavior till the 1968´s.  
The explanation seemed to lie in a reaction against the violence of 1920-22. The 
Catholic minority had been defeated and cowed. They had no stomach for 
another round of violence and the vengeance it would bring upon them, and 
most of them were not even prepared to vote for people associated with violence 
(Farrell, 1980:100) 
 
3.5  Challenges  in  Transforming  the  Irish  Free  State  to  the  Irish  Republic 
Ulster in its formation process faced some important problems that shaped its policies. 
First, the Southern state from the beginning of the foundation of Ulster has developed 
a negative behavior towards its establishment since it was against the division of 
Ireland. Southerners saw the existence of Ulster as a continuation of British colonial 
rule, they had freed themselves but their brothers were still in captivity. Second, 
Protestants saw the hegemonic Catholic Church that existed in the Southern state, as a 
threat. For Unionists, events after the foundation of the Southern state are considered 
as the proof that they were right in terms of criticizing the position of the church in the 
state apparatus. Another controversial point is the difference of the identities that are 
vindicated by the states, one state is sponsoring the Gaelic identity whereas the other 
the Protestant British Identity. Both cultures are defending themselves against 
absorption. (Shannon, 1985) The Southern State asserted its Irish identity despite the 
continuing relations with Britain. Third, the existence of Ulster meant that the new 
state was unable and not powerful enough to control the Northeastern part of the 
island. As the Southern part saw Ulster in its sovereignty area the Northern state was 
seen as a threat to Southerners, as well as it shakes the memories of Irish people by 
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remembering their colonial days. Fourth, attempts to solve the economic problems 
that were especially important to the Southern state were not resolved, because of the 
reluctance of Ulster to develop a more cooperative approach towards its southern 
neighbor. Fifth, the constitution of 1937 that proclaimed the independence of the Irish 
state contained clauses that held the foundations of the state, which would reshape 
1949, rejected the permanency of partition, leveled the position of the church. 
Separatism, Theocracy and Unity were the major themes in the South, under the 1937 
Constitution it became an imperative to unite Ireland. This increased the level of fear 
in the North. In addition, the theocratic kind of apparatus of the Southern state also 
alienated the Northerners since those identified the newly formed state as “Papist”. 
Also the engagement of de Valera in protectionism had worsened the image of the 
South in Northerners eyes, by creating an impression of a state that is close to the 
world. Sixth, during the World War II Ireland remained neutral with the fear that if it 
aligned itself with Germany, Britain would invade them. As the naval ports of Ireland 
were of vital importance, Britain insisted on their use in exchange for giving back 
Northern Ireland to the Free Irish State, but de Valera did not trust the British 
government. The non-alignment with Britain in the war worried parents of the 
conscripts who became furious by thinking that their sons where fighting in the British 
army but their country was neutral. Seven, in the World War II, Northern Ireland was 
used for U.S army bases, which created an American sympathy towards Ulster, 
whereas, Free Ireland was closing all its capabilities to the United States of America 
and Britain. Ulster used that situation to improve its relation with Great Britain and 
USA. Eight, German planes bombed Ulster and caused important damages to 
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industrial installations of the region, which also created respect for Ulster in the eyes 
of London. 
Belfast was brought fully into the war through the large-scale air attacks of 15-
16 April and 4-5 May 1941. Some 900 people were killed in the first and 191 in 
the second, and half of Belfast’s houses were destroyed or damaged...although 
morale was badly hit, nothing identified Northern Ireland so closely with 
experiences of London, Coventry, Clydebank, Plymouth, and other British cities 
as the blitz (Fraser, 2000: 23) 
 
Nine, when the war ended, veterans returned to their countries. They were surprised to 
hear that Ireland had not contributed to their cause. Finally, as the south has weakened 
its ties with Britain and did not align itself with the British government, Unionists 
were reassured that the status of Northern Ireland could only be changed in Stormont. 
This was a serious blow to nationalists in Ulster, as well as to the government of Irish 
Free Republic since their policies had worsened the situation in the Northern Ireland 
issue (Tonge,1998).  
 
3.6  The  Impact  of  World  War  II 
When victory came in May 1945, Northern Ireland, owing to its cooperation with 
Britain, had secured its place (of course due to the lack of cooperation on the part of 
Eire also). The Ireland Act of June 1949 formally gave the promise of Britain to 
Ulster that it remains a dominion of His Majesty and Britain, and that decisions to 
change the status of it would require the approval of Stormont. In Ireland, a new party 
called as Clann na Poblachta was founded in July of 1946. De Valera called for early 
elections as result of which a new government comes to power. A year later, the 
Republic of Ireland left the Commonwealth. By 1949 the two jurisdictions of Ireland, 
contrary to southerners’ wishes were further apart than the leaders of the era of 
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partition (1920-1922) could have imagined in constitutional terms. Irish 
Republicanism was successful in one aspect. It had achieved one of its main 
aspirations by separating itself from the British imperial system but its other hope of 
ending the partition, had become an unachievable dream. (Fraser, 2000) 
 
As from 1922 until the fifties, violent street fights, mobs with the aim to destroy 
Catholic quarters, IRA bombings became routine in Ulster. Catholics who constituted 
more than 40 percent of the Ulster region had to live under the very repressive rule of 
the Protestants. Catholics were the exploited part of society with limited access to 
resources, because of ascriptive criteria’s they were terrorized under--the monopolized 
action of the state to use violence-- successively. The repressive rule materialized in 
the form of policies such as denying public housing aid, well-paid jobs, all aiming to 
deny scarce resources of the region to Catholics. As Nager would emphasize through 
the split labor theory, in a setting of competence between two ethnic groups, the 
ethnic boundary will be reinforced and ethnic conflicts are encouraged. The repressive 
rule was legitimized through perceptual explanations that are taking root since tension 
turns itself into violence. That led to disillusionment on the part of Catholics who have 
started to lose their hope of unification by legal ways. Ulster was formally formed as 
the result of the Anglo-Irish treaty looked for windows of opportunity, as Bartkus 
would point at. As Gurr said, at that crucial moment communal groups tried to find a 
way to manifest their grievances. The choice would be made between exit, autonomy, 
access or control. The problem emerged there as Ulster was a small entity formed on 
racial basis, even the most modest condition was impossible for the Protestants to 
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grant to Catholics. So, as Buchanan puts forward in the remedial rights only theory, 
the Catholics have ethically obtained the right to secede, if not in all Ulster, in places 
where they form the majority, as also confirmed according to “associative group 
theory”. 
 
Ireland first obtained the status of dominion and with the help of the tide of events 
(Windows of opportunity) has forced Britain to give in to its main goal; 
Independence. It was acquired in exchange for impartiality during the World War II. 
President de Valera thus managed to change Ireland’s position from autonomy to 
independence (exit) in its relations with Britain. The second wish of Ireland with 
Ulster, however seemed to be out of the question since Ulster has been able to solidify 
itself on its territory. But a major deficiency of Ulster was the existence of ethnic 
based political parties, which dominated the political arena. As Brown argued, that 
was a sign of “the tyranny of the majority” since minorities remain constantly 
powerless in the political sphere, an impasse for the Catholic minority. They were left 
with the option to consent to suppression or to start initiatives to break this vicious 
cycle. 
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Chapter IV 
 
Decolonization  and  the  Problem  of  Northern  Ireland  in  the  
Post–Second  World  War  Period  
 
 
4.1  Characteristics  of  the  Decolonization  Period    
From the 16th century to the 20th century Europeans defeated and captured one after 
another the other parts of the globe. But in the twentieth century the process was 
reversed on the global scene and one after another they started to free themselves from 
their oppressors. That period was called the period of de-colonization. It was 
characterized by:  
1-the dismantling of formal political and economic controls over non-European 
states, including in this the abolition of such institutions as the concessions and 
treaty ports in China, the restrictions on tariffs and the extra-territorial rights 
once enjoyed by Europeans in Turkey, Iran, Thailand, China and elsewhere. 2-
the dismantling of the “open economy” in colonial and semi-colonial states. 3-
the changed character of Europe’s demographic expansion into Afro-Asia and 
the partial check to its cultural and intellectual influence.4-the open competition 
for international influence in areas once formally or informally reserved to a 
particular colonial or great power (Darwin, 1988:16) 
 
All these developments did not in reality end the hegemony of the European powers 
since they had accumulated so much throughout the centuries, a lot of things that 
could not be easily returned to the colonized countries. (Lloyd, 1996) What happened 
was at most a humiliation that didn’t last long. Those can be exemplified as: 
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Secondly the economic meaning of decolonization, therefore has not been the 
collapse of “imperialist exploitation” but rather the rise of the branch plant and 
the multi-national company which could trade safely inside the defenses of the 
closed economy, largely immune from the hostility displayed by post-colonial 
governments to foreign enterprise proper (Darwin, 1988:15) 
 
The dismantling of the open economy has not greatly changed since the closed 
economy opened the gap between the rich and the poor countries, and the world 
turned out to be the Northern rich and the Southern poor. Only the oil rich countries 
had escaped from that trend and became richer. In some cases such as in Algeria, the 
Belgian Congo and Angola, the end of colonial rule meant the evacuation of almost 
the entire foreign population. Only in South Africa could Europeans live in an 
elevated social position that was seen as their birthright before in the former colonies. 
Europeans were most humiliated in that manner since in the countries where some 
Europeans preferred to stay they had to content themselves with the status of guest-if 
not attacked by people who wanted revenge-they lost their privileges. The last point is 
that the ex-colonies have become the object of an open competition. Was that not 
what the great powers had aimed to prevent in the colonial era? 
 
4.2  British  de-colonization  and  the  Commonwealth  Issues: 
Britain that accomplished its decolonization in the period following the Second World 
War has some major differences from the other European powers. John Darwin claims 
that the British decolonization differs from other European cases in three aspects: 1-
Britain mostly decolonized itself gradually in the years between 1783-1914. As an 
example the Thirteen Colonies were granted independence and the British colonies in 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa all received almost complete 
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internal autonomy after 1850.“In the British colonies the loosening of constitutional 
ties was accompanied by the reinforcement of economic, social and cultural bonds 
through greater trade, investment and migration” (Darwin, 1988:6). 
 
Britain had realized earlier than its European counterparts what was happening and 
envisaged a system in which it could pursue its vital interests by the formation of 
some legal mechanisms that transformed the empire to a kind of royal federation.  All 
that was done with a certain plan that was accepted by the nobility and the 
mercantilists and coordinated by the Colonial Office.2-Britain was sharing the same 
advantages with the other European nations in terms of economic and financial 
relations to third parties. So it was in a more advantageous position compared to other 
European states since it had also its own colonies that no one could use for its own 
interests.3-Britain preferred not to use the method of direct colonial rule on 
unnecessary occasions but rather chose to “influence, persuade, inveigle (by economic 
benefits) or frighten local rulers into cooperation with them” (Darwin, 1988:7). 
 
At the end of the Second World War, at the eastern end of the Mediterranean, Britain 
had to abandon its imperial possession of Palestine, which was under British mandate, 
and dismantle their informal standing on Egypt (Lloyd, 1996). What is more as the 
British were withdrawing from Greece, the responsibility to defend Greece and its 
neighbor Turkey was left to the United States. As the number of independent 
countries increased, the number of countries participating in the British 
Commonwealth arrangement was increasing too. The increase in the number in fact 
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was nothing more than an illusion since in the 1950s there were more members than in 
the 1920s but less cohesion existed in terms of producing common policies between 
the members (Lloyd, 1996). But the increase in the number had a positive side for 
Britain, that of being able to pursue an imperial policy without being hurt too much 
despite the losses of some advantages in many parts of the globe and the loosening of 
the leadership position against its allies of the war, the United States and the Soviet 
Union. Britain, following Indian independence, focused in that period on the issue of 
training the remaining colonies with the help of the Colonial Office agency. For a 
step-by-step devolution of powers that could guarantee that those colonies could rule 
themselves in the near future and to not permit any infringement from other countries 
(within and outside the commonwealth) the British government applied a program that 
was strictly controlling the stages of progress to independence. The term “Dominion 
status” was still used in those days to describe the final stage that a colony had 
reached, which equalized the status of independence plus membership in the 
Commonwealth (Darwin, 1988). 
 
In the 1960´s it became clear that the British Empire was coming to an end, that a 
dignified process of expanding the Commonwealth with the remaining colonies 
through a qualifying period in a meritious manner was over. The British taxpayers 
were not willing to spend money on the colonies that they had acquired at very low 
costs. The British governments as part of the devolvement process and in order not to 
pay the cost of maintaining law and order, once a government was established in the 
colonies charged those expenses and responsibilities to the localities. Those gestures 
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made easier the formulation of a policy of withdrawal from the colonies since the 
heavy spending to retain those places was seen as malicious by the general public. The 
1961 Commonwealth conference showed how embarrassing was the idea to manage 
the older colonies, the new independent states within the Commonwealth 
arrangement. 
When the Commonwealth Prime ministers met for their 1961 conference they 
had to consider South Africa’s position as a republic; as a result of the Indian 
precedent it had become accepted that a formal application for renewed 
membership should be made when a member became a republic and this gave 
the Asian and African members of the Commonwealth, supported by Canada, an 
opportunity to insist that the conference communiqué must include a 
condemnation of apartheid (Lloyd, 1996: 343) 
 
Offended by those gestures, South Africa quickly withdrawed its application and 
ended its membership of the Commonwealth when it proclaimed itself as a republic in 
May. 
 
The issue of race was at the center of discussions in the late1950´s.  
Until then it had been regarded as perfectly reasonable to attribute national 
success or failure to racial differences, and it was often assumed almost as a 
matter of course that white people were racially (or genetically) superior to 
everyone else. In a sense the apartheid legislation had simply codified a view 
that had been widely held for a long time (Lloyd, 1996: 343) 
 
These ideas were accepted at such a level by the colonizing countries that a person 
like Hobson known as a leftist also had used the racist rhetoric shows Lloyd. He wrote 
in his book, Confessions of an Economic Heretic (1938) that “ a situation like the 
present in which lower stocks and lower races displace higher races and higher stocks 
would denote a human retrogression” (Lloyd, 1996:343). The devastating experience 
of Hitler leading Germany changed this accepted situation and the idea of seeing 
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Asians or Africans inherently inferior waned. But it was still argued that they were 
lacking the experience for government in order to become independent. 
 
Before the 1960´s, policies based on the differences in citizenship rights were non-
existent for British subjects. The subjects of the monarch had experienced different 
laws that varied from place to place. In the ninetieth century, in some places, the 
inhabitants still did not enjoy the full rights of British subjects. In the self–governing 
colonies there existed provisions that empowered the administrations to exclude 
undesirable British subjects. People from the poorer parts of the empire were not 
permitted to change their residence area to obstruct them to undercut wage rates. 
Englishmen and Scotsmen that took part in establishing trade unions were chased 
form South Africa and Canada under the pretext of participating in revolutionary 
activities.  
 
The movement of population was another problem for Britain. By 1950, immigrants 
from the West Indies were brought up to think that Britain was also their “home”. 
They easily understood that England was not their home. By the late 1950´s a new 
flow of 50,000 immigrants per year from India and Pakistan started to come. By 1961 
as that number reached a 100,000 people per year, for that the Commonwealth 
Immigration Act was introduced. That law was widely criticized as limiting the free 
movement of labor as well as of being against the unity of the Commonwealth.  
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As time passed, the idea that some colonies were too poor or small to gain 
independence was abandoned, if not the existence of that entity is endangered by its 
neighbors. The appointment of Macleod as Secretary for the Colonies in October 1959 
by Macmillan is accepted as a turning point in Commonwealth affairs since that 
accelerated the process of imperial departure from the remaining colonies. By 1961 it 
was clear enough that Britain was trying to withdraw itself with a minimum cost to 
Britain and the British taxpayer. 
 
By the 60´s the Commonwealth countries had started to change their position towards 
Britain from any special commitment to a relation that would increase their benefits. 
As Britain had applied for partial membership to the European Economic Community 
and was rejected in 1958, it applied for a second time for full membership and was 
again rejected due to vetoing by France. The Commonwealth countries felt relieved 
but were deeply shocked to see that the newly formed European Community was 
more unified than the Commonwealth countries. In 1965, a secretary-general and a 
staff were established in London to ameliorate that situation. At first Commonwealth 
conferences started as meetings of Prime Ministers in an environment of tolerance and 
respect. As time passed, the new members realized that their membership was not 
beneficial to them since rather an environment of consensus was pushing them to 
compromise on issues that in normal conditions they would not and by that they 
understood that their interests could not be the same as Britain. 
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Another conference was held in Singapore in 1971, in the same year Britain 
successfully concluded its negotiations to enter the European Community. The 
conference was important since the relations between the Commonwealth countries 
were worsened since a number of attempts to form a federation had failed. This had 
shown that a number of countries, which have common frontiers, could have friendly 
relationships but closer association was not possible any more. As members of the 
Commonwealth understood that the British market was not going to be open as before 
to their exports, they started to participate or to form new economic associations, for 
example Canada agreed to set up a North American Free Trade Area with the United 
States in the 1980´s. Also other Commonwealth exporters widened and diversified 
their markets during the 1960s to be ready for the admission of Britain to the 
European Community. 
 
4.3  Problem  of  Northern  Ireland  after  the  War 
Ireland throughout the war chose to stay neutral but about 60,000 Irish citizens joined 
the British armed forces and hundreds of thousands of Irishmen worked in British 
weaponry plants. When German planes landed in Ireland their pilots were interned, 
but when British and American planes touched the ground they were permitted to 
rejoin their units in Ulster. As opposed to the Irish government many members of the 
IRA participated in sabotage efforts against the British war machinery. IRA members 
believed that a German victory could lead to a unified Ireland once again. The North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization by different means has tried to break the neutrality of 
Ireland but was not successful in that respect (Irvine, 1991). 
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In the first national elections in 1948 the government changed hands after 16 years 
Fianna Fail 20 was ousted from office by a coalition from 10 Clann na Poblachta21 
with 31 Fine Gael, 19 Labor 22 and 7 members from Clann na Talmhan (Farmer’s 
party) and James Dillon as an independent deputy. John Costello, Chairman of Fine 
Gael became Taoiseach, the President of Eire. Costello while visiting Canada 
proclaimed the official end of the Free State and the beginning of the Irish Republic, 
in other words the withdrawal of Ireland from the Commonwealth. In 1959 Sean 
Lemass became the new parliamentary leader of Fianna Fail and Taoiseach by 
replacing De Valera. Lemass pursued a new economical program by abandoning the 
self–reliance policies that were pursued from the formation of the Irish state till the 
end of the 1950’s. The new policies that were aiming at bringing foreign investment to 
the country were successful and changed the profile of the country. Between the years 
of 1962 and 1972, Irish exports rose by 271 percent. New industries made their 
appearance such as synthetic textiles, electrical machinery, ship and boat building.. etc  
                                                 
20 Fiana Fail (FF): Political party formed by De Valera in 1926 when he broke away from Sinn Fein in 
order to enter the Free State Dail. Fianna Fail´s policies were ostensibly mildly radical and republican 
and most of the former Sinn Fein TDs joined it. De Valera got into power in 1932 and Fianna Fail 
remained in power from then until 1973 with only two short breaks from 1948 to 1951 and from 1954 
to 1957....(Fianna Fail) has long since dropped any pretension to radicalism or Republicanism (Farrell, 
1980: 353). 
 
21 Clann na Poblachta (CnaP): A populist Republican party in the South. Founded by Sean Mc Bride in 
1946 it included many ex-IRA men and took substantial support from Fianna Fail while its radical 
social programme attracted left-wingers. Clann na Poblachta won 10 seats in the 1948 Southern 
election and formed a Coalition government with Fine Gael and Labour. The Coalition collapsed in 
1951 over a radical health scheme proposed by CnaP Minister Noel Browne.The party won only two 
seats in the 1951 election . It helped to support another Coalition government in 1954 but never 
recovered from the 1951 debacle and was finally dissolved in 1965 (Farrell, 1980: 352). 
 
22 Irish Labour Party (IrLP): the official trade-union based social democratic party in the South. 
Although it traces its origins to James Connolly and has retained a radical fringe over the years, it has 
always been solidly respectable and constitutionalist. It provided a ‘loyal opposition’ in the Dail during 
the civil war and has formed a Coalition government with the conservative Fine Gael party on three 
occasions (Farrell, 1980: 354). 
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From 1961 to 1971, agricultural employment declined from 371,000 to 274,000; 
a drop of 25 percent. In contrast the number of people involved in industrial 
production increased by about 25 percent, 187,000 to 233,000. During this 
period industry created 15,000 new jobs...Inflation drives up the cost of living 
and sex mores are changing. The New Irish life style has challenged traditional 
Catholic values and authority...Liberated men and women demand a greater 
secularization of Irish society (McCaffrey, 1979: 171). 
 
Ireland has effected important changes in its economy but still as the dependence on 
foreign markets, there is a continuous risks that a large-scale recession or depression 
in other countries could lead to a run over of foreign capital. What is more, prosperity 
in the new economy was not absorbed equally by everyone; rather the middle classes 
have profited from the situation, whereas the poor suffer from the inflation. 
 
In terms of foreign policy the Irish governments had tried to gain as much as possible 
from the rivalry between the U.S.A and the U.S.S.R by accommodating itself to 
shifting economic cultural and social environments.  
After the Soviet Union withdrew its objections, Ireland became a member of the 
United Nations in 1956. In New York...Irish diplomats condemned imperialism 
and spoke as representatives of Third World victims of colonialism...Their 
conduct at the United Nations often infuriated Catholic bishops in 
Ireland...particularly their open–minded position in regard to the admission of 
Red China into the international organization (McCaffrey, 1979: 172-3). 
 
Another issue on foreign affairs is the Common Market issue that Ireland joined on 1 
January 1973 with a popular voting, a referendum. Ireland applied to the Common 
Market in order not to lose in the competition against Britain and to receive funds for 
development, and the possibility to enter in new markets where to export its own 
goods (Jackson, 1999). 
With her entry into the common market, Ireland’s foreign policy stance has 
shifted from Third World to European, with attention directed more to Brussels 
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than to the United Nations in New York. Ireland since 1958 has turned her back 
on Irish–Ireland and/or Catholic Ireland isolationism (McCaffrey, 1979: 173). 
 
On internal affairs an important issue was the situation of the Protestants living in the 
Southern part of the isle. The Protestant majorities in the North from time to time 
criticized the situation of their brothers in the South, and blamed the Catholic state of 
the South.  
Pressure upon Protestants in southern Ireland came not from the government but 
from the Catholic Church. In the decades before Vatican Council II (1962–65), 
the Catholic Church held strictly to the rule that if a Catholic were marrying a 
non–Catholic, there could not be a Catholic wedding ceremony unless the non–
Catholic first promised in writing that all children born of the marriage would be 
brought up as Catholics. Because many Protestants acceded to this demand, 
Protestants ministers watched in sadness as the number of their younger 
communicants steadily declined through intermarriage with Catholics (Shannon, 
1985: 15).  
 
After the Second World War, Catholics in Northern Ireland understood that neither 
the IRA led violence nor the politicians of the Southern part could unite in the 
foreseeable future the two parts of Ireland (Tonge, 1998). They also saw that the 
possibilities given by the British Labor government, as welfare state fundings, were 
the sole way to improve their material conditions. A 1947 British education act gave 
the opportunity to enjoy the secondary education without payment. That event 
increased the education level of the Catholics who started to think of living in Ulster 
as first–class citizens rather than to force the Ulster state to collapse for unification 
with the Free State. That change in attitude resulted in the failure of an IRA campaign 
between 1956–1962 since it became difficult to recruit volunteers for fighting and 
because of the cooperation of police of both of the states of the Island (Irvine, 1991). 
The policies of president Lemass in the Republic had also affected the situation, when 
Ireland fully concentrated on development rather than the Northern Ireland issue the 
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terrorist organization had experienced difficulties of organization and funding…etc. 
What is more in January and February 1965 the Prime Ministers, Terence O’ Neill and 
Sean Lemass met each other and discussions started between the two governments in 
issues of economics and mutual concern. 
 
The phase of slow change was cut off with the beginning of some Civil Rights 
movements’ agitations in 1968. Those movements copied the precedents set by the 
civil rights movements of the U.S.A. In 1967 the Northern Ireland Civil Rights 
Association was formed in order to force the system to give equal citizenship, rights 
and opportunities to the people living in Ulster (Farrell, 1980). Several groups joined 
and started a march, singing songs of the American civil rights movement. The Royal 
Ulster Constabulary, B–specials and Protestant mobs, attacked those groups. The 
Ulster president encouraged by the Labor government of Westminster decided to 
make improvements to the issue of civil rights and social justice but was prevented by 
fanatics of the Orange Order who were guided by persons like the Reverend Ian 
Paisley23 and politicians such as William Craig24. In February 1969 to counter a 
                                                 
23 Rev. Ian Paisley 1926 -   : Loyalist politician. Protestant fundamentalist minister. Son of a Baptist 
minister and ordained by his father in 1946. Founded breakaway Free Presbyterian Church in 1951 and 
is now perpetual Moderator of it. Founded Ulster Protestant Action in early 1960’s, led extra–
parliamentary opposition to Terence O’ Neill in late 60’ s and served two short jail terms. MP for 
Bannside at Stormont 1970–73. MP for N.Antrim at Westminster 1970 to date. Elected as Protestant 
Unionist but founded Democratic Unionist Party in 1971, and joined William Craig and Harry West in 
United Ulster Unionist Coalition in 1974. Member of Northern Ireland Assembly 1973–76 Elected 
Euro–MP June 1979. (Farrell, 1980, p.347) 
 
24 William Craig 1924 -    : Loyalist leader. Solicitor and MP for Larne at Stormont 1960-73. Unionist 
Chief Whip 1962–63. Held various ministries 1963–68. Dismissed from ministry of home affairs in 
1968. Set up hard-line Unionist, Ulster Vanguard, later Vanguard Unionist Party, 1972. Member of 
Northern Ireland Assembly 1973–75. Mp for East Belfast at Westminster, 1974 to 1979. Extreme right 
–winger, closely associated with Loyalist Para–military groups. Member of Orange Order. (Farrell, 
1980, p.339–40). 
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hostile motion O’ Neill dissolved the parliament and choose candidates that were 
loyal to his reform policies. In the districts where he was elected with an 
overwhelming majority two opponents entered against him .The first person was the 
Reverend Ian Paisley. The second candidate to oppose him was Michael Farrell. 
Michael Farrell, a Catholic by birth but a Trotskyite by conviction, who had 
been prominent in the civil rights marches and whose aim was to divide the 
Catholic vote and weaken O’Neill. Farrell…in the radical wing of the civil 
rights movement, wanted revolution, not reform. (V.Shannon, 1985: 19). 
 
When the election results were released O’ Neill had won with a slight majority by 
gaining 7,700 votes to Paisley’s 6,300 and Farrell’s 2,300. The winning margin was so 
narrow that the prestige of O’Neill was without doubt damaged. Finally two months 
later, O’ Neill resigned from his office. The peaceful marches were forgotten again 
and violence reappeared in the scene in the “marching season”.   
Encouraged by police apathy, and sometimes support, Protestant mobs forced 
Derry and Belfast Catholics to retreat into barricaded ghettos. During the civil 
rights phase of the Ulster crisis, the IRA kept a low profile; promoting civil 
liberties as a strategy mobilize and radicalize Catholic ghetto communities. In 
1969, Protestant violence revived the IRA as a Catholic defense force, and 
Catholics welcomed IRA protection (McCaffrey, 1979: 181). 
 
As the IRA was brought back in life and evidently in action, the organization split into 
two wings: the Official and Provisional IRA’s. The split was the outcome of a 
decision of the leadership to downgrade military action and to not continue the policy 
of abstentionism from Stormont.  
This downgrading of the military in favor of the political was too much for the 
traditionalist militarists in the movement. In January 1970 at the Sinn Fein ard–
fheis (conference) they formed the Provisional IRA as a breakaway organization 
from what now became known as the Official IRA (Tonge, 1998: 42).  
 
Both groupings focused on different tactics that would serve for their own purposes. 
The most important group appeared as the provisional IRA: 
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Appealing to the tradition of Irish resistance in arms to British rule, proclaimed 
the necessity of violent action to end what it called the British occupation of 
Northern Ireland. It also used socialist terminology and at times a Marxist or 
near–Marxist interpretation of the Ulster situation, but the nationalist element 
has on the whole been dominant and it has been this grouping, which has been 
most involved in the campaign of violence (Irvine, 1991, p.116–117) 
 
In August 1969 the British government sent troops to Northern Ireland to reinstall 
peace and order (Bew, 1990). A contingent of 6,000 British troops was sent to be 
deployed in Belfast and Derry. Hitherto the British army used not to intervene in local 
events and were minor in numbers. But this time they came and were numerous than 
at other times. They were welcomed by Catholics who saw in them a role of protector 
against Protestant mobs and a police force believed hostile to them. But this did not 
last long and struggle between the British army and the Catholics became routinized. 
The initial friendliness of the Catholics ceased because the population was 
disappointed to see that some fundamental changes could not be achieved (Shannon, 
1990) .The disappointment turned to frustration for which the army was the obvious 
target since the army was identified with the status quo. The persistent traditional 
nationalism of Catholics was that the British army was the engine of the alien 
domination (Fraser, 2000). Following the resignation of O’Neill, there were by-
elections for Stormont in which Paisley and another fundamentalist clergyman fueled 
the existing tension between the two communities. 
 
In June 1970 during the general elections for the United Kingdom parliament, serious 
outbreaks occurred and finally the British army entered the Catholic Falls Road in an 
attempt to find hidden arms. The British army imposed a curfew in the Falls Road 
area where bombs were used against civilians. Later, during confrontations four 
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civilians were shot. After the summer of 1970, the IRA started a new campaign of 
violence in which the organization seemed to find fresh recruits more easily than 
before (Tonge, 1998). To counter this new wave of terrorism, the Stormont 
administration reintroduced in August 1971 the application of ‘internment without 
trial of suspected persons’. In accordance with the operations of the Army and the 
police there developed, between the years of 1971–74, a series of sectarian murders 
believed to have been performed by clandestine Para–militaries. On Sunday, January 
30, 1972, the event labeled as “Bloody Sunday” occurred. British paratroopers killed 
fourteen Catholics in a protest demonstration. After that event the level of terror 
increased in such proportions between IRA and the Ulster Defence Association25 
(UDA) that in March 1972, the Conservative Government suspended the authority of 
the Northern Ireland government for a period of one year by taking the 6 counties 
under direct British rule.  
The immediate consequence was the Resignation of Faulkner’s government, the 
suspension of the Stormont parliament, the appointment of a Secretary of State 
for Northern Ireland with a seat in the cabinet. The province was now virtually 
in total under the control of Westminster -the phase known as direct rule- 
(Irvine, 1991: 119). 
 
But the violence in Ulster could not be stopped, neither be contained. In June, the IRA 
offered a ceasefire with the desire to meet British ministers. Those were accepted after 
hesitations but did not serve any purpose and violence restarted. An incident known as 
                                                 
25 Ulster Defence Association: Hard–line Loyalist Para–military group formed at the end of 1971 out of 
existing ‘defence’ groups. Staged a series of mass rallies of masked and uniformed men early in 1972. 
The UDA is heavily armed and has been mainly responsible for the assassination campaign against 
Catholic civilians between 1972-1975. It is also heavily involved in gangsterism and protection rackets, 
and a number of its leaders have been killed or wounded in internecine struggles. The UDA is closely 
linked with William Craig’s Vanguard party and provided the muscle for the UWC ‘strikes’ in May 
1974 and 1977 (Farrell, 1980: 361). 
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“Bloody Friday” happened after that. After some incidents that happened in the Irish 
republic, the emergency powers law was declared and many IRA members were put 
on trial since it was believed that violence that was transferred from the Northern 
Ireland area had the potential to destroy liberal democracy in the republic and that 
foreign investors should not be scared (Jackson, 1999). 
 
In 1972 something very important happened in Ireland. After long debates about the 
Ulster issue, guided by intellectuals, some decisions were taken to create conditions 
that would cease the dividedness of Ireland. At first a national referendum removed 
the special status of the Catholic Church from the constitution (Article 44), the 
government raised social benefits to a level comparable to that of Britain. Another 
important decision was that Irish has ceased to be a requirement for secondary school 
and for all civil service appointments. What is more, the Supreme Constitutional court 
ruled unconstitutional the laws that were prohibiting the sale of birth control devices.  
 
In 1972 a green paper called The Future of Northern Ireland was published aimed to 
put suggestions for irresolvable issues in Northern Ireland (Shannon, 1985). That was 
done with the collaboration of the Secretary of State and the British government in 
order to fill the gap of the political actors that appeared with the abolition of Stormont 
.In the Green Paper: 
Political parties and groups put forward suggestions, ranging from that of Ulster 
Unionist party for a revival of a local parliament and administration with some 
superficial changes, to that of the SDLP which advocated joint sovereignty of 
Great Britain and the Irish Republic over Northern Ireland as a transition stage 
towards unity by consent of the whole Island; between these two a various range 
of intermediate options was put forward (Irvine, 1991: 121). 
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The Westminster government in accordance with the Green paper formulated a 
proposal aiming to form a devolved government. That had to be formed out of an 
eighty-seat parliament constituted with proportional representation and a cabinet 
shaped by the different parties in proportion to their strength. The process was aimed at 
adding Catholics in the governance. Shared responsibilities with Catholics alarmed the 
hard-line Unionists led by Paisley but the 1973 elections showed that the majority 
favored the arrangements (Wichert, 1991). The SDLP obtained 19 seats, the Alliance 
(liberal Unionist party) 8, the main Ulster Unionist party under Brian Faulkner 23 and 
various extreme Unionist groups 27 seats. The first meeting of the parliament was 
unsuccessful because of the disruption caused by the extreme groups. That event was 
followed by talks between the British and Irish governments and led to the 
Sunningdale Conference. The conference in December 1973 was held between the 
Official Unionists, SDLP, Alliance parties and the British and Irish governments. 
The Unionist and the British government wanted the Irish government to 
guarantee the new arrangement in the north and to lay to rest the ghost that 
Ireland could somehow be unified by force against the will of the majority of the 
people in the north...The Sunningdale Agreement includes a declaration by the 
Irish government that it “fully accepted and solemnly declared that there could 
be no change in the status of Northern Ireland until a majority of the people of 
Northern Ireland desired a change in that status”(Shannon, 1985: 23) 
 
An agreement was reached to form a power-sharing executive for Northern Ireland 
made up of six Faulkner Unionists, five SDLP and one Alliance member. There was to 
be formed a Council of Ireland acting on unanimity as a consultative agency in the 
fields of natural resources, agriculture trade and industry, tourism, roads and transport, 
public health, and culture and arts. 
 93
The Dublin government and the SDLP, both mindful of the nationalist emotions 
of their respective constituencies wanted some all-Ireland institution created that 
would demonstrate that they were making progress, however slowly and 
modestly, toward the ideal of national unity. Faulkner agreed to a two-level 
political structure. There was to be Council of Ireland made up of cabinet 
ministers from Belfast and Dublin who, with the aid of a small permanent staff, 
would seek to harmonize policies and laws relating to political terrorism 
(Shannon, 1985: 24) 
 
An issue that stayed unresolved was the issue of cooperation on terrorism; more 
specifically the Unionist and Westminster governments wanted a treaty requiring 
Dublin to extradicate suspects to the North. This couldn’t be achieved for various 
reasons. One was, Ireland pressing a case in the European Court of Human Rights 
against Britain that the British government was guilty of religious discrimination and 
torture. The new executive started its duty at the beginning of 1974, with Brian 
Faulkner as the Prime Minister and Gerry Fitt of the SDLP as his deputy.  
When the new power-sharing executive took office in January 1974, it looked 
on the surface as if twenty months of Direct Rule had been successful: the 
protestants appeared to have accepted a compromise, the Catholics seemed to 
have voted for constitutional politics, violence had declined considerably since 
the previous year and there appeared to be a prospect of working out a political 
solution (Wichert, 1991:165) 
 
Faulkner knew he could dismiss these all-Ireland arrangements as nonsense since the 
Consultative assembly and the permanent secretariat could do nothing without the 
explicit approval of the Belfast government but to many of the Unionist voters these 
were seen as the institutions of a united Ireland .A third of the electorate had given its 
vote to non-Faulknerite Unionism. Neither Protestant, nor Catholic paramilitaries had 
handed in their weapons and the existence of a Council of Ireland enraged loyalists and 
didn’t calm the extreme Catholic nationalists. After the executive took office in 
January 1974, the Ulster Unionist Council rejected the Sunningdale agreement and 
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Brian Faulkner had to resign as leader of the Unionist Party and the movement split 
into two: The Faulknerite Ulster Unionist Party and the United Ulster Unionist 
Coalition (UUUC). In February 1974 a surprise general election was called. The 
Faulkner Unionists lost all of its twelve seats in the British House of Commons 
whereas enemies of the power-sharing arrangement won eleven seats. The only power-
sharing supporter to be elected was Gerry Fitt in Catholic West Belfast .If the elections 
had been conducted with proportional representation voting, the power-sharing 
supporters would have won many more votes and then representation. In May 1974 a 
new organization known as the Ulster Workers Council announced a general strike on 
May 14. 
The leaders were members of the Protestant working class...they represented a 
genuine revolt from the shop floor and the streets by people who believed that 
aristocratic landlords and wealthy businessmen who had led the Unionist party 
for more than fifty years were betraying Protestantism and Ulster (Shannon, 
1985, p.26). 
 
The objectives of the general strike were the abrogation of the Sunningdale Agreement 
and new elections to the new assembly. The political strikes that were held one year 
earlier --for ending direct rule-- were unsuccessful but this time Protestant paramilitary 
gangs were better organized and forced people to participate in the strike by violent 
methods. The strike could not be stopped because the police was not controlled by the 
executive but from London. The policeman simply stood aside from the affair and 
strikers after two weeks succeeded in shutting down the electric power stations so to 
paralyze the province. The executive resigned. Different groups learned a lot from this 
affair. The British government understood that an external attack on the authority of 
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parliament had been successful so British rulers understood that no solution could be 
imposed from outside Ulster (Wichert, 1991). 
 
After those events, Faulkner lost his standing and power in the Unionist party for 
falling to pay enough attention to the opinion of the grass roots. The Unionists 
understood with that event the potential of the UDA had to mobilize working-class 
support. The SDLP leadership understood that power sharing in Northern Ireland was a 
possible and also a desirable goal that perhaps could be achieved once again in the 
future. The Catholic population was once again intimidated and their doubt about the 
possibility of reform and compromise from the unionist community was shakened. The 
IRA that provided essential services to the Catholic minority during the strike, was 
happy to strengthen its ties with the population once again. Protestant workers who had 
participated in the strike “realized that the ‘spirit of 1912’ was not dead and that they 
could still rebel against British politics”(Wichert, 1991: 168). 
 
The era after the World War II, known as the decolonization period, saw the 
emergence of numerous states on the international scene. Many states used the 
nationalistic primary rhetoric of self-determination. The UN General Assembly by 
adopting on December 14,1960 the resolution number 1514 paved the way for 
colonies to freed themselves from their oppressors. But as time passed the principles 
of ‘self-determination’ and ‘sovereignty’ clashed with the principle of ‘territorial 
integrity’. Major powers disagreed to the implementation of the resolution to non-
colonial settings. 
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A second global trend in the world was the civil rights movements that changed the 
racial policies of the United States of America (USA). That event had led to the 
formation of civil rights movements employing peaceful, non-violent methods for 
claiming the nullification of grievances, which existed because of the political 
systems. In Ulster the same methods were tried by the Catholic minority but were 
countered by violent methods by the sectarian Ulster policing forces and evidently the 
Orange Order. The state was not willing to discuss the options that Gurr (2000) 
claimed to exist. That situation helped the radical groups such as the IRA to recruit 
new members for fighting the Protestant state apparatus, and, if possible, to destroy it.  
 
At the same time in the Southern state, the events that Buchanan (1998) redouted, 
occurred. With the secession of Ulster from the Irish state, the Protestants who lived 
in the South became a minority of 10% of the Southern population. Although the Irish 
Republic didn’t explicitly exert pressures on the minority, the minority fell to 3% of 
the population. This helped for the perceptual explanations of radical Protestant 
leaders of the North that fueled constantly the risk of devastation by the Catholic 
majority if one day unification occurs. This brought Britain again in Northern Ireland 
and helped the Catholic militants to claim that they were fighting a war of colonial 
liberation. 
 
The policies of the new prime minister of Ireland, Lemass affected the Catholic state 
to expose itself to the outside world. The policies that were applied focused on 
developing the country rather than trying to solve the Northern Ireland issue. But 
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those policies brought together Terence O’Neill and Sean Lemass, the two prime 
ministers of the respective states of Ireland, in 1965. This was an important event, 
which led in the future the prospects for dealing the Northern Ireland issue between 
the governments of Ireland as well as Britain. The Sunningdale conference ending 
with an agreement that suggested devolution of power for Northern Ireland led to a 
power-sharing executive that had to resign as a result of the grass-roots 
demonstrations that plagued the country. The elite of Ulster could not apply the treaty 
since the Protestant working class, supplemented by paramilitaries, resisted the 
implementation of the treaty because of the fear of being deprived of their 
comparative advantage against the Catholics. So in that case, too, the competition for 
resources set the agenda, resulting in the deception and fear of Catholics to a peaceful 
resolution of the conflict. 
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Chapter V 
 
Structural  Changes  In  Northern  Ireland  From The 1970’s  
To  The Present  Times. 
 
 
Irish public life-mostly in the republic and later in the relations between Ireland and 
Ulster-from the early 1970´s through the mid 1990´s was mainly affected by three 
events: the oil crises of 1973 and 1979, membership of the European Economic 
Community (in1973), and the endless turmoil in Northern Ireland.  
 
5.1  Economics  reflected  on  politics 
The oil crises of the 1970´s had important results for the region: the 1973 crisis had 
quadrupled the price of oil and the hikes of 1979 had amplified the results of the prior 
crisis. The Irish economy was already in a fragile situation when the crisis came. 
Even before the oil crisis, the Fianna Fail Minister of Finance, George Colley, 
had decided to break a fundamental convention of Irish public finance in 
drawing up his plans for 1972-by failing to balance the current budget of the 
state and permitting a projected current account deficit of around 1,3 percent of 
GNP.... By 1974 the current deficit had reached 92 million Pound, or 3,1 per 
cent of GNP; and in 1975, the nadir of Irish public finance, this deficit had 
swollen to just under 259 million pound, or close to 7 percent of GNP (Jackson, 
1999: 378)  
 
Some policies of stabilization were applied to bring the current account deficit under 
control but those policies only encouraged projections of growth since increasing 
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public spending in order to stimulate the economy had increased the amount of public 
deficit. 
Once again, an in 1973, it was oil, which converted a dangerous situation within 
the public finance into cataclysm: the oil crisis of 1979 added a crucial external 
dimension to the home-grown inflationary pressures. By 1979 the Irish balance 
of payments deficit was 10.1 percent of GNP; and, though there was a slight 
recovery in 1980, this figure slipped to 12,5 percent in 1981. By December 1992 
the accumulated debt of the state had reached 12 billion pound (Jackson, 1999: 
379) 
 
During the 1970’s Keynesianism was applied in economics. The disastrous results of 
successive ministers of finance involved the accumulation of huge debts, so a 
continuous budgetary problem. The policies applied in the 1980´s to calm the situation 
worked a little but the country became totally dependent on international markets. 
Thus meant that an international crisis of the stock markets could create grave 
problems for Ireland (Such as the collapse of international markets in 1987,the 
currency crisis of 1992). The irresponsive and partisan policies of the 1970 ´s were 
paid at high costs  
It was their successors in the 1980s...who paid the price for this mixture of 
misjudgment and misplaced party loyalty. The cost involved the modification of 
certain fundamental attitudes and institutions within Irish political life (Jackson, 
1999: 380) 
 
In the 25 years between 1948 and 1973 only six changes of government occurred; 
while in the 25 years between 1973 and 1998 there were 12 such changes. What is 
more between 1989 and 1998, Fianna Fail was able to enter into coalitions with the 
Labor or the Progressive Democrats in order to acquire power. Economic pressures 
accompanied by international influence had an ideological impact on Irish politics. As 
the tax levels were increased, public spending reduced the middle classes who were 
taxed at source and especially the poor sections of the society that benefited from 
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welfare provisions and state expenditure suffered. Unemployment levels remained 
high in the 1980s and 1990s, reaching a level of 300,000 jobless (21 percent of the 
workforce). All those led to a growth of class politics in Ireland.  
 
The economic crisis of the late 1980’s was due to the misgovernance of the early 
years in the form of debts, as well the collapse of international stock markets that 
occurred in 1987 and after (Jackson, 1999). The economic pressures helped to the 
creation of a radical conservative party with the name of Progressive Democrats as 
well as to some new alignments within the mainstream political parties of Fianna Fail 
and Fianna Gael. Fianna Fail, which was known for its political populism and 
opportunism, had to review its policies in the late 1980s by accepting neo-liberal 
policies used in other suffering economies. Similarly Fianna Gael changed social-
democratic emphases to a neo-liberal position. That situation was seen in the promise 
of the Fianna Gael leader FitzGerald -after the election defeat of 1987- to support 
Fianna Fail minority government if it applied the rigorous budgetary constraints of 
spending cuts and economic growth. The strategy known as the Tallaght remained in 
force until 1990.  
 
5.2  Entry  to  the  EEC  and  the  problem  of  Northern  Ireland  
Ireland’s interest in membership for the EEC was due to the crisis of confidence she 
was experiencing in the 1950’s. This was ameliorated by the policies of Whitaker and 
Lemass that changed the culturally xenophobic and economically protectionist Irish 
guideline of governance. Ireland was willing to enter the community for several 
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reasons. In more immediate terms, membership was attractive because it promised to 
Ireland, immediate cash profits because of the Common Agricultural Policy that was 
formulated in 1963. Membership also meant the application of the wider economic 
and political goals of Lemass. Those included lowering tariffs and his “technocratic” 
approach to Irish partition (Jackson, 1999) Ireland’s application (as well as British 
application) was overturned in 1963 because of French suspicions that those 
applicants, if accepted as members, would act as American Trojan horses to conquer 
the fortress of European Civilization. When General de Gaulle retired from the French 
Presidency in 1969, the most important element to block Irish membership was 
eliminated .So negotiations restarted for British and Irish membership and with a 
referendum held on 10 May 1972, which approved Ireland’s admission. Irish 
membership was formally approved on 1 January 1973. The president that made 
structural changes for Irish admission, Lemass, died 18 months before seeing his 
dream realized: the admission. 
 
From 1973 to 1991 Ireland received subventions from Brussels amounting to about 14 
million pound. The Common Agriculture Policy due to its subsidiary mechanisms 
brought enormous benefits to Irish farmers whose income doubled in the first five 
years of Irish membership. Before 1991, 10.3 billion out of 14 billion pound given to 
Ireland was used in the agricultural sector. Although there was a real growth and 
diversification of the economy in late 1990s, the Irish economy still depended on the 
agricultural sector with a quarter of total export value coming from that sector in the 
beginning of the decade. Direct subventions from the Common Market decreased the 
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impact of the economic crises of the 1970s and 1980s and helped to keep up Irish 
living standards. Membership of the EEC also underlined the attractiveness of Ireland 
to American investors. The arrival of European and American capital in the 1970s and 
1980s had affected the overall form of Ireland’s trading relationships: the historic 
commercial links between Ireland and Britain were gradually replaced by a more 
diverse web of economic partners (Jackson, 1999: 386). 
 
Membership to the EEC has changed the nature of relationship between Ireland and 
Britain. Before the difference in per capita GDP between the two countries was 
largely in favor for Britain.  
Disparities in power and wealth, combined with intimate cultural and economic 
bonds, made for a political relationship charged with British condescension and 
Irish defensiveness. Shared membership of the Community brought some 
oxygen into this fetid atmosphere: Ireland’s economic links with Britain have 
grown more tenuous, while at the same time Irish interests within the European 
Union have often brought a strategic unity with the British (Jackson, 1999: 388)   
 
Ireland was able to break its connection -established in 1826- with sterling in joining 
European Monetary system before Britain in 1979. What is more, Irish GDP per head 
overtook that of the British in 1997. As a result of this process of economic release the 
political relationship between Ireland and Britain inside the European Union has 
improved. Because of the mechanisms of the community, British and Irish bureaucrats 
had to work together in many issues, which brought an increased degree of 
understanding and sympathy than before (Jackson, 1999). Later, interests that 
coalesced in the European level shaped Anglo-Irish relations. The Fianna Gael leader 
FitzGerald in 1976 spelled out an example of that special relationship to the British 
Foreign Secretary, Tony Crosland. He argued that: “Irish interests lay in an 
 103
equilibrium between the three major powers of the EEC, and that a more active British 
role suited the Irish since it mitigated the threat of Franco-German domination”. 
(Jackson, 1999: 388)  
 
Close British-Irish communication, formed as a result of interaction in European 
issues,” lay behind the radical initiative on Northern Ireland which began tentatively 
in 1981 and which culminated in the Anglo-Irish agreement (November 1985)” 
(Jackson, 1999: 388–89). The most important step for the crisis of Northern Ireland 
was made with Lemass´s creative redefinition of anti-partitionist strategy, to form 
cooperative institutions between the two Irish states in order to end partition. The 
renunciation of violence and imposition on Northern Ireland formed the foundations 
of the policies to be pursued in 1973, at the Sunningdale Conference, and in 1984-5 
with the New Ireland Forum and the Anglo-Irish agreement.  
 
5.3  The  Armed  struggle  and  the  political  side  of  the  armed  struggle 
The collapse of the executive led the British government to install “direct rule” in 
Northern Ireland. For the past ten years, the region has been governed in a similar 
pattern of crown colony. A British cabinet minister, appointed as state minister by 
Westminster, and several junior ministers, take decisions in consultation with a civil 
bureaucracy. The people of Northern Ireland do not participate in electing the 
governing agencies. They are permitted only to vote for local councils, which have 
minor powers, and for the parliament in Westminster (Shannon, 1985: 28). 1974 to 
1976 were considered as the years of the Protestant backlash. According to M. Smith 
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(1995) from the spring of 1972 the murdering of Catholic civilians increased, the so 
called “Protestant Backlash” started, in that year loyalists were responsible for 102 
deaths through shootings and bombings. By 1977 total loyalist killings reached 531. 
According to Farrell, the main agencies operating the backlash were the UDA´s 
military wing, the Ulster Freedom Fighters26, and the Ulster Volunteer Force27. The 
members of those radical organizations tended to regard all Catholics as potential 
rebels. So their victims were Catholics who had nothing to do with the republican 
movement. (M.Smith, 1995) The main aim was to terrorize the Catholic population, to 
‘choke-off ’or to not support the Provisionals (PIRA). The incidents had generated 
great fear and anxiety within the Catholic community. Unionists who had succeeded 
in dismissing the executive were ready to eradicate any remaining Catholic 
opposition. Many Unionist voters that were joyful with the collapse of the executive 
thought that the time had come for a better bargain with the British and the Catholic 
minority. But they quickly learned that what they had dreamed could not be so easily 
realized (Shannon, 1985: 27). The British government held elections for a new 
convention in order to force some change in the region, a better constitutional 
settlement. But that was impossible since the hard-liners, led by Paisley and Craig had 
obtained the majority of the seats in the new convention. Faulkner’s organization 
                                                 
26Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) : An extreme Loyalist murder squad who announced their existence 
and their intention of killing Catholics in 1973. They claimed responsibility for the murder of an  SDLP 
Senator in June 1973 and subsequently of many other Catholics. It is generally assumed that the UFF is 
simply a pseudonym for UDA murder gangs (Farrell, 1980: 362). 
 
27 Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) 1966-75 : The old UVF disappeared after 1922, but in 1966 the  name 
was revived by a small Loyalist group who murdered two Catholics that summer. They re-emerged to 
plant a series of bombs which toppled the Prime Minister Terence O´Neill in 1969, and since then the 
UVF has expanded into a large para-military organisation,more disciplined than the UDA but equally 
involved in sectarian killings. Despite occasional semi-radical utterances the UVF is violently anti-
socialist and has connections with the British National Front Organisation.(Farrell,1980: 364). 
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served nothing since he obtained devastating results and retired from politics. The 
majority of the convention voted for a return to the government form of the pre-1972 
with only minor changes. The SDLP rejected that proposition and the British 
governments continued to veto its application. At the same time the Provisionals were 
placed in a dilemma: Loyalist killings were undermining PIRA’s claim to be the 
defenders of the Catholic population. If PIRA failed to react to stop the attacks it 
risked losing much of its credibility amongst nationalists. Yet to respond in kind 
would confute the republican principle of non-sectarianism, which the movement had 
sought to observe in principle (M.Smith, 1995).The republican ideology in fact, was 
seen as non-sectarian, PIRA’s attacks, were done mainly against the RUC and UDR28. 
M. Smith (1995) argues that the PIRA units tried to avoid the killings of civilians 
since “the image of non-sectarianism” was necessary to prove to Protestants that a 
single nation would not be against their interests. Despite the rhetoric of the PIRA’s 
leadership, it was clear that from the mid-1972s, those Provisional units had started to 
kill Protestants in the same manner as their loyalist counterparts. The participation of 
PIRA units in the sectarian war was a confirmation for many Protestants that a united 
Ireland would bring disaster for them and made them more resistant to such a prospect 
(Shannon, 1985). PIRA members by rule never gave importance to the Protestant 
tradition since those were considered as tools of British imperialism whose will to 
defend their interest would collapse when colonial patronage would be ineffective 
                                                 
28 Ulster Defence Regiment : A local part-time military force established in 1970 to replace the B 
specials. Under British Army control, it was intended to be religiously mixed and only lightly armed. It 
was quickly infiltrated by Loyalist para-military groups and most of the Catholics left after the 
introduction of internment. By January 1974 its membership was over 97 per cent Protestant. At the 
same time Loyalist pressure has ensued that the UDR is now armed with self-loading rifles, sub-
machine guns, Bren guns and Browning machine guns mounted on armoured cars. Its strength early in 
1975 was about 8, 000 (Farrell, 1980: 361-362). 
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(M.Smith, 1995). As the Provisionals believed that the power to change the status was 
in the hands of British politicians in London, they diverted their military instrument to 
Britain. The main aim was to terrorize the British population, to create a feeling of 
insecurity in the populace in order to make feel them that they were never immune 
from the conflict in Northern Ireland. Wichert (1991) argues that it was believed that 
the feelings of insecurity would transform itself into political pressure for withdrawal 
since the populace would start to question the role of the British army in Ireland and 
whether the continuous British rule was inflaming the conflict. In late 1975 attacks 
were started in England, and especially the wealthy and influential members of society 
were intimidated in the belief that these people could brought the PIRA’s message to 
the highest establishments  
 
In late 1976 the I.R.A and the Protestant gunmen reached a truce after that the I.R.A 
violence had surpassed the loyalist one. In November 1979, new round of talks were 
started with political leaders under the leadership of Humphrey Atkins, Mrs. 
Thatcher’s first minister for Northern Ireland .The talks under his leadership were 
unsuccessful. The basis for the failure of all political initiatives in the 1970s is to be 
found in the economic developments, which reinforced the political perceptions. 
As the middle classes continued to do better, the consequences of the oil crisis 
and world over-capacity began to de-industrialize Northern Ireland. As a 
consequence the gap between the middle and the working classes grew ever 
wider and any attempt at political modernization of these low-income groups 
was forestalled by social and economic fears. It was therefore the respective 
working classes, which continued to force moderate political leaders on both 
sides into retrenchment and made moderate political progress impossible. The 
centuries-old tribal certainties of the extremist groups appeared to be safer for 
the majority of the population than the vagueness of middle-class politicians 
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who seemed to add political insecurities to the existing economic ones. 
(Wichert, 1991: 177-178). 
 
The government’s attempts to end economic discrimination with the implementation 
of the Fair Employment Act of 1976 through the Fair Employment Agency was seen 
as counter-productive to end violence since every job given to a Catholic meant a loss 
for a Protestant. Wichert asserts that the implementation of the fair employment act 
particularly affected the Protestant working classes “since the legal end of 
discrimination against Catholics in employment effectively worked against the 
employment of Protestants”(1991:179). The increasing tension in the society made 
difficult the acceptance of the British and Irish proposals that power would be 
returned to Protestants only if they showed their willingness to share it with the 
Catholics. In the years of 1980 and 1981 the crisis known as the ‘dirty protest’ 
dominated the political sphere. Those were protests and hunger strikes led by the IRA 
prisoners who aimed to regain their “special category status” that recognized them as 
quasi-political prisoners.  
Each death was marked by a huge funeral attended by thousands of 
sympathizers. Hunger strikes are an ancient tradition in Ireland. In Irish 
nationalist and revolutionary politics in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, funerals were frequently transformed into political demonstrations. 
The sacrifices of the hunger strikers awakened dormant passions among many 
Irish people who were hostile to I.R.A violence. The martyrdom of the hunger 
strikers also reinvigorated the romance and fanaticism of the I.R.A legend. It 
helped attract fresh support, not only from the organization’s traditional 
recruiting grounds -the West Belfast and Derry working-class neighborhoods- 
but also among college-educated, middle-class youths (Irvine, 1991: 129) 
 
James Prior -who served from 1981 to 1984- as Secretary of State replaced Humphrey 
Atkins a month before the end of the hunger strike. Although that previous initiatives 
had failed, James Prior believed that a constitutional solution could be found. He 
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suggested a model that came to be known as the ‘rolling devolution’. By that, another 
assembly had to be formed that would function as a consultative agency  -with the 
rights to scrutinize legislation- in the beginning for Northern Ireland. The role could 
be extended to include the supervision of government departments of Northern Ireland 
and finally to a legislative function if cross-community could be reached. The 
necessary legislation to enable the application of the plan was passed from the 
Westminster and elections were held in October 1982 by a proportional representation 
system for a 78-seat assembly. 
 
Wichert (1991) argues that a significant change in Northern Ireland between 1981-84 
was the coming–back of Sinn Fein to electoral politics. Those years were important 
for the Provisionals since they had obtained victories in elections in Northern Ireland. 
The results of the by-elections of 1981 and the elections of 1982 were important since 
the PSF´s triumph represented a clear erosion of the SDLP´s hold on the Nationalist 
vote. Irvine (1991) says that the two main Unionist parties were able to obtain 
between them 47 seats and the Alliance 10. The SDLP had 14 members and Sinn 
Fein; the political wing of the Provisional IRA that participated in such an election for 
the first time won 5 seats and 10 per cent of the total poll. That reach was considered 
as a step forward to displace the SDLP as the main voice of nationalism in Ulster. 
M.Smith, (1995) claims that the degree of support not only increased the confidence 
of the Provisionals for themselves but also attracted external interest. In fact in July 
1983 Gerry Adams was received in London as the guest of the leader of the Greater 
London Council, Ken Livingstone. Adams used this opportunity to express its cause: 
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he explained how the PSF was going to undermine the SDLP in order to establish a 
kind of republican veto. But something different occurred. “Both SDLP and Sinn Fein 
members refused to take their seats in the assembly, which destroyed all hopes to it 
achieving the desired ‘cross-community support’...it was finally dissolved in June 
1986” (Irvine, 1991:129). As the popularity of the Provisionals increased the danger 
that the SDLP that was running for peaceful politics could be smashed and replaced 
by Sinn Fein appeared probable. Under these conditions, John Hume who was the 
leader of the SDLP, put pressure on the Irish Republic to take the initiative to 
determine the nationalist agenda. By the nationalist agenda it was asked from Ireland 
“to spell out for the first time what constitutional guarantees and institutional 
structures a united Ireland might offer, and to press the British government and the 
Unionists for some response. Out of Hume’s efforts came the New Ireland Forum 
(Shannon, 1985: 30) 
 
The public sessions began on May 30, 1983 with twenty-seven members, thirteen of 
them from the government parties forming the coalition (eight from Fine Gael and 
five from Labor), nine from the Fianna Fail, and five from the SDLP were the 
participants. These four parties, it was claimed by the Forum, represented over 90 
percent of the nationalist population and almost three-quarters of the entire population 
of the island. The Unionist parties and the Alliance rejected all the invitations for 
participation. Although political parties representing Protestant opinion were missing 
individuals and groups from the north made written and oral submissions to the 
Forum. A total of 317 written submissions were received from both parts of Ireland, 
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Britain, the United States, Belgium, France, and Canada. The Forum invited thirty-one 
individuals and groups for oral presentations. After discussing the problem, the Forum 
acknowledged numerous conclusions that it characterized as ‘major realities’: 
Existing structures and practices in Northern Ireland have failed to provide 
either peace, stability, or reconciliation...and the guarantee in the 1973 Northern 
Ireland Constitution Act that no change in constitutional status can take place 
without the approval of the (Unionist) majority --has in its practical application 
had the effect of inhibiting the dialogue necessary for political progress 
(Shannon, 1985: 33)...  
 
Another point about the Irish nationalists was that they underestimated the ethos, the 
distinct identity and power of the Unionists that was defined as: “a sense of 
Britishness, a particular sense of Irishness, and a set of Protestant values that 
Unionists ‘believe to be under threat from a Catholic ethos’ ” (Shannon, 1985: 33) 
 
The report, that was the final product of the Forum, was made public in May 1984. 
The report, with the belief that those were meeting the criteria for peace and 
reconciliation, suggested three possible sets of constitutional arrangements.  
(1) A unitary state achieved by consent with special provisions for unionist 
interests and traditions; (2) a federal state in which each area would have its own 
parliament, with a federal legislature for matters considered appropriate; and (3) 
a joint authority by which the governments of Britain and Ireland would have 
equal responsibility for all aspects of the government of the Northern 
Ireland.(Irvine, 1991: 131) 
 
The options of the report were discussed in a detailed manner in Ireland with some 
parties (especially by Fianna Fail) for the first option whereas other parties favored the 
other options. All options were rejected in Ulster. Also Mrs. Thatcher rejected them 
all in a press conference on 19 November 1984. After the rejection of the Forum 
report, publications supporting the “Irish dimension” appeared more and more in 
Britain. Inter-governmental meetings between London and Dublin continued and 
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resulted in the Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA) on 15 November 1985. M.Smith 
believes that the political victory of the PSF “in the early 1980s came as a shock to the 
British and Irish governments, but it spurred both governments to find more effective 
means of dealing with the republican political threat, the outcome being the Anglo-
Irish Agreement” (1995: 188.) 
 
Despite the Provisionals’ support for the agreement, the Anglo-Irish Agreement was 
seen in Provisional circles as a counter-insurgency method -by diplomatic means- 
aiming to inject a credibility to constitutional nationalists so that British rule and its 
interests can be stabilized for the long-run. 
Dublin did not concede its claim to the six counties and unionists were 
guaranteed a veto against unification as long as they remained in the majority in 
the province ... It stressed cooperation and the joint fight against terrorism. By 
setting up an Inter-governmental Council both governments concede each 
other’s interest and responsibility in the province, but stressed that neither’s 
sovereignty was impinged on (Wichert, 1991: 194).  
 
Britain gained much from this treaty since without conceding anything except 
accepting that the Republic has an interest on the North, it won Dublin’s support for 
the policy of encouraging constitutional and moderate groups to participate in the 
power devolvement process by negating terrorist methods. By using the threat that 
terrorism could spread also to the republic, Britain had regained the initiative in the 
province, decreased the pressure coming from the United States and showed that it 
could still stand up to unionists. Fraser, (2000) argued that the agreement was 
welcomed in the republic since it did not challenge the system or the Southern 
constitution while preserving the aspiration for Irish unity and permitting the North’s 
problem to be contained there. What is more, the Anglo-Irish treaty was successful in 
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putting the PIRA in a dilemma. The organization could either have chosen to protest 
the treaty in a violent manner and damage the success of the political branch of the 
organization or they could not take that path and risk to lose the political initiative that 
they had established in the last years.  
The effects of choosing the latter course of action were soon apparent in PSF´s 
poor showing in the January 1986 by-elections. The agreement was intended to 
curtail the rise in support for the PSF and secure the position of the SDLP. The 
tactic was successful in this respect. (Smith. M.L.R, 1995: 190). 
 
The signing of the agreement of Hillsborough was a triumph for the SDLP but a 
negative response was received from the Protestants. The leader of the SDLP Hume 
tried to stress the issue of reconciliation.  
Hume’s conviction that the two cultural traditions needed to be recognised and 
reconciled,...differed...from the republican extremists who held unionism to be 
artificial and a concept which would disappear with the British presence on the 
island[also], since the unionist community not only did not want his kind of 
reconciliation but feared it as its final defeat. (Wichert, 1991: 198-199).  
 
Wichert (1991) criticizes Hume’s argument, which is portraying the ‘Ulster Problem’ 
as solvable, if only the Protestants chose to be reasonable and rational. Witchert 
claims that it is based on a false assumption that Protestants want the issue to be 
solved in that manner. Wichert adds that the British government was in a better 
position compared to Hume in understanding the Unionists but those were not 
consulted in the process of the signing of the Agreement. The Unionists felt safe after 
the rejection of the New Forum report by Thatcher, thinking that they would not be 
forced to power-sharing experiences. This relative security ended with the shock of 
the AIA. Although the British government tried to reassure them “unionists saw the 
granting to the republic of an institutionalized channel for ‘interference’ in the affairs 
of Ulster as an unambiguous sign that Northern Ireland was being pushed out of the 
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United Kingdom”(Bruce, 1992: 236) After the accord was signed, various ‘Ulster 
Clubs’ were prepared for demonstrations, all Unionist Westminster MP´s resigned 
from their seats and finally a demonstration attended by around 200,000 people was 
organized in Belfast on 23 November(Fraser,2000).  
 
In the by-elections of January 1986 Unionists increased their votes by gaining 
Protestant votes from the Alliance but lost one seat to SDLP. Following that on 3 
March a ‘Day of Action’ was organized. Strikes, disruptions in commerce and 
communication, barricades formed by masked Loyalists and some rioting at night in 
Belfast were the events of that day. The OUP and DUP joined forces in order to 
destroy the Agreement, declined cooperation with the government if the treaty is not 
annulled. “The unionist protest, under the slogan ‘Ulster Says No’ gradually modified 
its demands from scrapping the Agreement to suspending it, after which, they said, 
they would be willing to talk to the SDLP about devolution and power sharing” 
(Wichert, 1991: 200) 
 
When the Secretary of State, Tom King, refused that option, OUP and DUP could not 
agree on a modus vivendi to protest. The OUP of Molyneaux wanted to mobilize 
passive resistance and demonstration within the limits of law whereas the DUP under 
the guidance of a prominent hard line deputy, Peter Robinson (who was more 
prominent than Paisley himself), wanted to make the province ungovernable by the 
revival of the 1912 inheritance that had paralyzed the province in 1974. The difficulty 
to bring down the Agreement was understood by Protestants. Opposed to 1974, there 
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was no change in the government form and minimal physical manifestation of the 
AIA existed. The few existent institutions were attacked properly: the Secretary of 
State, the police, the administrative Secretariat at Maryfield in Belfast. Protestants 
finally realized that nothing had occurred that would affect them badly and that the 
Catholic power had not increased. “Given that the Agreement offered so little tangible 
focus for its opponents, the absence of an attractive substitute was possibly of 
disproportionate significance in the campaign’s ultimate collapse”. (Jackson, 1998: 
413) So active opposition to the Agreement decreased in the end of the 1980s. As 
their counterparts, the Catholics, had resisted unionist rule in the twenties, Unionists 
had shown their disagreement to a ‘Direct Rule from London with an Irish dimension’ 
in the eighties.  
 
Another area that did not see any progress was the cooperation between the Northern 
and Southern police forces. Cross-border security could not be achieved because the 
Garda Siochana29 was neither as well equipped nor trained as the RUC nor had it 
institutional independence from political interference.  
PIRA’s backlash against the success of the AIA meant that greater army 
numbers (10,000 by the end of 1988) had to be employed in particularly 
vulnerable areas, that is the border, mostly to interrupt cross-border armaments 
movements and, with help from the SAS30, to prevent PIRA operations 
(Wichert, 1991: 196). 
                                                 
29 Garda Siochana or Gardai (Civil Guards): The police force in the South. Established in 1923 as a 
(normally) unarmed force to replace the old heavily-armed RIC. The Gardai have always had an armed 
Special Branch however to deal with political dissent (Farrell, 1980, p. 353) 
 
30 Special Air Services Regiment (SAS) and Military Reaction Force (MRF): The SAS is a highly-
secret crack unit of the British Army. Set up during the Second World War it has been for plain-clothes, 
counter insurgency and special operations work in a number of countries...After many denials 
Westminster finally admitted that SAS personal were active in Northern Ireland, though still denying 
that they operated as SAS units. The MRF consists of armed plain-clothes squads patrolling in 
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The British government increased its pressure upon the organization in 1988 by the 
ban on broadcasting for members of prohibited organizations and supporters of 
violence. Declarations of renunciation of violence from candidates in local elections 
were brought as a requirement. M.Smith (1995) stated that those restrictions created a 
fear on the Provisionals of political marginalization. What is more, the Provisionals’ 
anxiety increased after the Anglo–Irish agreements. The feeling of isolation pushed 
Provisionals to begin a formal dialogue with the SDLP, in January 1988 in order to 
from a pressure group that would force the Irish government to use diplomatic ways to 
secure national self–determination. SDLP made clear that for cooperation with PSF, 
the PIRA should end its violent campaign. The inability of PSF to control the PIRA 
proved the ambiguities that existed in the Provisional tradition. 
 
The worst possible outcome was obtained in the 1992 elections since a declined 
political base showed to the entire world that PIRA was fighting its war on a minority 
definition of nationalism. The PSF lost in the elections of 1992. Gerry Adams lost his 
seat of West Belfast. After the losses when in March 1992, Gerry Adams spoke that 
the ‘ballot box in one hand and the armalite in the other’ being an ‘outdated’ slogan, 
people thought that a shift in republican thought was realized. The reason behind that 
speech was something else however. The PSF was excluded from the talks, which 
started on 30 April 1991 at Stormont because of its rejection to condemn the PIRA 
violence. The talks were going on between individual political parties and Peter 
                                                                                                                                            
unmarked cars or under cover of apparently legitimate businesses. MRF squads admitted responsibility 
for killing two unarmed Catholic civilians in 1972 and have been accused of killing several more. 
(Farrell, 1980: 361 ) 
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Brooke, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. It was the first try after the 1973 
Sunningdale conference to start cross–party negotiations. The target of the 
Provisionals to form a common nationalist front was reached after the Hume-Adams 
talks started in April 1993. The contents of the Hume-Adams dialogue were revealed 
to the Irish government on 7 October 1993. The participants never made the details 
public but it was thought that some proposals were formulated so that the Provisionals 
would renounce violence. After those events the belief that the promises would be 
kept appeared realizable for a while. Adams declared his willingness to take the 
proposals from his talks with Hume to the PIRA by recommending the organization to 
review the continuation of the armed struggle. Adams was projected as a man of peace 
in the global agenda after contacts with John Hume. But the optimism did not last 
long. After the Shankill bombing of PIRA that killed 10 persons in October 1993, 
reports of press claiming that a series of secret talks were pursued, appeared in the 
press, in late November 1993. The first acknowledgement of the existence of the 
secret talks came from the Provisionals who became furious when John Major at a 
speech claimed that PSF could enter into dialogue with the British government if 
PIRA agreed to end violence permanently. 
 
As public pressure increased after the news of the secret talks, the British and Irish 
governments decided to take political initiative on the issue. On 15 December 1993 
the Downing Street declaration was made public. The declaration was made in order 
to cover the embarrassment that the British had felt after the secret talks. Secondly, it 
was done in order to counteract against the Hume-Adams initiative. Thirdly, despite 
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the inconclusiveness in the secret talks the aim was to induce the IRA to stop 
violence. Adam’s interpretation on the Downing Street declaration of 1993 was: 
a slow and painful process of England’s disengagement from her first and last 
colony, Ireland. It may be a small step, as was the Hillsborough Agreement of 
1985 which...gave Dublin, for the first time, ‘a foot in the door’ in the six 
counties (M. Smith, 1995: 226) 
 
Jackson argued that the Hume-Adams process re-energized the British-Irish détente, 
with the crafting of first the Downing Street Declaration (November 1993) and the 
Framework Document (February 1995) (1998:413).  
 
The IRA violence continued till the 31 August 1994 ceasefire when PIRA declared an 
unconditional and indefinite ceasefire. The loyalist community understood the 
ceasefire as the result of a secret deal to pressure unionists into accepting a united 
Ireland. The event that increased their suspicion was that the British government 
signaled that it was making a change over the section 75 of the 1920 Government of 
Ireland Act  
Section 75 of the Act asserted the Westminster parliament’s supreme authority 
over Northern Ireland. The government indicated that it was prepared to replace 
section 75 with a clause allowing a change in the status of Northern Ireland if a 
majority of the province so wanted...Although nationalist demanded revisions to 
the 1920 Act, nevertheless amending section75 would, in effect, be a rather 
meaningless formality and could hardly be represented as a sign of a secret deal 
with the Provisionals, symptomatic of British backsliding on the 
union.(M.Smith, 1995: 213) 
 
After the meeting of Albert Reynolds, the Irish Prime Minister, in Dublin with Gerry 
Adams, John Hume on 6 September the Combined Loyalist Military Command 
replied by announcing the end of its ‘operational hostilities’ on 13 October 1994 with 
the sole condition that the nationalist would not return to violence. “With republican 
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and loyalist ceasefires in place, the way seemed clear for substantive political 
progress, though no one doubted the chasms of distrust which would have to be 
bridged”(Fraser, 2000: 74). 
 
A governmental crisis in the Irish republic that changed the president Albert Reynolds 
with a new Fine Gael–labor coalition led by John Burton government affected the 
peace process since it was not until 22 February 1995 that Major and Burton revealed 
their ‘Frameworks for the Future’. It was formed with the intention to set an agenda 
for political discussions. The first Framework envisaged a parliament of 90 members 
elected by proportional representation from which legislative decisions would require 
a weighted majority. The second Framework suggested joint institutions of the North–
South which would have executive, consultative and harmonizing functions. 
Executive functions might extend to: sectors involving a natural or physical all–
Ireland framework; European Union programmes and initiatives...Harmonizing 
functions included: aspects of agriculture and fisheries; industrial development 
...The Consultative role of the North-South body would be to exchange 
information about ‘existing and future policy’ with a view to ‘common or 
agreed positions (Fraser, 2000: 75) 
 
Unionist suspicion about the all–Ireland institutions could not be allayed although 
Major and Mayhew gave those assurances. Two important issues were blocking the 
way to progress. One was the decommissioning of paramilitary arms. The British 
government and the Unionists wanted the decommissioning of the IRA weapons and 
warned the Sinn Fein not to include it in the all–party talks. The Sinn Fein leaders 
tried to show that decommissioning of the IRA would mean surrender and that the 
Sinn Fein and IRA were separate organizations. The second problem was the issue of 
parading. By 1995 it was a big problem. That year 3, 500 took place compared to 
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2,120 in 1985. Parades were creating confrontations on certain routes where the 
population had become nationalist as a result of population movement. The most 
famous place of confrontation was Portadown as events happened also on 9 July 1995. 
On 8 September 1995 James Molyneaux, whose political base had been undermined 
by the Framework documents announced his resignation and was replaced by David 
Trimble. On 28 November an agreement was reached between Major and Bruton for 
the establishment of an international body to be chaired by the former American 
Senator George Mitchell in order to report the arms decommissioning process Bertie 
Ahern. Pruitt, (2000) believes that the third-party intervention model was used in 
dealing with the Northern Ireland issue. That is a communication chain formed in 
secrecy in which all the negotiations are done in privacy. The third party arranges for 
the disputants to meet, tries to improve relationship, or at least transmits messages 
between them. As a mediator he/she undertakes to structure the agenda, suggest new 
ways of looking at issues and possible solutions. Finally…a mediator may threaten, 
bribe, or otherwise pressure disputants to make concessions and seek compromise31. 
Two days later the president of the U.S.A visited the region to show its optimism 
about the peace process. On 9 February 1996, the IRA ended the ceasefire after 17 
months of silence, showing that political progress was remote. Elections that were 
held on 30 May to create a forum didn’t yield productive results since, as the ceasefire 
was ended, the Sinn Fein was not admitted to participate in the forum and the SDLP 
                                                 
31 Secrecy is facilitated by communicating through chains of intermediaries, and has the great 
advantage of providing political cover and deniability to the main disputants…This is especially 
advantageous in severe ethnic conflicts in which direct talks…appear to grant legitimacy to the 
adversary…All negotiations must be private…otherwise, negotiators…become overly committed to 
their initial positions. One more point…chains that work well and produce results tend to become 
shorter in the long-run, with intermediaries dropping out and parties at or near the ends of the chains 
meeting each other directly. See Pruitt, Dean G. 2000.The Tactics of Third Party Intervention.  
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stopped attending in September. In the summer of 1996, serious riots occurred in 
North Ireland in the season of the parades. On 1 May 1997, Tony Blair’s Labour party 
formed the government. As the parade season approached tension was increasing once 
again.  
On 10 July, to an almost universal sense of relief, the Orange Order announced 
that its four most contentious parades would not take place. The remaining 
Orange parades on 12 July proceeded virtually without incident. That Northern 
Ireland had passed a point of crisis became clearer 10 days   later when the IRA 
announced the renewal of its ceasefire (Fraser, 2000: 78.) 
 
Negotiations that regrouped all parts of the Northern Ireland conflict re–started under 
the leadership of Mitchell and finally were concluded on 10 April 1998, Good Friday, 
after the personal involvement of Tony Blair and his counterpart. According to the 
treaty:  
The basis of the Union was set firmly on consent; this was seen both as a 
guarantee to unionists and a confirmation to nationalists that Britain had no 
other interest in Northern Ireland. The formula enabled Sinn Fein to see the 
Agreement as a transitionary phase to Irish unity...The Agreement set out new 
principles for the internal government of Northern Ireland through a 108–
member Assembly, elected by proportional representation. Governmental 
responsibilities would be allocated to party strength in the Assembly and 
mechanisms were set in place to ensure that key decisions would have cross–
party support. (Fraser, 2000: 79.) 
 
A referendum was held on 2 May in Northern Ireland and the treaty was accepted by 
71.2 of the electorate. Despite the Agreement tensions within the community 
remained high. 
 
On the referendum, held on 8 June 2001, the Irish people rejected the enlargement of 
the European Union by voting against the Nice Treaty (James, 2001). At the same 
time another election was held in Ulster. On 7 June 2001 the Protestant population 
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showed its anger of sharing power with Sinn Fein. The Orangist David Trimble, who 
was at the head of the power-sharing government till 1 July, resigned from his office 
because of the pressures coming from his community since IRA had not started the 
decommissioning of arms (Claude, 2001a). On 13th of July violent demonstrations, 
which injured several police officers, created suspicions. It was believed 
demonstrations were orchestrated by the PIRA in order to show London the necessity 
to reform the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), which was constituted of 93% of 
Protestants (Claude, 2000b). Finally a group of dissidents, called the Real IRA, 
opposing the peace process, exploded a bomb in Omagh’s town center killing 29 
people. Last of the events or incidents committed by the REAL IRA is a bomb that 
had exploded on 3 August 2001 near a London subway station giving serious harm to 
seven people (?, 2001). Negotiations about the decommissioning of arms continue, 
after the demission of David Trimble. Later IRA on August 14 announced that it wont 
continue the disarmament process in a time when everyone had believed that the 
police system will be reformed and IRA that has halted the thirty years war will make 
the last step to end the armed conflict.  
 
The period between 1970’s till our days has been shaken by major changes. Those can 
be shortly given as the structural changes that the Republic of Ireland has made. 
Second, was the entrance of Ireland with Britain to the European Community. That 
event created a rapprochement between Britain in material terms as well as relations 
improved in matters of economic as well as political issues. The rapprochement has 
led to various attempts to find solution for the Northern Ireland crisis. The attempts to 
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find some solutions was resisted mostly by Protestant lower classes and Catholics who 
were afraid to be sold out to the British occupation. Fierce resistance was developed 
by Catholics who used the political as well as the military option to reflect their 
grievances and impose on the British state, that was seen as culpable, to find a 
solution to the issue. Protestants on the other hand, used the same methods to resist the 
treaties signed by the English and Irish states such as the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 
1985 or the Downing Street Declaration of 1993. Nowadays the Good Friday 
agreement is dealt with parties in Ireland. The major issues that remained unsolved 
were the disarmament of the IRA and the reformulation of the Ulster policing forces 
on an equalitarian basis. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The Irish conflict is rooted in the earlier English presence that has created an Irish 
colony-state .The presence of settlers and the monopolization of resources such as the 
most fertile lands that were confiscated from the Catholics and given to the few 
approved persons make the issue an economic matter. It is also cultural since the 
requirement of being a member of the dominant religion to acquire status is important. 
It is also social since the migration of societies has fueled the struggle for valuable 
lands and has given superiority to the owners of those goods.  
 
The English have colonized Ireland by taking most valuable places; secondly they 
have forced the native populations to migrate from the fertile agricultural areas. Later 
they have tried to incorporate the conquered lands to London. Faced with challenge, 
they provoked sectarian tensions and utilized violence to subdue Catholics. Also they 
have granted some privileges to Protestant poor classes by taking them to the 
yeomanry, to protect landlords’ farms.  
 
When the merchants of Ireland faced the protectionary walls of England, they with the 
help of the Landlords, tried to challenge the center by forgetting the sectarian issues 
that were separating them. When the core (England) offered with the Act of Union 
(1801) some possibilities to the development of an indigenous industry, the elites 
accepted the continuation of British rule. An uneven development theorist would 
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suggest that the elites were given some privileges and in return they offered the 
country to England. 
 
Another point is about the development of the industry in a colonial setting, where 
specialization in some issues is required as Hechter would argue .The proof of that is 
the development of a linen industry and later a shipping industry that became the best 
in all British production areas. 
 
The increase in production led to Catholic immigration to the Belfast area since other 
areas became poorer after the Act of Union. When they arrived to industrial areas, 
they faced violence from the Protestant lower classes since those saw them as a threat 
as it is suggested by the Split Labor theory.  
 
As O’Sullivan would argue the competition for resources increases the probability of 
ethnic violence. The first sectarian rioting appeared in those years when perceptual 
explanations were used against the Catholics. When the Catholics faced violence, they 
realized the reason of being unsuccessful was that the Protestants governed them. So 
they started the quest for a new state. Since security was missing for them within the 
existing state, they tried to free themselves with ‘Home Rule’. The proprietors of the 
lands were disturbed and riots reappeared in industrial settings.  
 
Later the elites of the Protestants appealed to the masses to tell how important is the 
creation of a Protestant state. Brown would consider that situation with domestic 
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explanations about the size of the group and the systemic explanations on the security 
dilemma that shapes the events. The fear from the larger group that, if acquired the 
means, can subdue them and British assistance led the Protestants to form a state for 
themselves. 
 
As Bartkus would say, the First World War opened a window of opportunity for the 
Catholics who obtained the prospect to liberate themselves from the oppressor. The 
same can be applied to Protestant elites that used another window of opportunity, the 
Civil war, to create or to consolidate their own state. Ireland also used the windows of 
opportunity by first obtaining the status of dominion in the World War I, later, in 
exchange of remaining neutral in the World War II gained independence. The 
president de Valera opted for exit (independence) from the former autonomy status in 
its relations with Britain.  
 
Protestants in their own states were able to apply systematic discrimination to 
Catholics, by strengthening their dominant ethos of Protestantism, to make viable a 
microstate that could not exist without that. 
 
The aspiration of Ireland of uniting with Ulster was unrealistic since Ulster had been 
able to solidify itself on its territory. The existence of ethnic based political parties 
that dominated the political sphere was the proof of “the tyranny of the majority” 
argued Brown (1993), an environment in which minorities remain constantly 
powerless in the political sphere and in which case they are forced to use weapons.  
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The World War II era, called as the decolonization period, saw the emergence of 
numerous states in the international scene that used the nationalist rhetoric of self-
determination. The UN General assembly adopted on December 14, 1960 the 
resolution no: 1514, which paved the way for colonies to free themselves from 
oppressors. Later the principles of ‘self-determination’ and ‘sovereignty’ clashed with 
the principle of ‘territorial integrity’ since major powers have showed their 
disagreement of the implementation of the resolution to non-colonial settings. 
 
The civil rights movements, which changed the racial policies of the United States of 
America by employing peaceful, non-violent methods of showing disagreement to 
political systems, were also used in Ulster. The Catholic minority applied the same 
methods but faced the violent methods of the Ulster policing forces and the Orange 
Order members. The state did not discuss the options that Gurr(2000) claimed to exist. 
That situation put the IRA as the sole alternative. 
 
Meanwhile in the Southern state the events that Buchanan (1998) speculates 
happened. Protestants living in the South became a minority of 10% of the Southern 
population after the secession of Ulster. Although the Irish Republic didn’t explicitly 
pressure the minority, it fell to 3% of the whole population of the Republic of Ireland. 
This trend helped to legitimize the perceptual explanations of radical Protestant 
leaders of the North of being erased by the Catholic majority, if unification is realized 
some day.  
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The policies of the new prime minister of Ireland, Lemass differed from his 
predecessors. He tried to open the Catholic state to the outside world by focusing 
development rather than trying to solve the Northern Ireland problem. Those policies 
set the way for Terence O’Neill and Sean Lemass; the two prime ministers of the Irish 
states came together in 1965. The Sunningdale conference, which ended with an 
agreement suggesting devolution of power to Northern Ireland was inapplicable since 
the power-sharing executive failed to govern the country when grass-roots 
demonstrations supplemented by paramilitaries, plagued the country and blocked the 
implementation of the treaty. The fear to loose their comparative advantage against 
the Catholics led the Protestant working class to rise and demonstrate. In that case too 
the competition for resources resulted with the deception and fear of Catholics to a 
peaceful resolution of the conflict. 
 
The period between the 1970’s till the end of 90’s has seen important changes. Those 
were the structural changes of the Republic of Ireland. Also admittance of Ireland 
with Britain to the European Community created a rapprochement between Britain 
and Ireland in matters of economic as well as political issues. This led to various 
attempts to find solutions for the Northern Ireland crisis. The attempts were resisted 
mostly by the Protestant lower classes who were afraid to be sold out to the Catholic 
rule. Catholics also developed fierce resistance, using the political as well as the 
military option, to reflect their discontent and to force the British state to find a 
solution to the issue. Protestants on the other hand used the same methods to resist the 
treaties signed by the English and Irish states such as the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 
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1985 or the Downing Street Declaration of 1993. The Good Friday agreement that 
was accepted in April 1998 is still dealt in Ireland. The major issues, which remained 
unsolved, were the disarmament of the IRA and the reformulation of the Ulster 
policing forces on an equalitarian basis. 
 
Accordingly, the main argument of the thesis was the persistence of an ethnic conflict 
in a first world. For that issue major theories were viewed and some were found 
relevant in certain contexts. But the major failure was that of the Modernization 
theory which was unable to account for the “First World Nationalisms”. 
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